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PREFACE 
 
Many PhD theses revolve around a single concept. This one is about two. The 
original idea was that the topic would be the labor market effects of globalization. 
However, while being stationed at a spatial economics department, it soon turned 
out that many of my colleagues were quite thrilled about the regional dimension 
of economic phenomena. Furthermore, the first three years of the four-year project 
were marked by an abundant availability of micro data on agglomeration, while 
far less data related to globalization were available. The end result is that this 
thesis is as much about agglomeration as it is about globalization, or maybe even 
more. However, the two topics are not as distinct as it may seem on first sight: 
both are strongly related to the division of labor, and both share that their 
evolution has been – to a considerable extent – shaped by technological progress. 
Most of the data used in this thesis cover 2000–2008, a time of turbulent change 
in international trade, and almost exploding use of computers and the internet.  
Not only the contents of the thesis have ended somewhat different from what 
I expected, the same holds for the writing process. When I started the project, I 
had expected to spend my time on reading papers about one narrow topic, writing 
papers about one narrow topic, and then hopefully after four years there would be 
enough material to fill a book. What followed – to my great pleasure and relief – 
was a heterogeneous mix of activities, together with colleagues at VU University, 
the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) and sometimes 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). In addition to working on scientific research, I 
enjoyed my involvement in teaching and performing some contract research. 
Though the lack of focus sometimes worried me, the end result has positively 
surprised me in the sense that the different chapters seem to fit together rather 
well. And it is the end result that counts. Furthermore, I have always considered 
myself a generalist, and have very much liked the opportunity to expand my 
knowledge on a diverse range of topics.  
One of the most enjoyable elements of working as a scientist has been 
working together with so many different people. Scientific work is not done in 
isolation, but rather as a process of cooperation. The many discussions with 
colleagues about economics and other intellectual matters – whether it was in the 
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Mensa or while working on a project – always interested me. I therefore like to 
sincerely thank the many colleagues I have worked with during the past years, or 
who have commented on my work. I would like to thank Platform31 and the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis for financial and material 
support, and Statistics Netherlands for making available the micro data. Without 
the involvement of these three institutions, this thesis would not have been 
possible. But most of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Henri de Groot, for 
his many motivating and inspiring ideas, and his always constructively critical 
comments. 
Even though economists have recognized the value of the domestic and 
international division of labor since well over two centuries ago, opposing the free 
movement of people across space as well as international trade has remained 
fairly common. My findings add to the evidence that agglomeration and 
globalization result in higher productivity, without causing notable negative 
transitional effects. I hope that my findings will lead to better policy, which helps 
to maximize the benefits of specialization and efficient allocation of resources. 
 
Apeldoorn, January 2013, Stefan Groot 
 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the dynamics in the global economy take place within the vicinity of 
cities. Because of their harbors, airports and other transportation facilities, they 
are major hubs to the rest of the world and thriving centers of economic activity. 
Trading cities and the type of externalities that can be found in cities play an 
important role in driving economic growth (see, for example, Jacobs, 1984 and 
Simmie, 2001). Recent trends in globalization have further enhanced the 
importance of cities as the command centers of activities that are dispersed around 
the globe (Jones, 2005). 
 
1.1 Central Topics in the Thesis 
 
Agglomeration 
From the very fact of their existence, it can be observed that clustering together in 
towns and cities must bring advantages to its population. Without some sort of 
economies of scale, agglomeration economies, or other local advantages, people 
would have been distributed more or less randomly across space (see the spatial 
impossibility theorem by Starrett, 1978). Firms and workers are much more 
productive in close proximity of other firms and workers than they would be in 
relative isolation, as an extensive literature – dating back to as far as the founding 
fathers of economics – has shown. 
One of the advantages of living in cities in the past – that is, until the end of 
the ancient regimes in the early 1800s – was the relative safety offered by city 
walls. Within a densely populated area the costs of facilities with high fixed costs, 
such as city walls, water supply, hospitals and schools, can be covered by a large 
number of people. However, the advantages of cities go much further than that. In 
the classical works by Adam Smith (1776) and Alfred Marshall (1890), the 
success of cities is explained by allowing for increased specialization, the 
availability of large pools of labor, closer linkages between intermediate suppliers, 
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and by easing the diffusion of knowledge. The concentration of people together 
with a great variety of activities in close vicinity is thus precisely what makes this 
crowding attractive in the first place. 
The famous pin factory example by Adam Smith (1776) is one of the first 
economic discussions of the concept of the division of labor, and the advantages 
of fragmentation of production processes that is made possible by agglomeration 
(that is, the clustering together of firms and people). In the view of Smith, 
agglomeration results in higher productivity because it allows for increased 
specialization. Smith provides three arguments in support of his reasoning. First, 
the division of labor within the pin factory enables each worker to spend more 
time on a narrower set of tasks (for example, he describes that 18 different steps 
are required to manufacture a pin), thereby improving the ability to perform these 
tasks. Second, by not having to switch between the multiple tasks that need to be 
performed to produce a pin, switching costs such as changing tools can be 
avoided. Third, Smith argues that more simplistic tasks make the application of 
technology less complicated, which may result in higher innovation. In the pin 
factory, therefore, each increase in the division of labor results in increased output 
per worker. Specialization is not possible beyond the point where a worker is no 
longer fully occupied with his set of tasks, or to put it in the words of Adam Smith 
(1776, p. 17): “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market” (see 
also Stigler, 1951). Therefore, the productive advantages of cities are to some 
extent defined by the size of accessible markets. 
Transportation and transaction costs have played a central role in shaping the 
history of cities. The evolution of the size of cities throughout history is mostly 
driven by the available modes of transport. The ‘extent of the market’ is not only 
defined by distance, but also by the speed at which distance can be traveled. In 
ancient Rome, a population of around one million lived in an area with a radius of 
only a few kilometers (Morley, 1996); the distance that could be traveled by foot. 
At the time of the 1869 census1 Amsterdam’s 265 thousand citizens lived within 
an area of just 14 square kilometers, more or less the same area it occupied at the 
end of the golden age. Commuting longer distances was simply not feasible until 
low cost mass transportation became available in the late 19th century. Between 
                                                 
1 Comparable and detailed historical census data for the Netherlands is available for each decade 
since 1849, and is available through http://www.volkstelling.nl. 
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the end of the 18th century and the early 1960s, the area of Amsterdam increased 
tenfold, while its population only tripled. The introduction of trains, trams and 
other transport improvements reduced transportation costs and allowed people to 
live further from their jobs. The course of history has thus resulted in less rather 
than more crowding of cities.  
The geography and economic structure of cities started to change even more 
when cars became affordable to the general public (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004), 
which was in the 1960s in the Netherlands and somewhat earlier in the US. In just 
a few decades, suburbanization diffused urban populations over large areas. In 
2010, the Amsterdam metropolitan area had a population of 2.3 million and an 
area of 1,600 square kilometers. Even outside the metropolitan area, there are 
many towns from which ten to twenty percent of the labor force commutes to 
Amsterdam on a daily basis. As advancements in transportation have decreased 
distance in terms of time, the geographical size of cities has increased, and 
commuting between the suburbs and the productivity centers became one of the 
central features of agglomeration processes. This allowed ever larger numbers of 
people to benefit from the productivity advantages of cities. 
 
Globalization 
The effects of transportation costs are far from limited to transaction costs within 
the boundaries of the city. As cities depend on continuous imports of food to feed 
its population, and export the produced surplus of goods to distant markets, access 
to water has been crucial to their success. Even nowadays, transportation of goods 
over water remains to be far cheaper than transport over land (or by air, for that 
matter). Prior to the invention of motorized land transport, sailing ships were the 
only available mode of transport that could transfer goods economically over 
longer distances. It should therefore come as no surprise that most cities were 
built close to waterways. Their harbors expanded effective markets to more 
distant locations, thereby allowing even more specialization. 
International trade caught the attention of David Ricardo (1817). As he 
explains in his classical work, when countries specialize according to comparative 
cost advantages, this increases productivity even further. Just as advancements in 
transportation changed the shape of cities by increasing the geographical size of 
markets for labor, goods and services, decreasing prices of transportation and 
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communication have allowed for increased international division of labor. 
Consequently, productivity increased even further. As John Stuart Mill (1848, p. 
130) explains, “The increase of the general riches of the world, when 
accompanied with freedom of commercial intercourse, improvements in 
navigation, and inland communication by roads, canals or railways, tends to give 
increased productiveness to the labour of every nation […] by enabling each 
locality to supply with its special products so much larger a market, that a great 
extension of the division of labour in their production is an ordinary 
consequence.”  
The outer limit of markets – or, at least, some markets – is nothing less than 
the globe. The acceleration of this process of markets becoming increasingly 
global, which followed the invention of information and telecommunication 
technologies, caused some economists to sense a “death of distance” (Cairncross, 
1997). Paradoxically, trends in agglomeration suggest a rather opposite view, and 
the importance of agglomeration seems to have increased. The process of 
increased globalization that started at the end of the 20th century has enhanced the 
role of cities, which have gained importance as the command centers of activities 
that are dispersed around the globe (Jones, 2005). For example, while the 
population of the city of Amsterdam fell from 880 thousand in 1960 to 670 
thousand in 1985, it had recovered to 780 thousand by 2010 (De Groot et al., 
2010). It is thus clear that proximity is more important than ever in shaping our 
economic and geographical landscape, and – in strong contrast to the work of 
Cairncross (1997) – distance is more alive than ever. The relevant question is thus 
not what would happen if the world were flat, or if distance were dead, but rather 
what would happen if transaction costs would decrease. The answer to this 
question depends on the size of agglomeration economies, transportation costs, 
and consumer preferences (Leamer, 2007; Garretsen, 2007). 
Technological advancements in transportation as well as information and 
telecommunication have resulted in increasingly complex and global production 
systems. As Figure 1.1 shows, international trade with emerging markets has 
increased at a fascinating speed during the last two decades. Between 2000 and 
2008 (the years for which we have micro data available in later chapters), the 
share of imports from the BRIC countries in total Dutch imports increased from 
just 5 percent to 13 percent. The share of the BRIC countries in Dutch exports 
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increased from 1½ to over 4 percent. As the differences in economic structure 
between the Netherlands and the BRIC countries are much larger than the 
differences between the Netherlands and other advanced economies, the 
possibilities for specialization are relatively large.  
Following the founding fathers of economics – Smith, Ricardo and Mill – 
there has been little discussion among economists about the positive long-term 
effects of this trend: higher productivity allowing for a higher standard of living. 
The advantages of trade with the BRIC countries is, for example, reflected in 
lower prices of imported goods (Groot et al., 2011a). However, it is also clear that 
international integration – not just with the BRIC countries – has resulted in some 
changes in people’s lives and the way business is done. One of the central topics 
that this thesis addresses is the labor market implications of these changes. 
 
Figure 1.1. Dutch export (left) and import (right) shares to and from the BRIC 
countries 
 
Source: Groot et al. (2011a, p. 28). 
 
As Scott (2006) notes, even the early economists had attention for the potential 
negative side effects of increased specialization. In the fifth part of The Wealth of 
Nations, Smith (1776) expresses his concern about the effects that high levels of 
specialization could have on the dignity of work. The work of Smith prompted 
Jean-Baptiste Say (1803) to comment bitterly about the presumed need to spend 
ones’ career on the manufacturing of one 18th of a pin (Scott, 2006). Another point 
of concern has been that the simplification of work through specialization has 
made it easier to replace workers by machines or by other workers. It has often 
been feared that this could result in a race to be bottom in payment or other 
working conditions. However, this line of thought is mostly based on the fallacy 
that the amount of work within the economy is somehow fixed, such that if a job 
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is lost – for example, due to mechanization or someone abroad doing it cheaper – 
unemployment goes up. In reality, the division of labor is far from a zero sum 
game. Unemployment is mostly the outcome of a complex interplay between 
supply and demand on the labor market, whereby employers continue to hire 
employees as long as their marginal productivity exceeds the labor costs. 
Therefore, if labor becomes more productive – regardless whether it is due to 
mechanization, increased specialization, or increased international trade – the 
long-term consequence will be higher wages rather than higher unemployment. 
However, the short-term effects are less trivial. The fact that the size of the total 
pie goes up, does not exclude the possibility that some individuals end up with a 
smaller piece of the pie than they had before. There might be transition effects: if 
you happen to be the one to be fired, this is likely to result in at least a temporary 
loss of employment and income. Furthermore, the increased domestic and 
international division of labor may make the skills of some workers more 
valuable, while reducing the value of those of others. 
 
Regional labor markets 
Rather than analyzing the effects of agglomeration and globalization on the 
aggregate Dutch labor market, we focus in this thesis on regional labor market 
effects. Regions differ in economic density, economic structure, as well as the 
composition of their work force. Therefore, trends in regional wages and 
productivity, and commuting patterns, are likely to be heterogeneous across 
regions. Furthermore, due to the location of harbors (Rotterdam, Amsterdam) and 
airports (Schiphol) there are substantial differences between regions in their 
international accessibility. As Figure 1.2 shows, there is also substantial 
heterogeneity in the distribution of foreign owned firms and foreign-born 
employees across space. A novel feature of this thesis is that we take this 
heterogeneity explicitly into account. 
A natural spatial level of aggregation for analyzing regional differences in 
wages and productivity as well as unemployment, is that of the local labor market 
(Briant et al., 2010). For example, large wage differences and differences in 
unemployment within local labor markets are unlikely to exist, because labor is 
relatively mobile within short distance. NUTS-3 regions are a reasonable 
approximation for local labor markets in the Netherlands (see Appendix A, p. 
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177). In contrast, because commuting takes place mostly within local labor 
markets, we analyze commuting patterns on the level of municipalities. 
 
Figure 1.2. Share of labor force employed at foreign owned firms (left) and share 
of foreign-born employees in the labor force (right), 2008  
   
Source: Own calculations based on CBS micro data. 
 
1.2 Micro data 
Traditionally, economic analyses of phenomena such as agglomeration and 
globalization have relied mostly on aggregate data. This literature has shown a 
substantial positive effect on productivity of the increased division of labor that is 
made possible by agglomeration and globalization (see, for example, Frankel and 
Romer, 1999, for the relation between trade and GDP, and Ciccone and Hall, 
1996, for the relation between economic density and productivity). Much less 
attention, however, was devoted to the potential negative effects that such trends 
could have for individual groups of workers. Furthermore, the use of aggregated 
data may result in conclusions that are inaccurate. For example, Combes et al. 
(2008a) have shown that a part of the correlation between agglomeration and 
aggregate productivity is explained by differences in labor market composition 
rather than a positive relation between density and productivity. Correlations 
between aggregated variables may even disappear almost completely when micro 
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data are used, as Chapter 5 will show regarding the negative relation between 
education and unemployment risk. 
During the last few decades, both the theoretical and the empirical literature 
have shifted towards a microeconomic approach, that stresses the importance of 
heterogeneity across workers and firms (see Melitz, 2003, for the theoretical 
underpinnings of the importance of firm heterogeneity, and Bernard et al., 2007, 
for an overview of the empirical literature). Increased availability of micro data to 
the scientific community – particularly since the 2000s – has played an important 
role in this process.  
Van Bergeijk et al. (2011) provide a discussion of the transition from this 
traditionally macro towards a more micro approach in studying globalization and 
agglomeration. An important lesson that has been learned is that insights in 
heterogeneity across regions, firms, and workers are essential to fully grasp the 
complexity of economic problems. From a policy perspective, this implies that 
one-size-fits-all policies are the exception rather than the norm. For example, 
authors such as Autor et al. (1998 and 2006), argue that technological progress 
and globalization are skill biased, such that their impact on wages and 
employment are positive for some groups of workers while negative for others. 
Micro data are essential to test the empirical implications of such hypotheses, as it 
allows to explicitly analyze worker and firm heterogeneity. More generally, micro 
data allow us to reduce heterogeneity that remains unobserved at a more aggregate 
level. Previous studies have shown that these effects may be substantial 
(Duranton, 2010; Melo et al., 2009). 
In the Netherlands, the availability of micro data that allows to address topics 
such as globalization has improved substantially during the last ten years (see also 
CBS, 2010). However, the empirical literature that uses micro data is still in an 
early phase, partly because there remain substantial limitations to the accessibility 
of micro data (Van Bergeijk et al., 2011). Even if micro data are available within 
statistics offices, it is not always made available to researchers because of privacy 
considerations. Another problem is the fragmentation of data. For example, to 
analyze patterns in location behavior of workers and firms, and the resulting 
commuting patterns, linked data are required that include variables related to the 
location of the firm where an employee works, data related to residence location, 
data on his or her commute, and data on individual characteristics such as 
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education and occupation. Similarly, when analyzing the labor market effects of 
globalization, data that include both firm level indicators such as exports, imports, 
and foreign ownership, and individual worker characteristics, wages, and 
unemployment, remain scarce. 
The micro data that are used in this thesis allow to go one step further, and 
analyze what happens with individual employees and firms in conjunction with 
relevant variables that are related to agglomeration and globalization. It is also 
precisely the availability of this micro data that enables us to offer some unique 
insights into the underlying mechanisms that determine labor market outcomes on 
a spatially disaggregated level. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
From the previous sections, a number of questions emerge. It is clear that recent 
trends in agglomeration and globalization are substantial, and that these trends 
could have potentially large effects for employees in terms of wages and 
unemployment. Furthermore, it has become clear that these effects could be 
asymmetric for different types of workers, and across regions. This thesis 
therefore addresses a number of – mostly empirical – questions for the specific 
case of the Netherlands based on unique micro data at the individual level of firms 
and workers:  
? How did (regional) wage inequality change between 2000 and 2008, and 
what patterns are found for different groups of workers? 
? What is the contribution of agglomeration economies to variations in 
productivity of firms as measured by wages paid to workers? 
? How are commuting patterns related to production and agglomeration 
externalities, and to amenities, and does this relation depend on individual 
worker characteristics, such as level of education? 
? What is the relation between trade, offshoring and foreign owned firms on 
job loss and job finding? 
? What is the relation between the presence of highly educated foreign 
workers and productivity of Dutch firms as measured by wages paid to 
workers? 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Besides the introduction and the 
conclusion, there are five self-contained studies: one general chapter about recent 
trends in wage inequality, two chapters that are related to agglomeration, and two 
that are related to different dimensions of globalization. Figure 1.3 presents a 
schematic outline of the relation between the different chapters.  
 
Figure 1.3. Schematic outline of the thesis 
 
 
Wage inequality; a decomposition approach 
As a logical step to start the quest for the effects of agglomeration and 
globalization on the labor market, Chapter 2 will explore recent trends in wage 
inequality. If changes in the division of labor have different effects on people with 
different characteristics, this should become visible by analyzing the wage 
distribution. Authors such as Autor et al. (1998 and 2006), have argued that 
technological progress and globalization are skill biased. The tasks performed by 
lower educated workers are often more routine, which makes it easier to either 
replace their labor by machines or by offshoring it abroad.  
In Chapter 2, we explore and decompose trends in Dutch wage inequality into 
different components, such as gender, age, and level of education. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by providing detailed decompositions that are made 
possible by the available micro data and an extension to the framework of Juhn et 
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al. (1993), and the fact that we provide empirical evidence on trends in Dutch 
wage inequality during the last decade (expanding on Ter Weel, 2003). 
 
Agglomeration economies and regional wage differences 
In Chapter 3, we shift our attention to explaining regional wage differences. As 
agglomerations allow for more specialization, lower transaction costs, and 
because close proximity of people and firms eases the diffusion of knowledge, it 
is to be expected that productivity is higher in cities. In a competitive labor 
market, this will be reflected in higher wages. Spatial wage disparities may reflect 
several other forces, most particularly sorting processes of both individuals and 
firms with different characteristics. As we show in this chapter, higher skilled 
workers are more attracted to working in areas with a high employment density 
than less skilled workers. However, even after correcting for regional 
heterogeneity in both worker characteristics and sectoral structure, doubling the 
employment density of a region is associated with a 4.8 percent increase in wages. 
Besides economic density, Chapter 3 looks at various other sources of 
agglomeration economies, such as specialization within industries, competition, 
and diversity of the regional economy. 
This chapter adds to the current literature on agglomeration economies (for 
example, the work of Combes et al., 2008a) by using more detailed data on 
individual worker characteristics, such as level of education, and by providing 
estimates of agglomeration economies that are both relevant for Dutch policy 
makers and for an international comparison of estimated agglomeration 
economies.  
 
Commuting and agglomeration 
After finding that skilled workers are more likely to work in agglomerated areas 
than lower skilled workers, Chapter 4 will analyze whether such a bias also can be 
found in commuting patterns. We will not only devote attention to agglomeration 
driven by productivity, but also discuss amenities, as skill differences can strongly 
influence both job and home location. 
Even though studies related to commuting have often included education as a 
control variable, we are one of the first to explicitly address this relationship. 
Furthermore, we take into account both the attractiveness of a location as a place 
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to work and the attractiveness as a place to live as determinants of location 
decisions and thus commuting patterns. 
As employment in cities is more specialized relative to the countryside, the 
benefits of commuting are likely to be higher for skilled workers. Furthermore, 
because of a more complex matching process for more specialized workers, the 
high skilled may be less likely to find a job close to home. At the same time, high 
skilled high paid workers might have a higher willingness to pay for housing close 
to agglomeration centers, such that they can reduce commuting time and benefit 
from urban amenities. Results show that highly educated commuters travel 
further, both in distance and time. Furthermore, they are more likely to commute 
towards relatively productive places and they are more likely to live in and 
commute from areas with higher land rents. 
 
Unemployment, trade, offshoring and multinationals 
Chapter 5 shifts attention to the international division of labor, and estimates the 
impact of several dimensions of globalization on job loss and job finding. It thus 
focuses on the earlier mentioned short term (transitional) effects of globalization. 
Together with worker characteristics such as age, gender and education, we 
analyze whether working for a foreign owned firm or an exporting firm, as well as 
the offshorability of the occupation of a worker, are related to the probability of 
unemployment. Once a worker has become unemployed, we analyze the relation 
between the same characteristics of the worker and last known job on the 
probability of finding a new job.  
This chapter employs a rather unique dataset, in which our employer-
employee database is linked to data on unemployment benefits. We can thus 
observe the entire life cycle of unemployment – from the previous job to 
unemployment and from unemployment back to a new job – in one unified 
framework. It will be one of the first studies that analyzes both the transition from 
a job to unemployment and the transition from unemployment back to a new job 
in an integrated manner. In addition, besides using a number of existing 
offshorability indicators, we develop our own indicator that explicitly takes the 
importance of proximity for occupations into account. Besides providing 
interesting and novel stylized facts on the nature of unemployment by level of 
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education, by occupation, and by industry, we show that unemployment and 
globalization are mostly unrelated. 
 
Foreign workers and firm productivity 
In Chapter 6, we analyze the effects of the presence of highly educated foreign 
workers on the productivity of firms and regions. Cities have a long history of 
attracting high shares of foreign workers. In the 17th century, a large share of the 
French Huguenots and Portuguese Jews that migrated to the Netherlands choose 
Amsterdam as their residence. According to the 1849 census, 4.6 percent of 
Amsterdam’s population was foreign born, whereas this figure was 3.0 percent for 
other Dutch cities and only 1.9 percent for the countryside. Nowadays an even 
larger share of the population is born outside the Netherlands, and these are even 
more concentrated in the larger agglomerations (see Figure 1.2).  
Particularly, the presence of skilled foreign workers may bring benefits to 
productivity, as their knowledge may be transferrable and complementary to that 
of natives. The presence of a diverse workforce in cities may thus (to some extent) 
explain higher productivity. However, causality could also go in the other 
direction, as foreign workers might be attracted by high productivity and wages. 
As interpersonal relations that allow for the exchange of relevant professional 
knowledge are particularly dense within firms, a logical starting point to look for 
productivity advantages is within firms. Chapter 6 compares the wages of high 
skilled foreign workers to the wages of comparable natives, and estimates the 
effects of the presence of high skilled foreign workers from advanced countries on 
the wages on other workers within the same firm. We find that foreign knowledge 
workers earn slightly less than comparable native colleagues do, and that their 
presence is positively related to the wages of other workers in the firm. This 
chapter contributes to the literature by its firm level approach. This does not only 
allow to test whether the observed relation between the presence of foreign 
workers and wages on the regional level also exists on the firm level, it also 
enables us to better control for endogeneity and omitted variable bias on the level 
of regions. 
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2  WAGE INEQUALITY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: EVIDENCE AND TRENDS 
 
“Measuring the growth of incomes or the inequality of incomes is a little like 
Olympic figure skating – full of dangerous leaps and twirls and not nearly as 
easy as it looks.” 
Alan Reynolds (2006) 
2.1 Introduction2 
Rising wage inequality in the US and other OECD countries has provoked debates 
on the severity of this phenomenon, its causes, and its potential remedies. Up to 
now, however, the size of changes in the income distribution and especially its 
causes, have remained controversial. During the 1980s and 1990s, wages of some 
groups on the US labor market – especially blue collar workers – have fallen in 
real terms, whereas the wages of workers in the higher percentiles of the wage 
distribution have grown substantially (Lawrence, 2008).  
The Netherlands is often considered an exception to this general picture 
(Burniaux et al., 2006; Förster and Mira d'Ercole, 2005). This chapter contributes 
to the existing literature on wage inequality in several ways. We are the first to 
use micro data to decompose trends in Dutch wage inequality after 2000. 
Furthermore, we develop an extension to the Juhn et al. (1993) framework that 
enables us to separately analyze how changes in the supply of different worker 
characteristics as well as the prices of those characteristics changed the wage 
distribution. Even though the provided decompositions do not truly explain trends 
in wage inequality, they provide useful insights in the underlying characteristics 
of trends in wage inequality. 
Changes in Dutch wage inequality have been mild, both when compared to 
the substantial increase in US wage inequality and when compared to trends in 
most other European countries. Figure 2.1 shows standardized percentile ratio’s 
for the 90–50th and 50–10th (pre-tax) gross wage differentials of six OECD 
                                                 
2 This chapter is based on Groot and De Groot (2011). 
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countries. Wage inequality has increased substantially in the US throughout the 
entire 1977–2009 period (albeit the change was notably higher at the upper half of 
the distribution). The Netherlands, in contrast, was consistently among the 
countries characterized by relatively low wage inequality, with relatively 
moderate change of wage inequality during the entire period. Ter Weel (2003) 
shows that the Dutch 90–10th percentile wage differential increased by less than 
two percent between 1992 and 1998, after having increased by eight percent 
between 1986 and 1992. Similarly, Atkinson and Salverda (2005) have shown that 
inequality in the Netherlands has remained fairly stable during most of the 1977–
1999 period. 
 
Figure 2.1. Trends in inequality of gross annual wages of full-time working 
employees in six OECD countries, 1977–2009 
A. 90–50th percentile ratio’s           B. 50–10th percentile ratio’s  
   
Source: OECD Statistics on international wage inequality. 
 
The literature on Dutch wage inequality in recent years is limited, despite several 
important trends such as globalization and the advent of information and 
telecommunication technologies, that may have impacted the wage distribution in 
the past decade. This chapter describes and decomposes trends in the Dutch wage 
distribution during the 2000–2008 period, using detailed micro data on wages and 
employee characteristics. We show that the best-paid workers have gained more 
during this period than workers in the middle of the distribution have. Workers at 
the lower percentiles, however, have gained as well relative to the median worker. 
The 99–90th wage differential of male (female) workers has increased by 4.2 (1.1) 
percent, and the 90–50th differential by 2.4 (1.6) percent. At the bottom of the 
wage distribution, inequality remained constant for males, while inequality of 
wages of women decreased substantially as the 50–10th differential decreased by 
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2.2 percent. The net effect of these changes on aggregate inequality measures such 
as the Theil and Gini coefficients boils down to only a very moderate increase in 
inequality. 
An important advantage of using micro data instead of macro data is that the 
former can provide insights in how changes observed in the aggregate wage 
distribution are related to changes in (implicit) prices and volumes of individual 
worker characteristics. This allows us to show that changes in aggregate wage 
inequality have no single explanation, but are the net effect of diverse and 
complex interactions on the labor market. More specifically, we will describe 
levels and trends of Dutch wage inequality, and apply the framework of Juhn et al. 
(1993) to distinguish three types of effects: (i) quantity changes of observable 
worker characteristics – e.g. the effect of changes in labor market composition; 
(ii) changes in the implicit prices of worker characteristics; and (iii) residual 
changes that are related to unobservable worker characteristics.  
Additionally, we extend this method to identify trends in prices and quantities 
of isolated components of human capital, like education and age. The method 
developed in Juhn et al. (1993) can only do this for all components combined. 
Because there are likely to be substantial differences between trends in the supply 
of labor of females versus males (both in terms of quality and quantity), we 
perform separate wage regressions and decompositions for males and females. 
Well-paid jobs are not uniformly distributed across professions and regions. We 
will therefore present results not only for the economy as a whole, but also for 
different regions. This shows that after correcting for observed human capital, 
wages in the four largest agglomerations of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) pay a premium of 8.9 (8.3) percent in 2008 
(2000). 
Skill-biased technological progress is generally considered the most plausible 
explanation for increasing wage inequality in the US (Autor et al., 1998 and 2006; 
Katz and Murphy, 1992). Other potential causes are globalization, reduced supply 
of skilled labor, and labor market institutions (see, for example, Nahuis and De 
Groot, 2003). The theories result in very similar testable hypotheses: rising skill 
and experience premiums. The mechanisms through which they operate are, 
however, very different. In the first case, technological progress increases relative 
demand for skills. For example, the advent of information and communication 
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technology might be in favor of especially the high skilled (Autor et al., 1998 and 
2006; Katz and Murphy, 1992). In the case of globalization it is increased 
competition with countries housing large pools of unskilled workers that reduces 
the relative demand for low-skilled labor and thus increases the skill premium (i.e. 
wages of higher skilled workers increase relative to the wages of lower skilled). 
The third case emphasizes the fact that access to higher education is no longer 
increasing as it did during the 1970s and 1980s, reducing the (growth of) the 
supply of high skilled labor (or alternatively that the quality of high skilled is 
deteriorating). It has proven difficult to empirically separate these different forces, 
and the debate is far from settled.  
Nahuis and De Groot (2003) and Ter Weel (2003) argue that the relative 
stability of the Dutch wage distribution is explained by the fact that educational 
attainment has continued to grow for a relatively long period in time. Between 
2000 and 2008, the number of students graduating from higher tertiary education 
continued to increase. Increased demand for skilled labor (possibly caused by skill 
biased technological progress or globalization) has thus been balanced by 
increased supply of skilled workers, such that the resulting price of skills showed 
little change. In countries where supply of skilled labor remained constant during 
recent decades (as was the case in the US), it resulted in a higher skill premium 
and thereby higher wage inequality. Nowadays, the number of highly educated 
workers is increasing at a much lower rate, albeit it is still increasing. In the 
Netherlands, the skill premium of male (female) workers has increased by 15 (35) 
percent between 2000 and 2008, which suggests that demand for high skilled 
labor has been increasing faster than supply. 
Finally, the effects of labor market institutions on the wage distribution can 
be substantial (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Suyker and De Groot, 2006; 
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Changes in the way wages are negotiated, 
minimum wages, unemployment benefits, unionization, and other labor market 
institutions are known to be important determinants of wage inequality (Teulings 
and Hartog, 1998). 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section will 
present the micro data used in this chapter. Section 2.3 presents descriptive 
statistics on (trends in) Dutch wage inequality between 2000 and 2008. Section 
2.4 discusses the methodology that we have used to decompose trends in 
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inequality in different components, and present the results of this exercise. Section 
2.5 focuses on the regional dimension of wage inequality. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2  Data 
We use employee micro data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Data on worker 
characteristics are drawn from nine consecutive cross-sections of the annual labor 
force survey (EBB, Enquête Beroeps Bevolking), covering the period 2000–2008.3 
For wages, we rely on tax data reported by employers, available through the CBS 
social statistics database (SSB, Sociaal Statistisch Bestand). For workers with 
multiple jobs, we include each job as a separate observation. We have used the 
CBS consumer prices deflator (CPI, Consumenten Prijs Index) to deflate annual 
earnings. Throughout most of our analyses, we rely on log hourly wages, defined 
as the natural logarithm of the deflated pre-tax wage (the so-called fiscal wage, 
which is employer reported) divided by the number of hours worked. The latter is 
calculated by multiplying the sum of standardized4 monthly contractual hours and 
over hours (available through SSB) by the number of months the employee 
worked during a year, which is based on the start and end date of the job. The 
derivation by CBS of hours worked, as well as start and end dates of jobs, are 
based on employer reported data. 
To make sure that only workers with a sufficiently strong attachment to the 
labor market are included, we have imposed the following restrictions. First, 
workers must be older than 18 on January 1st and younger than 65 on December 
31st of each year, and must work for at least 12 hours per week.5 Second, the 
hourly wage should exceed the minimum wage in 2008 (adjusted for inflation), 
which was 7.83 euro per hour in prices of 2008. Third, wages should not exceed 
10 times the median wage to avoid an excess impact of extremely high incomes. 
We use age as a proxy for experience, which captures different sources of human 
                                                 
3 Due to methodological changes in the labor force survey, there is a discontinuity in our dataset 
between 2005 and 2006. The effects of this change have been filtered out by keeping the wage 
distribution constant between 2005 and 2006. Our methodology compares (log) wages at each 
percentile of the wage distribution, thus considering the wage distribution as a continuum. For the 
years 2000 to 2005, we subtract the change between 2005 and 2006 at each percentile. 
4 In this context, standardization implies a correction for differences in paid leave (including 
illness). 
5 Statistics Netherlands defines workers with a working week of at least 12 hours as employed. 
Workers with a working week of at least 36 hours are considered full-time employees. Jobs 
occupied by teenagers are often sideline jobs, that would be outliers in our dataset. 
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capital, including – but not limited to – present and previous occupations. We 
measure education as the nominal number of years of schooling that is needed to 
achieve the (self-reported) highest level of education that a worker has 
successfully achieved. Other worker characteristics that are included are country 
of birth – a binary variable that indicates whether a worker is born in the 
Netherlands or not – and gender (all from census data), and whether a worker is 
employed part-time (less than 36 hours6 per week) or full-time (36 hours or more). 
The resulting dataset of nine cross-sections contains 436,734 observations, an 
average of 48,526 per year. Sample size increased substantially over time by 
Statistics Netherlands, with only around 20,000 observations in our dataset in the 
first years and over 80,000 in the last. Even though we are – to some extent – able 
to follow individuals over time, creating a (balanced) panel would substantially 
reduce the number of observations. Therefore, we use the data as pooled cross-
sections. 
Table 2.1 presents some descriptive statistics on the key variables of interest. 
It must be kept in mind that all figures reflect our sample rather than the total 
Dutch working population, and thus may not be fully representative. Pre-tax real 
wages have increased by 8.0 percent between 2000 and 2008. Even though the 
period of observation is limited, some pronounced changes have occurred. 
Workers in 2008 are 0.63 years older. The average years of education and share of 
women remained rather constant, while the share of part-time jobs in our sample 
increased substantially.7 As part-time workers and females are overrepresented at 
the lower percentiles of the wage distribution, and older workers feature most 
prominently at the higher percentiles, this could have resulted in increased wage 
inequality. If, however, changes in worker characteristics are evenly distributed (if 
the higher average age is, for example, not the result of increased labor market 
participation of older workers, but only a level effect), inequality would have 
                                                 
6 Weekly hours worked are calculated by dividing standardized monthly working hours (both 
contractual hours and over hours) by 4.333, which is the quotient of 52 (weeks) and 12 (months). 
7 The latter is partly due to a methodological revision by Statistics Netherlands between 2005 and 
2006. It can be observed that part-time workers have a higher probability to be included in the 
labor force survey after the revision. Though we correct for this in the results presented in the 
remainder of this chapter, the descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 refer to the uncorrected data. 
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remained unchanged. The use of micro data gives the possibility to determine 
what driving forces are dominant, and how they interact. 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics, 2000–2008 
  2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
      
# Observations 17,829 22,953 45,553 82,676 82,089 
      
Log real hourly wage 2.896 2.922 2.937 2.955 2.976 
 (0.373) (0.371) (0.375) (0.425) (0.426) 
Age 41.95 42.42 43.10 42.19 42.58 
 (9.80) (9.95) (10.05) (10.68) (11.00) 
Education (years) 14.89 14.96 15.22 14.83 14.90 
 (3.175) (3.160) (3.142) (3.119) (3.116) 
Female 0.432 0.465 0.487 0.420 0.431 
 (0.495) (0.499) (0.500) (0.494) (0.495) 
Part-time 0.384 0.403 0.430 0.582 0.566 
 (0.486) (0.491) (0.495) (0.493) (0.496) 
Foreign born 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.074 0.080 
  (0.252) (0.258) (0.251) (0.262) (0.271) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  
2.3 Trends in inequality 
Before we start exploring the characteristics of both levels and trends in the 
distribution of wages, we first look in somewhat greater detail at trends in wage 
inequality in the Netherlands. Figure 2.2 shows how the distribution of pre-tax 
real hourly wages of employees in the Netherlands changed during the last 
decade. Wage inequality among full-time working male employees increased 
somewhat, even though change at the 90–50th percentile was very small (see panel 
A). However, when we look at female employees, there is almost no change 
visible. While the Gini coefficient increased only moderately for both male and 
female full-time workers, the Theil index shows substantial change (see panel B). 
Because the Theil coefficient is relatively more sensitive in the tails of the wage 
distribution, whereas the Gini index is more sensitive in the middle, this finding is 
consistent with evidence showing that inequality increased mostly at the top of the 
distribution, which is presented later in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
22    |   Chapter 2. Wage inequality in the Netherlands: evidence and trends 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Trends in wage inequality of full-time working males and females, 
2000–2008 
A. Standardized Gini and Theil coefficients          B. Standardized percentile ratios of full-time    
workers 
  
 
The finding that changes in wage inequality are moderate is consistent with 
previous studies on wage inequality in the Netherlands (Suyker and De Groot, 
2006; Irrgang and Hoeberichts, 2006; SCP, 2007; Ter Weel, 2003; Van den 
Brakel-Hofmans, 2007). Comparative research into wage inequality in advanced 
countries indicates that, during the past two decades, wage inequality increased in 
most OECD countries (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; OECD, 2007). The 
Netherlands thus appears to be one of the few exceptions to the general trend. 
There is some variety in studies that rank countries based on wage inequality, but 
the Netherlands is generally viewed as a country with a relatively egalitarian 
distribution and only a slight increase in inequality (see, for instance, Burniaux et 
al., 2006; Förster and Mira d'Ercole, 2005).8 Notwithstanding these results, recent 
findings of Straathof et al. (2010) indicate that also in the Netherlands top wage 
inequality has started to increase somewhat, following the international trend. 
As the Theil index is an entropy based measure, it is relatively 
straightforward to decompose inequality into different components (Theil, 1979). 
Authors like Bourguignon (1979) and Shorrocks (1980) have developed a simple 
methodology to decompose inequality into a within-group component and a 
between-group component. Inequality within each subgroup g is given by: 
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8 The OECD (2007) reports the same for disposable income, but reports a clear increase in wage 
dispersion measured as the 90th to 10th percentile ratio. 
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where lg is the number of workers in group g, wg,i the wage of each worker and wg 
the average wage of the workers in the group. Inequality between these subgroups 
is then given by: 
 
1
ln
N
g g g
between
g
l w w
T
L w w?
? ?? ? ?? ??   ,          (2.2) 
 
where N equals the number of groups that are defined, L the total labor force, and 
w the average wage across all workers. When inequality within each subgroup has 
been calculated using equation (2.1) and between-group inequality using equation 
(2.2), total inequality is equal to the sum of average within-group inequality Tg in 
each of the N subgroups that were distinguished (weighted by their economic 
weight), and between group inequality: 
  
1
N
g g
g between
g
l w
T T T
L w?
? ??  .              (2.3) 
 
The Theil index thus provides the possibility of an exact decomposition of 
inequality, where different components are meaningful and can be added by 
simple mathematical manipulations. A disadvantage of the Theil index – which is 
equal to the mean product of income and its own logarithm (Theil, 1972, p. 100) – 
is that its interpretation has no clear economic logic. The popularity of the Theil 
coefficient in the economic literature is thus largely based on its suitability for 
estimating the contribution of different groups to total inequality (Fields, 1979).9  
The Theil coefficient can also be used to further decompose total between 
group inequality into the specific contribution of each type of between group 
inequality (e.g., education, experience, gender and part-time versus full-time in 
our case), by a more sophisticated extension of the Theil model that was 
introduced by Fishlow (1972).  
                                                 
9 In this respect, the Gini coefficient is the exact opposite of the Theil coefficient. The Gini 
coefficient is often used for its clear economic interpretation, which originates in the Lorenz curve. 
Gini decomposition procedures have been developed by, among others, Rao (1969) and Fei and 
Ranis (1974). These methods are not based on weighting different inequality components, since 
ranking of subgroups on each of this different inequality is required, but on more complex 
calculation methods (Fields, 1979). 
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The contribution of one type of between group inequality can be written as: 
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where the average wage in each industry is: 
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Similar equations yield the contribution of gender and experience to total 
inequality between groups. Total between-group inequality is given by the sum of 
the different components, and a remaining part with random effects and 
interactions. Formally: 
 
between between education between experience between genderT T T T? ? ?? ? ?  
between part time between interactionsT T? ? ?? ? .         (2.6) 
 
We use this equation to determine how much of total between-group inequality is 
associated with variation among education, gender, and experience wage 
averages. The difference between equation (2.2) and equation (2.6) stems from the 
exclusion of variation in income classes, and is equal to the within-group 
variation. 
The left panel of Figure 2.3 shows the development over time of total, within 
and between-group inequality, as computed by the method described in equations 
(2.1)–(2.3). It reveals a marginal increase of total wage inequality. About 40% of 
inequality is due to between-group differences, and it appears that the share of 
between-group inequality has remained fairly constant. The right panel of Figure 
2.3 and Table 2.2 show the results of a further decomposition of inequality 
between groups with the method described in equations (2.4)–(2.6). The most 
important source of between-group inequality is between workers with different 
levels of education, followed by differences between workers that differ by age. A 
2.3. Trends in inequality    |   25 
 
 
relatively small effect is attributed to differences between gender or differences 
between part-time and full-time workers. 
 
Figure 2.3. Trends in wage inequality of real hourly wages, 2000–2008 
Theil coefficients of within and between        Additional decompositions for 2008 inequality* 
   
* Number of subgroups: 9 for education, 9 for age, 2 for gender, 2 for part-time. 
 
Looking at the trends in Table 2.2, it becomes clear that there is a relatively high 
variation over time in the different components that sum up to the more constant 
overall inequality. Inequality between education groups increased by 14 percent, 
but this was overcompensated by steep decreases in inequality between workers 
with different experience levels (–34 percent). Even though we cannot fully 
explain the large shifts in inequality between experience groups between 2000 and 
2004, the dynamics in the composition of the labor market in terms of age have 
been rather large. For example, the participation rate of workers between 55 and 
65 increased from 33.6 percent to 46.3 percent. The gender gap remained 
constant, while the amount of inequality associated with differences between part-
time and full-time workers has more than doubled. 
 
Table 2.2. Theil decomposition pre-tax wage inequality of real hourly wages 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
      
Total 10.88 10.98 11.40 11.66 11.39 
Within groups 5.98 6.19 6.76 6.98 6.58 
Between groups: 4.80 4.71 4.62 4.67 4.81 
   Education 2.31 2.51 2.44 2.52 2.63 
   Experience 2.03 1.62 1.40 1.31 1.32 
   Gender 0.72 0.64 0.74 0.70 0.72 
   Part–time 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.36 
Interactions –0.09 –0.10 –0.12 –0.12 –0.22 
 
Note: Number of subgroups: 9 for education, 9 for age, 2 for gender, 2 for part-time. 
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As the Gini and Theil indices are aggregate measures for inequality, they are not 
very informative about where in the wage distribution changes have occurred. An 
observed change in the coefficients can be consistent with many different 
underlying processes. Figure 2.4 shows recent trends in Dutch wage inequality 
among male and female workers, as measured by percentile changes of log hourly 
wages between 2000 and 2008, for each percentile of the wage distribution. The 
median wage of male workers has increased by 6.4 percent, the median wage of 
females by 7.7 percent. Though we do not have a clear explanation for the higher 
wage growth of female workers compared to males, it is not explained by a 
change in composition.10 
 
Figure 2.4. Trends in male and female wage inequality, 2000–2008  
 
The negative slope for the bottom half of the wage distribution implies that wages 
have become somewhat more equal for the lower incomes. For wages above the 
median, the pattern is diverged, though most of the higher percentiles experienced 
above median wage growth. At the highest percentiles, there has been some 
diversion. While female workers at the top five percentiles have gained 8.3 
percent on average, which is very close to wage growth of the median female 
worker, their male counterparts gained as much as 12.4 percent which was far 
above median. It seems thus that when looking at males, “the rich” have gained 
                                                 
10 For example, when gender fixed effects together with a large number of variables related to 
worker characteristics (including education and industry) are included when estimating one wage 
regression per year, the estimation results show a substantial reduction in the male-female wage 
differential, by almost 2 percentage points between 2000 and 2008.  
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the most, while for females this is not the case. It is important to note that wages 
in Figure 2.4 have not been corrected for a changing composition of the labor 
market. It could be that the people who are rich in 2008 have different 
characteristics than those in 2000. 
The six panels in Figure 2.5 compare wage changes by percentiles for 
different subgroups on the labor market. Differences in average wage growth are 
related to between group inequality (e.g. if one curve is above another on average, 
average wage growth was higher in that group), while differences in the shape of 
the distributions are the result of changing within group inequality. Similar to 
Figure 2.4, the panels in Figure 2.5 compare aggregated change in real log wages 
between 2000 and 2008. 
The panels A (males) and B (females) compare workers with different levels 
of education. We start by discussing level effects. Wages of male workers with 
only primary education have decreased by 1.2 percent on average in real terms, 
while this figure increased by 0.1 percent for females. Wages of male (female) 
workers with secondary education increased by 3.9 (5.9) percent and wages of 
workers with tertiary education by 5.6 (8.4) percent. Between group inequality has 
thus increased (as the highest growth rate was experienced by the group with the 
highest average wage in 2000), which is consistent with the results of the Theil 
decomposition. This increasing skill differential can be observed consistently for 
male and female employees, and implies increasing rewards to skills. 
For male workers with only primary education, wages around the median and 
at the higher percentiles (except for the top decile of the distribution) have 
decreased substantially in real terms, while wages at the lower percentiles have 
remained constant. For workers with secondary education, wages have increased 
slightly faster at both the highest and the lowest percentiles, thus increasing within 
group inequality at the top of the distribution, while decreasing it at the bottom. 
Compensation of workers with tertiary education has increased more at the higher 
percentiles than at the rest of the distribution, resulting in higher inequality. 
Panel C (males) and panel D (females) compare wages of workers of different 
age. Age groups mainly differ in the level of growth. Wages of male (female) 
workers in their thirties and early forties have increased by 7.6 (8.6) percent, 
wages of younger workers by 6.5 (8.9) percent, and wages of older workers by 3.3 
(5.5) percent on average. This reduced inequality between groups of older and 
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younger females. For males, inequality between groups increased somewhat 
because wages of workers between 31 and 45 increased faster than wages of 
younger workers, but inequality decreased because older workers experienced the 
slowest average wage growth among all groups. 
The most likely explanation for the relatively low growth rate of wages of 
older workers is a changing skill composition within this group. Well paid and 
higher educated workers are far more likely to continue working when they are 
old than less educated workers, but during the last decade policies targeted at 
increasing labor market participation of elderly workers have been implemented. 
As less educated workers are now also more likely to work in their fifties and 
sixties, the average level of education has decreased. This results in relatively low 
aggregate growth of wages for this group of workers. An alternative explanation 
is also related to changing institutions. Even though workers are generally thought 
to reach the top of their productivity between their forties and fifties, older 
workers have the highest wages for institutional and historical reasons. As the 
economy has become more competitive, inequality between older workers and 
workers of middle age could have decreased because of a weaker institutional link 
between tenure and wage. Differences between trends in the distribution of wages 
within the different groups are relatively small. All ages show a similar above 
average growth of wages at the highest percentiles for males, while the 
distribution remained constant within all age groups for females. 
Panel E (males) and F (females) compare wages of full-time workers with 
wages of part-time workers. Wages of male (female) full-time workers increased 
by 9.6 (13.0) percent, substantially faster than wages of part-time workers, which 
increased by 4.4 (7.4) percent. The fact that growth of full-time worker wages 
outpaced aggregate wage growth is the result of an increased share of part-time 
jobs (that earn lower hourly wages). The fact that wages of full-time workers 
wages increased faster than wages of part-time workers could be explained by 
reduced supply of full-time labor. 
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Figure 2.5. Trends in wage inequality by subgroup, 2000–2008 
A. Change by type of education, male workers     B. Change by type of education, female workers 
    
 
 
 
C. Change by age category, male workers         D. Change by age category, female workers 
   
 
 
 
E. Part-time vs. full-time work, male workers        F. Part-time vs. full-time work, female workers 
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Payment of part-time jobs of females has become slightly more equal, which is 
consistent with a decreasing importance of cohort effects. The increased share of 
part-time jobs is closely related to increased female labor market participation. 
Euwals et al. (2007) show that the participation rate of women (at a given age) 
increases as they are member of younger age cohorts, but find that this effect is 
now declining. Because of this, an increasing share of the part-time jobs is 
occupied by older workers (that have higher average wages). This results in a shift 
in percentiles. 
We have thus far seen that composition effects explain a large part of 
observed trends in the wage structure. The Mincerian wage regression (Mincer, 
1974) is an often-used tool to analyze the structure of wages, as it separates 
variation in wages due to observed worker characteristics from a residual wage 
component (e.g. the distribution of the error term). We have estimated a wage 
regression for each year separately: 
 
it it t itw X ? ?? ?  ,            (2.7) 
 
which explains log wages wi as a function of a constant and worker characteristics 
Xi, and a remainder ?i that is attributed to unobserved differences between 
workers. We include education (years of educational attainment), age (as a proxy 
for experience), whether a person works part-time or not, and whether a person is 
foreign born or not. The results are presented in Table 2.3.  
The skill premium (e.g. the monetary value of having attended one additional 
year of school) ranges from 5.4 percent to 6.2 percent for males and from 4.8 
percent to 6.5 percent for females, and is moderately increasing over time for 
males, and substantially increasing for females. The returns to age or experience 
are concave, with an estimated top in 2000 (2008) at 56 (52) for males, and 52 
(51) for females. The career premium, measured as the expected ceteris paribus 
wage difference between an 18 year old male (female) worker and a worker at the 
career top ranges from 82 (47) percent in 2000 to 83 (54) percent in 2008. 
Experience is thus considerably more rewarded for males compared to females. 
Full-time workers earn more than part-time workers, and native born workers earn 
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more than foreign born. The latter is most likely at least partially the result of 
omitted variables, like social skills (for example language proficiency). 
The distribution of the unexplained wage component ?i can be interpreted as 
inequality within groups on the labor market with narrowly defined worker 
characteristics, which is conceptually similar to the within group inequality from 
the previous section. Sorting all workers in our sample by this residual wage gives 
the distribution of wages independent from observed human capital. 
 
Table 2.3. Estimation results of wage regressions, 2000–2008 
  2000 2004 2008 
       
  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
       
# Observations  10,133    7,696   23,384   22,169   46,693   35,396 
       
Education (yrs.) 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
 (63.1) (48.0) (97.5) (92.1) (121.1) (129.0) 
Age 0.064*** 0.042*** 0.066*** 0.044*** 0.074*** 0.051*** 
 (25.7) (16.8) (39.4) (30.9) (65.9) (47.0) 
Age-squared –0.0006*** –0.0004*** –0.0006*** –0.0004*** –0.0007*** –0.0005***
 (19.7) (13.2) (31.7) (26.1) (65.9) (38.9) 
Part-time –0.047** –0.006 –0.087*** –0.011** –0.019*** –0.046*** 
 (5.5) (0.9) (15.1) (2.6) (5.7) (11.5) 
Foreign born –0.065*** –0.059*** –0.076*** –0.053*** –0.112*** –0.060*** 
 (5.7) (5.0) (9.4) (7.8) (17.9) (11.2) 
       
R² 0.421 0.308 0.396 0.324 0.388 0.388 
 
Note: t-statistics (absolute values) are in parentheses. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows trends in residual wage inequality, e.g. the change in residual 
wage inequality at each percentile between 2000 and 2008. The changes in 
residual inequality are relatively low, given the fact that our data cover nine years. 
Residual wage growth at the top five percentiles of the residual wage distribution 
was 1.5 percent above average. Wages at the lowest percentiles also increased 
somewhat above average. This is in clear contrast with workers between the 20th 
and the 80th percentile, where the distribution remained very flat. When we 
compare Figure 2.6 with Figure 2.4, we see that the residual wage distribution is 
relatively flat. However, as Figure 2.6 ranks workers according to their residual 
wage, while Figure 2.4 sorts workers by their actual wage, it is not possible to 
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assess the extent to which within group (residual) wage inequality explains total 
wage inequality by comparing these two figures. 
 
Figure 2.6. Trends in male and female residual wage inequality, 2000–2008 
 
 
2.4 Decomposition of changes in wage inequality 
There are several methods to analyze changes in the structure of wages. These 
methods – like the Theil decompositions used in the previous section – typically 
decompose differences in average wages between groups of workers with certain 
characteristics (e.g. education, age, whether a worker is native or foreign born) in 
two sets of components: (i) changes in average observed worker characteristics, 
and (ii) changes in the estimated returns or prices of those characteristics. In this 
section, we use the technique developed by Juhn et al. (1993) to decompose trends 
in wage inequality into three components, (i) a part due to quantitative changes of 
observable worker characteristics – e.g. the number of workers on the labor 
market with certain characteristics, (ii) a part that can be attributed to price 
changes – representing the wages that are associated with each of these worker 
characteristics given their supply – and (iii) residual changes that are related to 
unobservable worker characteristics. The method thus takes residual wage 
inequality explicitly into account, a feature that other models lack. Another 
important advantage of the method is that it allows us to analyze the entire wage 
distribution, instead of just the variance of wages.  
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The method of Juhn et al. is based on estimating wage equations (this is just the 
Mincer equation, as presented in the previous section): 
 
it it t itw X u?? ?   ,            (2.8) 
 
where wit is a vector with the log hourly wage of individual i in year t, Xit is a 
matrix with individual characteristics, ?t is a vector with separate regression 
coefficients for each year and uit an error term that captures all unobserved 
dimensions of the wage. In each year, we sort all workers according to their 
residual wage. The residual uit can be separated into two components: the position 
of the individual in the residual wage distribution (a percentile rank ?it) and the 
cumulative distribution function of the residual wage Fi( · ), which gives the 
relation between the percentile rank and the amount of residual wage inequality, 
which varies over time. We thus have: 
 
? ?1 |it t it itu F X???   ,           (2.9) 
 
where the right-hand side term is the inverse cumulative distribution of the 
residual wage of workers with the characteristics Xit. So we are left with three 
sources of changing wage inequality: (i) changing distributions of the 
characteristics of workers that are captured in Xit, (ii) changes in the prices of 
various observed characteristics as reflected in the estimated ?’s and (iii) changes 
in the distribution of the residuals of the wage regressions that were estimated in 
each separate year (uit). Changes in the residual wage distribution are changes in 
the relation between the percentile rank, and the residual wage. We define     as 
the average price of observable characteristics, and           as the average 
cumulative residual wage distribution (taking the average residual at each 
percentile over the years 2000–2008). Wage inequality can subsequently be 
decomposed into its three sources as follows:  
 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 1 1| | |it it it t t it it t it it t it itw X X F X F X F X? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?   .     
  (2.10) 
? ?1 |t itF X? ?
?
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The first term represents the effect of a changing labor market composition at 
fixed prices. The second term captures the effects of changing prices of the 
observables, keeping the quantities of each worker characteristic fixed, and the 
third and fourth term capture the effects of changes in the residual wage 
distribution. We can use equation (2.10) to reconstruct the wage under ceteris 
paribus conditions. At a given price level of worker characteristics and a given 
distribution of residual wages, the wage distribution is given by: 
 
? ?1 |qit it t it itw X F X? ??? ?   .        (2.11) 
 
If we keep only the residual wage distribution constant, such that both prices and 
observed characteristics of workers vary over time, the distribution of wages is 
given by: 
 
? ?, 1 |p qit it t t it itw X F X? ??? ?   .        (2.12) 
 
If all three sources of wage change vary together, changes in wage inequality are 
captured by: 
 
? ?, , 1 |p q dit it t t it it it t itw X F X X u? ? ??? ? ? ?    .      (2.13) 
 
A convenient way to identify these different effects is to start by estimating 
equation (2.13), which is equivalent to equation (2.8). The regression coefficients 
of different years are used to obtain average prices   . After sorting the residuals 
(in each year separately) we can determine the average residual over the years in 
each percentile. The next step is to calculate quantity effects, using equation 
(2.11), and price effects, by taking the difference between equations (2.12) and 
(2.11). The effects of changes in the residual wage distribution are given by the 
difference of equation (2.13) and (2.12). 
Juhn et al. (1993) use their methodology to decompose changes in wage 
inequality in price and quantity effects for all worker characteristics together. We 
now propose a simple extension to their framework, which enables us to isolate
?
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effects of different worker characteristics. Let mitx  be a vector with the quantities 
of individual worker characteristic m with corresponding price mt? , and 'itX  a 
matrix with all other observed quantities (with prices 't? ), such that 
' 'm mit t it t it tX X? ? ?? ?x . 'itX  is thus very similar to itX , but it does not include 
the variable m that we would like to isolate, which is in the vector mitx . We define 
it? to be the position of an individual in the conditional wage distribution 
? ?1 | ' 't it it tF X? ?? , representing the distribution of wages conditional on quantities 
and prices of all worker characteristics except characteristic m. As before, mt?  and 
't?  are estimated using equation (2.13). By keeping ? ?1 | ' 't it it tF X? ??  constant, 
we can isolate the effects of changes related to characteristic m from changes in 
both the residual distribution and changes in the wage distribution related to all 
other worker characteristics. The ceteris paribus effect of changes in the quantity 
of m is given by: 
 
? ?1 | ' 'q m mit it t t it it tw F X? ? ??? ?x    ,                  (2.14) 
 
and the effect of changes in prices and quantities of characteristic m jointly give 
rise to: 
 
? ?, 1 | ' 'p q m mit it t t it it tw F X? ? ??? ?x    .       (2.15) 
 
A difference between the above equations and equations (2.11) and (2.12) is that 
m
itx  and ? ?1 | ' 't it it tF X? ??  are correlated, whereas Xit and ? ?1 |t it itF X?? are 
independent. Within groups with similar characteristics, however, the distribution 
of ? ?1 | ' 't it it tF X? ??  remains to be uncorrelated from mitx . This implies that
interdependencies between characteristic m and the distribution of wages related 
to all other worker characteristics (for example the fact that older workers are
relatively skill abundant) is captured in ? ?1 | ' 't it it tF X? ?? , whereas changes in 
? ?1 | ' 't it it tF X? ??  that are the result of changes in mitx  are not captured. This
implies that, for example, an increasing share of higher educated workers 
resulting from a higher participation rate of older workers – that have a higher 
average level of education – will not be captured. We can thus estimate a wage 
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distribution corresponding to changed prices and quantities of characteristic m as 
if all other worker characteristics had remained unchanged. 
Panel A in the upper half of Table 2.4 gives the results of the decompositions 
for all worker characteristics combined, for male workers. Changes in the 99–90th 
differential are mostly attributed to changes in the residual wage distribution, 
while there is a small opposite composition effect (observed quantities). Price 
effects have slightly reduced inequality at the highest percentiles as well. This is 
consistent with the findings of the previous section, which showed a strong 
increase of residual wage inequality at the highest percentiles. The increase of the 
90–50th differential is the net effect of different opposite forces. Observed 
quantities have reduced inequality somewhat, whereas observed prices and trends 
in the residual distribution tended to increase inequality. The lower half of the 
wage distribution changed little. Here, a changing labor market composition 
decreased inequality, but increased inequality due to trends in prices of human 
capital resulted in a close to zero overall change in inequality. Within group 
inequality remained unchanged in the lower half of the distribution.  
The panels B and C show the isolated effects of education and experience on 
the wage distribution (recall that all variables on human capital are still included 
in the regression analysis). If the prices and quantities of all other components of 
human capital would have remained unchanged, a changing composition of the 
work force in terms of education would have increased wage inequality by 4.2 
percent – which is by coincidence equal to the total change in the 99th to 90th 
percentile wage differential. Similarly, keeping other prices and quantities 
constant, increasing returns to education would have increased inequality 
somewhat as well. 
The fact that (as panel A showed) all trends in the composition of labor 
market supply combined reduced inequality at the highest percentiles rather than 
increase it, implies that the isolated effect of education was (more than) 
neutralized by other changes in the composition. As panel C shows, a changing 
age structure reduced inequality (e.g. a reduction in the share of older workers at 
the 99th percentile relative to the 90th percentile has resulted in a ceteris paribus 
reduction of inequality). A changing educational composition of the labor market 
resulted in a reduction of inequality at the 90th to 50th wage differential, and to a 
lesser extent at the lower half of the wage distribution. At the same time, 
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increasing returns to education moderately increased wage inequality, particularly 
the 90th to 50th differential. The diverged pattern shows that education or 
experience alone do not provide a clear cut explanation for observed changes in 
the aggregate wage distribution. Different types of human capital have opposite or 
interacting effects on the wage distribution. 
 
Table 2.4. Decomposition of wage inequality, 2000–2008 
Differential 
Total 
change in 
inequality 
(1) 
Change due to 
observed 
quantities 
(2) 
Change due to 
observed 
prices 
(3) 
Change due to 
residual 
distribution 
(4) 
  
 MALES 
     
 A. All characteristics 
99–90th 0.042 –0.011 –0.005 0.058 
90–50th 0.024 –0.008 0.013 0.019 
50–10th 0.006 –0.014 0.015 0.005 
     
 B. Only education
99–90th 0.042 0.042 0.009 –0.008 
90–50th 0.024 –0.015 0.022 0.017 
50–10th 0.006 –0.003 0.006 0.002 
     
 C. Only experience 
99–90th 0.042 –0.007 –0.005 0.055 
90–50th 0.024 –0.005 –0.011 0.041 
50–10th 0.006 –0.009 –0.004 0.018 
  
 FEMALES 
     
 A. All characteristics 
99–90th 0.011 0.007 –0.001 0.004 
90–50th 0.016 0.010 0.018 –0.012 
50–10th –0.022 –0.022 0.014 –0.014 
  
 B. Only education 
99–90th 0.011 –0.002 0.022 –0.009 
90–50th 0.016 0.012 0.029 –0.025 
50–10th –0.022 –0.014 0.010 –0.018 
     
 C. Only experience 
99–90th 0.011 –0.008 –0.004 0.023 
90–50th 0.016 0.002 –0.004 0.018 
50–10th –0.022 –0.029 0.002 0.005 
 
The lower half of Table 2.4 shows the results of decompositions for female 
employees. At the upper half of the female wage distribution, wage inequality 
increased somewhat due to a changing composition of the labor force. At the 
lower half, in contrast, a changing composition reduced inequality. Both wage 
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inequality between the 90th and the 50th percentile and inequality between the 50th 
and 10th percentile has increased due to trends in prices of human capital, while 
these changes were moderated by decreasing residual inequality (e.g. inequality 
between workers with similar characteristics). In strong contrast to male top 
earners, wage inequality at the highest percentiles of the female wage distribution 
shows hardly any change. Similar to the male wage distribution, increased returns 
to education have resulted in increased inequality across the entire distribution, 
though most notably at the upper half of the distribution. Changes in the 
educational composition of the female work force had mixed effects, having 
almost no effect on top wage inequality, while slightly increasing the 90th to 50th 
percentile wage differential and slightly decreasing the 50th to 10th differential. 
The broad picture of Table 2.4 is consistent with the findings presented in 
Figure 2.4. It shows that wage inequality within groups of workers with 
homogeneous skill characteristics decreased for the lower percentiles (this is 
consistent with the negative slope in Panel A of Figure 2.5), whereas within group 
inequality remained stable for most of the above median workers (which implies a 
zero slope in Figure 2.5). Wage inequality within groups with similar experience 
has stayed constant at the lower half of the distribution, and is increasing as we 
approach the highest percentiles. 
 
2.5 The regional dimension of wage inequality 
Wages do not only vary across workers with different human capital endowments 
and across occupations, but there are also substantial regional wage differences 
(see Glaeser et al., 2008, for the US, and Gibbons et al., 2008, for the United 
Kingdom). This is to some extent explained by spatial heterogeneity in the 
distribution of workers and economic activities (and thus different job types), but 
after correcting for these, there remain regional wage disparities due to differences 
in the level of productivity that are quite large in some regions. Table 2.5 shows 
levels and trends in the distribution of pre-tax wages and residual wages between 
and within the 22 largest agglomerations (as defined by Statistics Netherlands) 
and the periphery (which we define as all municipalities outside the 
agglomerations). Jobs in the largest agglomerations pay a clear premium over the 
periphery (column 4), even after correction for human capital (see also Chapter 3).  
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Absolute wages in Amsterdam are about 20 percent higher than in the periphery, 
while the residual wage differential (the average of the residual wage of all 
workers in a region) is about 10.2 percent. In several other agglomerations there is 
a negative average spatial residual. A worker with a standardized level of human 
capital is expected to earn a 7.7 percent lower wage in Enschede than in a 
peripheral municipality, and a 6.1 percent lower wage in Heerlen. There is a 
positive and significant correlation of 0.47 between the level of (residual) wages 
and (residual) wage growth, pointing at enhanced regional disparities over time. 
Agglomeration externalities provide a partial explanation for the observed 
differences in residual wages across regions, which is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
When looking at the percentile ratios for different regions presented in the 
columns 6 to 8 in Table 2.5, it appears that regional differences in the log wage 
distribution below the median are relatively small. A potential explanation for this 
is that institutional restraints – that do not differ between regions – are more 
important at the bottom of the wage distribution than at the top. Above the 
median, and especially at the top of the distribution, there are some substantial 
differences. As expected – given the presence of many high quality jobs – the 90–
50th percentile differential is slightly higher in the Randstad11 agglomerations, in 
particular in Amsterdam, where the differential is (0.686). The lowest 90–50th 
percentile differentials are found in agglomerations outside the Randstad. The 
highest 99–90th percentile differential is found in The Hague (0.733), while it is 
the lowest in ’s-Hertogenbosch (0.474). In general, inequality at the highest 
percentiles is somewhat higher in agglomerations with high average wages. 
Furthermore, there is a relation between initial (above median) inequality and 
trends in inequality. In case of the agglomerations in Table 2.5, there is a 
correlation coefficient of 0.48 for the 99–90th differential, 0.48 for the 90–50th 
percentile differential and 0.11 for the 50–10th differential. So inequality in 
already unequal agglomerations increased relatively fast, especially at the highest 
percentiles. 
 
                                                 
11 The Randstad refers to the area in the Netherlands where the four largest agglomerations – 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht – are located. 
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2.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined levels and trends in the Dutch wage structure between 
2000 and 2008, using micro data from Statistics Netherlands. It has been shown 
that (real pre-tax) wage inequality has increased slightly across different 
dimensions, especially at the top of the wage distribution. These changes are, 
however, mostly the result of composition effects. 
Without accounting for changes in the composition of the work force, the 99–
90th percentile differential increased by 4.2 percent for male workers and by 1.1 
percent for females, the 90–50th differential increased by 2.4 percent for male and 
1.6 percent for female workers, while the 50–10th ratio increased by 0.6 percent 
for male workers while decreasing by 2.2 percent for female workers. When we 
correct for trends in observed worker characteristics by estimating Mincerian 
wage equations, changes in residual inequality are respectively 5.8 (0.4) percent, 
1.9 (–1.2) percent and 0.5 (–1.4) for male (female) workers. In addition, we find 
that wages increased faster in regions with a higher initial wage, especially in the 
large agglomerations in the Randstad area. 
This study finds, consistent with previous work, that changes of wage 
inequality are moderate in the Netherlands, compared to the US and other 
advanced economies. It is shown, however, that this is in fact the net effect of 
counteracting underlying changes. Changes in the composition of the labor market 
– or observed quantities of worker characteristics in the terminology of Juhn et al. 
(1993) – have generally resulted in lower inequality. This is, however, the net 
effect of a changing composition with respect to age, resulting in decreasing 
inequality, and a changing skill composition resulting in higher inequality. 
Increasing skill prices have resulted in a higher 90–50th percentile ratio, whereas 
changes in the residual wage distribution have been linked to changes in the 99 – 
90th percentile ratio. 
The findings of this chapter are consistent with the empirical implications of 
both skill biased technological progress as well as globalization (due to similar 
empirical implications of the two). We do not find evidence for polarization in the 
Netherlands, in contrast with the findings of Goos and Manning (2007) on the 
United Kingdom and Autor et al. (2008) on the US labor market. Further research 
will be needed to isolate the empirical effects of different potential explanations 
for observed changes in the structure of the Dutch labor market. 
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3 REGIONAL WAGE DIFFERENCES IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: MICRO EVIDENCE ON 
AGGLOMERATION EXTERNALITIES 
 
“In almost all countries, there is a constant migration towards the towns. 
The large towns [...] absorb the very best blood from all the rest [...]; the 
most enterprising, the most highly gifted, those with the highest physique and 
the strongest characters go there to find scope for their abilities.” 
Alfred Marshall (1890) 
3.1 Introduction12 
Regional wage disparities are known to be large in many countries, and they are 
often a source of public concern. Disparities reflect several forces, including 
sorting processes of both individuals and firms with different characteristics, as 
well as agglomeration externalities that affect the productivity of individuals. 
Most governments have specific policies targeted at regions that structurally lag 
behind. Properly targeted policies require a thorough understanding of the sources 
of the productivity differences between regions. 
This chapter aims to identify the nature and causes of wage differences in the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands is an interesting case because of its perceived 
flatness in both geographical as well as economic dimensions. It has a very 
characteristic polycentric structure with only middle sized cities according to 
international standards, as evidenced by, for example, the relatively flat rank-size 
distribution of cities. Moreover, its institutional setting is known to result in a 
fairly equal distribution of income (see, for example, De Groot et al., 2006 and 
Chapter 2 of this thesis).  
One of the reasons why regional wage disparities in the Netherlands are 
relatively small, could be the role of collective wage agreements. Particularly in 
lower paid jobs and in the public sector, such collective wage agreements – that 
                                                 
12 This chapter is based on Groot et al. (2011b). 
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do not differentiate between regions – are likely to result in a more equal 
compensation of individuals with similar jobs across regions than it would have 
been otherwise. This could result in higher unemployment in more peripheral 
regions, as the productivity of the least productive workers will be below the 
collectively set wage. However, this cannot be observed when comparing 
unemployment across Dutch regions. In fact, the province of Zuid-Holland (which 
has the highest density) has the second highest unemployment, while the province 
of Zeeland (one of the least densely populated provinces) has the lowest 
unemployment. Even when institutions do not seem to be decisive for regional 
wage differences, it must be kept in mind that wage differentials are not only the 
result of agglomeration economies and spatial sorting. 
The remainder of this chapter will show that, even though regional wage 
differences in the Netherlands are relatively small, there are still substantial 
regional differences, mainly between the main agglomerations in the Randstad 
region and the more peripheral regions (see also Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Considering the spatial characteristics indicated above, our analyses on Dutch 
data provide us with a lower boundary for effect sizes. In our distinctly non-flat 
world, where all kinds of regional differences mediate economic relationships (cf. 
Melo et al., 2009, De Groot et al., 2009), such a benchmark will be helpful to 
structure future discussion. 
To achieve these goals, we first describe the nature and magnitude of regional 
(pre-tax individual worker) wage differences in the Netherlands. We subsequently 
relate the spatial component of observed wage differences (after correcting for 
observed worker heterogeneity) to agglomeration effects. Our analysis is based on 
micro data provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). One of the advantages of 
micro data is the opportunity to reduce heterogeneity that remains unobserved at a 
more aggregate level. Previous studies have shown that these effects may be 
substantial (Duranton, 2010). Our approach is similar to the analysis on spatial 
wage disparities in France by Combes et al. (2008a). However, the availability of 
data on human capital allows us to estimate the effects of education on local 
wages directly. An advantage of this is that it enables us to analyze the importance 
of different dimensions of worker heterogeneity for regional wage differences. 
The inclusion of worker fixed effects (as is done by, for example, by Glaeser 
and Mare, 2001, and Combes et al., 2008a and 2010) is another often used 
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approach to control for worker heterogeneity. However, including fixed effects 
has several econometric drawbacks (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002 and 
Plümper and Troeger, 2007). First of all, workers who do not move between 
regions or sectors identify only changes over time in that area. However, the 
problem is that we are mostly interested in agglomeration economies, which do 
not vary very much over time. Some authors claim that the inclusion of fixed 
effects in such a case “throws out the baby with the bath water” (Beck and Katz, 
2001). The identification through workers that move to a different region, on the 
other hand, raises the issue of selection bias, as accepting a job in a different 
region is related to how favorable the offer is.13  
Furthermore, even though such fixed effects eliminate biases by time-
invariant omitted variables, time-variant omitted variables (such as experience) 
may still result in biased estimates. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
agglomeration economies – if we assume that sorting is a relevant process – as 
workers that accumulate relatively more human capital throughout their careers 
may be more likely to move to a more productive location than those 
accumulating less human capital. 
Even though we are not the first to estimate the size of agglomeration 
economies using micro data, it will be insightful to see how our estimates of 
agglomeration economies in the Netherlands compare to estimates from other 
countries. Furthermore, adjusting on the choice of relevant variables, 
methodology, as well as the use of different datasets paves the way for 
comparative overviews. Meta-analyses enable us to analyze the relative 
importance of different object-related variables (such as the region and timeframe 
under observation), and different research-related variables, such as the 
agglomeration measures that were used. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we start by discussing different causes of 
regional wage differences. Section 3.3 provides a description of the data and 
methodology that are used. Section 3.4 presents stylized facts about regional 
                                                 
13 Combes et al. (2008a) argue that selection biases are not likely to be relevant, because workers 
base their migration considerations on future expectations of wages rather than on actual wage 
offers. However, if we assume that a higher wage is more attractive to an employee than a lower 
wage, selection effects cannot be fully excluded. 
differences in wages. Section 3.5 uses the Mincer equation to relate wage 
differences to observed worker characteristics and to subsequently derive a spatial 
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residual that captures wage variation across space that cannot be attributed to 
individual characteristics. Section 3.6 aims to further explain this spatial
residual, and relates it to different agglomeration externalities. Section 3.7 
discusses the robustness of the results along several dimensions and Section 3.8 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Sources of regional wage differences 
Among the different ways to classify sources of regional wage differences, 
Combes et al. (2008a) provide perhaps the most intuitive. They distinguish 
between three sources of regional wage differences. The first is the composition 
of the labor market. Higher wages in a region may reflect a more favorable skill 
composition. Local non-human endowments (e.g., deep water access) are the 
second explanation, and agglomeration economies the third. The latter results 
from spatial proximity of firms to other firms, from thick labor markets, and from 
knowledge spillovers. We will briefly discuss these three in turn. Rather than 
developing a mathematical theoretical model, we follow the model developed by 
Combes et al. (2008a). 
Workers with different skills and experience levels, or with different ethnic 
backgrounds, are not homogeneously distributed across space.14 As sectors are not 
spread evenly across regions either, and different industries require a different mix 
of worker characteristics, workers tend to spatially sort themselves based on the 
supply and demand for their specific competences. One notable reason for the 
absence of an isotropic wage landscape is that institutions in higher education, as 
well as industries that require highly skilled labor, are usually concentrated in 
densely populated cities. Students that move from the periphery to a city to be 
educated there, subsequently have little incentive to move back to the periphery 
(see Venhorst et al., 2010). Therefore, composition can be held accountable for 
part of spatial differences in wages. In other words, assuming that wages are equal 
to the marginal product of labor, average wages will differ across regions, even 
when there are no regional differences in the productivity of workers with equal 
characteristics. However, when there are regional wage differences that exceed 
                                                 
14 Gender, which is also a common cause for wage differentials (see, for example, Chapter 2 or 
Altonji and Blank, 1999), has a more or less uniform spatial distribution in the Netherlands. 
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such composition or sorting effects, productivity differences come to the 
surface.15 
Productivity differences come in (at least) two kinds, and although they can 
be given different labels, we will use non-human endowments on the one hand, 
and agglomeration externalities on the other. Regions that have good access to 
waterways, a favorable climate, or valuable natural resources can have a higher 
level of productivity than less endowed areas. An especially interesting type of 
non-human endowments are those with a non-natural nature, like technology, 
local institutions and private capital, as they are often endogenous. Railway 
stations in the nineteenth and twentieth century are a nice example. Stations were 
built on the most populated locations at that time, but as they strongly reduced 
distance (measured in time), they further reinforced agglomeration forces. This 
causes substantial endogeneity, since these effects thus coincide with effects of 
population density. We will therefore use instrumental variables (IV), using 
density in 1840 as an instrument for current density. The year 1840 was chosen 
because the population census that took place in that year is the last available 
before the start of the industrial revolution in the Netherlands – which was rather 
late, in comparison to other countries – and one year after the first railway was 
opened. 
Starting from the observation that people are not homogeneously distributed 
across space, and that therefore there must be advantages of clustering, various 
authors have pointed at the importance of agglomeration externalities for 
economic growth. Following Marshall (1890), agglomeration economies have 
been classified into three broad categories: those arising from labor market 
interactions, linkages between firms, and technological externalities resulting 
from knowledge spillovers (see Duranton and Puga, 2004, for an overview of the 
micro foundations of agglomeration externalities). As the empirical implications 
of externalities from thick labor markets are very similar to those of interactions 
between firms or knowledge spillovers, the relative importance of these 
explanations is difficult to test. 
                                                 
15 This chapter does not take consumers and their preferences into account. A consumer preference 
for densely populated regions could also result in spatial sorting of different education groups, as 
workers with a higher income can pay a higher price for housing in their most preferred areas. 
Combes et al. (2008a) are convinced that such a preference, which can very well be based on 
urban amenities, cannot play a role, and we follow them in this regard. 
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One of the mechanisms through which agglomeration works is a combination of 
physical proximity with scale effects of both demand and supply. Large local 
demand and supply reduce transaction costs on markets for final goods and on 
markets for production inputs, leading to cost reductions as groups of firms enjoy 
“collective economies of scale” (Harvey, 1981, p. 105). Duranton and Puga 
(2004) extend this view to all inputs, whether workers or intermediate goods, and 
note that cities reduce the costs of incomplete information. If such effects are on 
the side of firms, we choose to label it specialization or concentration; if they are 
on the side of population, we call it urbanization. However, the literature is quite 
confounded on this issue. Specialization covers all advantages of local 
concentrations of firms, or local ‘monoculture’ of industries. It also includes 
knowledge spillovers, which promote local innovation (Jaffe et al., 1993), in so 
far as these spillovers occur within a sector. If they occur across sectors, either in 
completely different industries (Neue Kombinationen, Schumpeter, 1934) or in 
related industries (Frenken et al., 2007), they are a benefit of diversity or variety. 
Glaeser et al. (1992) analyzed this contrast in detail, putting intra-sectoral 
knowledge spillovers, which they labeled the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) 
effect, side by side with cross-sectoral spillovers, labeled Jacobs effects, after 
Jacobs (1969). In the MAR model, knowledge is industry-specific and regional 
concentration of certain industries therefore allows more knowledge spillovers 
between firms in the same industry. In Jacobs’ vision, innovations are born where 
differences meet. Duranton and Puga (2004) support this view, and conclude that 
heterogeneity is at the root of the mechanisms that explain the advantages from 
agglomeration. Although the debate on agglomeration economies has centered on 
these two hypotheses (most notably in Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009), Glaeser 
et al. (1992) distinguished a third category of agglomeration economies: Porter 
externalities, named after Porter (1990), who pointed at the importance of (local) 
intra-sectoral competition as a source of productivity gains. Glaeser et al. (1992) 
found that Jacobs externalities were empirically the most important agglomeration 
effect. However, in the following decades, many studies have repeated their 
analysis for different countries, regional definitions, time periods, proxies for the 
agglomeration externalities, etc., and they found rather mixed results. 
Reviews of this strand of literature are provided, among others, by Rosenthal 
and Strange (2004), Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009), De Groot et al. (2009) 
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and Melo et al. (2009). The latter two contributions present meta-analyses of the 
existing literature, and they show that agglomeration externalities exhibit large 
variation across space, time and particularly research method. The inclusion of 
control variables (like industry effects), and the use of micro data instead of 
macro-level data are of large importance for the outcomes. In general, they show 
that agglomeration externalities seem to have positive effects, and that over time, 
they tend to become more important. 
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter combines three data sources from 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS): Dutch census data (SSB, Sociaal Statistisch 
Bestand) – which includes employer reported tax data, the labor force survey 
(EBB, Enquête Beroeps Bevolking), and firm data (ABR, Algemeen Bedrijven 
Register). As census data and the available firm data originate from registers 
rather than questionnaires, we can calculate our agglomeration variables using 
data on all Dutch firms and workers. However, as data on the work location of all 
Dutch employees is available only until 2005, this chapter only uses data for the 
period 2000 to 2005. We cannot construct the agglomeration variables used in this 
chapter for the years 2006–2008. 
In our wage regressions, we rely on the labor force survey to be able to 
correct for differences in human capital. All records have unique identifiers for 
individuals and firms, respectively, which enables us to create a linked employer-
employee database. In the tax records, the level of observation is that of the job, 
so a worker can have multiple entries in each year. We use only the job that paid 
the highest wage. Wages are defined as pre-tax hourly wages of individual jobs, to 
approximate the productivity level of workers. This approach is often used in the 
literature (for example by Glaeser and Mare, 2001 and Combes et al., 2008a and 
2010), assuming that employees are paid according to their marginal product. 
From the perspective of the worker, higher wages might be offset by higher costs 
of living, or higher costs of commuting. However, employers will only choose a 
location with high labor costs and land prices if these locations offer a 
productivity advantage (see Puga, 2010, for an overview). Wages do not include 
untaxed compensation for work related expenses, such as the costs of commuting. 
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Furthermore, wages have been deflated using the consumer price deflator (CPI, 
Consumenten Prijs Index) of Statistics Netherlands. 
The work location is available at the municipality level. For most of the 
analyses in this chapter we aggregate the location-specific data to the NUTS-3 
level (the so-called COROP regions; see Appendix A, for a map of the 
Netherlands). Briant et al. (2010) discuss the importance of regional 
classifications for the outcomes of economic geographical research, and conclude 
that it is important that the chosen scale of a regional classification corresponds 
with the level of aggregation at which the researched phenomenon is expected to 
operate. Even though COROP regions are not strictly local labor market areas, 
they provide us with the most reasonable approximation in the Dutch case. We 
use the regional classifications of 2005, and have data on 40 NUTS-3 regions and 
467 municipalities. The work location is the self-reported job site that is available 
through EBB. The work location of each employee thus reflects the actual work 
location, rather than the location of the head quarter. For each employee, we have 
information on his or her age, gender, ethnicity, hourly wage, and workplace 
location. For each business unit, we use the sectoral classification on the 2-digit 
NACE level and the number of employees. 
To estimate wage regressions, we combine this large dataset with the Dutch 
labor force survey. From this dataset, we use the self-reported number of hours 
worked (which enables us to calculate hourly wages)16, and the level of education. 
We exclude all employees earning less than one tenth of the average hourly wage 
or more than ten times the average, all workers younger than 18 on January 1st and 
older than 65 on December 31st in each year, and all workers with a working week 
of less than 12 hours. 17  After merging these three data sets, and performing 
selections as described above, we have a total of 190 thousand observations. This 
number is somewhat lower compared to the dataset used in Chapter 2, because the 
work location is not known for all employees in the labor force survey and 
                                                 
16 Hourly wages are calculated by dividing the employer reported pre-tax annual wage from SSB 
(e.g., the fiscal wage) by the self-reported number of hours an employee works in a typical week 
(from EBB) and the number of weeks the employee worked during a year, which is calculated 
from the (employer reported) start and end date of the job. 
17 We distinguish between part-time employees, working 12 hours or more per week, but less than 
32 hours, and full-time employees working 32 hours per week or more. Having a working week of 
at least 12 hours is the official definition of Statistics Netherlands of being employed. It should be 
noted that part-time working is very common in the Netherlands (Bakker et al., 1999). 
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because only the best paid job of each employee was included in each year. 
Between 2000 and 2005 the number of observations gradually increased from just 
over 17 thousand to 45 thousand observations. However, as we use pooled cross-
sections rather than panel data, this is unlikely to affect the results. 
We construct our agglomeration variables directly from the micro data. For 
this purpose we use cross sections of tax and firm data, such that we have about 
10 million observations annually available. In this case, location is based on 
employment by business unit.18 A business unit is defined as an establishment of a 
firm at a specific location. Proxies for agglomeration effects can be constructed in 
many different ways, and the choice for a specification has been shown to matter 
for the results found (De Groot et al., 2009). 
We use the share of industries in the economy of the NUTS-3 region or 
municipality (depending on the specification) to capture MAR externalities (with 
E for total employment, and subscripts ind for industry and r for region): 
 
,
,
ind r
ind r
r
E
Specialization
E
?   .          (3.1) 
 
When industry dummies are included, the log of specialization captures the same 
effect as a location quotient, viz. the effect of a smaller or larger share of an 
industry relative to the share of that same industry in all other regions. 
We use Shannon’s entropy (after Shannon, 1948) to capture externalities 
from diversity:  
 
, ,lnind r ind rr
ind r r
E E
Diversity
E E
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ,          (3.2) 
 
where we sum over the industries. A high value means that the region is highly 
diversified in terms of its employment structure, whereas a low value means that 
the regional economy is rather specialized in only a few large sectors. As a 
measure for diversity, entropies have several advantages over other measures, 
                                                 
18 CBS derives local employment by combining tax data (that gives total employment per firm) 
with a survey where multi-establishment firms with 10 or more employees provide employment in 
each municipality. Employees of multi-establishments firms with less than 10 employees (with a 
relatively low share in employment), are allocated to the head quarter. While not usable for linking 
specific individuals to firms, this reasonably approximates employment per firm per municipality. 
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because it accounts for the size distribution of sectors (cf. Shannon, 1948, 
Straathof, 2007). 
Finally, competition is measured using a Hirschman-Herfindahl based index 
on the distribution of employees across firms (subscript f denotes individual 
firms): 
 
2
, ,
,
,
1 f ind rind r
f ind r
E
Competition
E
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ??,         (3.3) 
 
where we sum over the individual firms in each sector-region combination. Since 
we calculate the index as one minus the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), a 
value close to one indicates fierce competition in a region. When the index is low, 
regional employment within an industry is highly concentrated in a relatively 
small number of firms. 
Besides these three sector-related agglomeration effects, we capture general 
urbanization effects with overall employment density in a region (where A stands 
for the surface of the area):19 
 
ln ln lnrr r r
r
EDensity E A
A
? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
  .          (3.4) 
 
We instrument density in 2000 with density in 1840, to account for endogeneity 
(Ciccone and Hall, 1996, Combes et al., 2008a , Graham et al., 2010). We will 
present both the results of OLS and IV estimations. If the use of instrumental 
variables leads to substantially different results, it is likely that the OLS estimates 
were biased due to the presence of endogeneity. 
                                                 
19 As pointed out by Combes et al. (2008a), when the area of regions has already been included as 
a separate variable, employment can – with proper reinterpretation of the coefficients – be 
included directly in the equation without subtracting the log of the area. 
Similar to Combes et al. (2008a), we apply a two-stage estimation strategy. In 
the first stage, we regress log hourly wages of individual workers on a set of 
variables that are related to human capital, as well as a set of industry-region-year 
fixed effects, or separate industry and region-year fixed effects. This way, we are 
able to separate the effects of sorting of workers across regions from the effects of 
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agglomeration. The region-year fixed effects can be interpreted as an indicator for 
the regional wage or productivity level, after correcting for differences in 
(observed) individual characteristics. In the remainder of this chapter, we refer to 
this as the spatial residual. As Moulton (1990) points out, estimating the effect of 
aggregate variables (such as agglomeration variables) on micro units, results in a 
downward bias in standard errors of the estimates. This is explained by the fact 
that errors within groups are not independently distributed. In the second stage, 
we regress the industry-region-year fixed effects on the agglomeration variables 
that were discussed above, year dummies, and industry fixed effects to control for 
regional differences in sectoral structure. For the second stage, we estimate 
several different specifications on both the NUTS-3 and municipality level. 
 
3.4 Stylized facts 
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present some stylized facts about 
the key variables in our dataset. Table 3.1 presents separate descriptive statistics 
for the observations in the two stages of our estimation strategy. For the second 
stage, we present descriptive statistics for observations at both the NUTS-3 level 
and the municipality level. The average age of the workers in our sample, as well 
as the shares of female workers and part-time workers, have been gradually 
increasing over time. The agglomeration variables show little change over time, 
even when we consider the relatively limited timeframe of the data used in this 
chapter. Furthermore, it can be observed that there is much more variation 
between municipalities than between NUTS-3 regions. 
Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows average hourly wages per worker in each NUTS-
3 region. The corresponding names of the Dutch NUTS-3 classification are 
included in Appendix A. On average, employees working in the Amsterdam 
agglomeration receive the highest hourly wages, while those in the North-Eastern 
part of the Netherlands (Zuidwest-Friesland) earn the lowest. In general, wage 
levels are relatively high in the western provinces of the Netherlands – mainly in 
the Randstad (the area where the four largest Dutch cities are located; Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht).  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 2000 2005 
Pooled 
2000–2005 
Descriptives for 1st stage    
    
# Observations 17,317 44,556 190,497 
    
Log real wage 2.896 2.938 2.928 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Age 41.95 43.53 42.84 
 (9.8) (10.0) (10.0) 
Female 0.432 0.492 0.474 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Foreign born-worker 0.069 0.070 0.069 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) 
Part-time worker 0.383 0.442 0.418 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) 
    
Descriptives for 2nd stage (NUTS-3 regions × industries × years) 
    
# Observations 1,145 1,338 7,412 
    
Log employment density 5.482 5.450 5.475 
 (0.87) (0.85) (0.85) 
Specialization (Log industry share) –4.191 –4.405 –4.318 
 (1.31) (1.41) (1.37) 
Log area 6.585 6.573 6.577 
 (0.73) (0.74) (0.74) 
Diversity (Shannon’s entropy) 3.025 2.973 3.002 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Competition (1–HHI) 0.819 0.816 0.819 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
    
Descriptives for 2nd stage (municipalities × industries × years) 
    
# Observations 3,620 4,998 25,881 
    
Log employment density 5.776 5.681 5.718 
 (1.31) (1.30) (1.30) 
Specialization (Log industry share) –3.392 –3.505 –3.453 
 (1.16) (1.23) (1.20) 
Log area 4.060 4.016 4.035 
 (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) 
Diversity (Shannon’s entropy) 2.841 2.804 2.824 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Competition (1–HHI) 0.665 0.660 0.660 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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As panel B shows, this can be partly explained by a relatively strong 
concentration of highly educated people in the Northern wing of the Randstad and 
the agglomeration of The Hague (the residence of Dutch parliament and the 
political centre of the country). At the same time, panel C indicates that these are 
also the regions with by far the largest employment density. The difference would 
have been even more pronounced if we had included the highest incomes (over 10 
times the overall average wage), since many high paid jobs are located in the 
largest cities in the Randstad. Sectoral diversity, presented in panel D of Figure 
3.1, does not show a very clear relation with average wages. The relatively high 
specialization in The Hague might be explained by a high share of not-for profit 
services, while other agglomerations are relatively specialized in services. 
To give an indication of the relation between key variables, Table 3.2 
presents some simple correlations. Even after correcting for (observed) worker 
heterogeneity, the remaining spatial residual has a correlation with the average 
wage in the region of 0.70. Sorting does thus not fully explain regional wage 
differences. Both the average wage and the spatial residual are highly correlated 
with employment density. Other strong correlations exist between average wages 
in regions and the share of highly educated workers. 
 
Table 3.2. Simple correlations between NUTS-3 regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Log average wage 1.00         
(2) Spatial residual 0.70 1.00        
(3) Share higher educated workers* 0.68 0.27 1.00       
(4) Average age 0.14 0.05 –0.25 1.00      
(5) Share of females –0.50 –0.36 –0.08 –0.28 1.00     
(6) Share of foreign-born workers 0.68 0.77 0.53 –0.08 –0.29 1.00    
(7) Share of part-time workers –0.41 –0.41 –0.19 –0.07 0.61 –0.56 1.00   
(8) Log employment density 0.74 0.70 0.69 –0.10 –0.28 0.77 –0.33 1.00  
(9) Diversity (Shannon’s entropy) –0.50 –0.40 –0.46 –0.11 –0.16 –0.39 –0.13 –0.45 1.00
 
Note: The spatial residual and its estimation is the topic of Section 3.5. It represents the part of the 
wages that is not explained by (observed) individual worker characteristics.  
*Higher educated workers are defined as those with at least higher tertiary education (HBO or 
university degree). 
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Figure 3.1. Stylized facts by NUTS-3 region, 2000–2005 
A. Average Log wage           B. Percentage share of higher educated workers* 
 
   
 
 
 
C. Log employment density          D. Sectoral diversity (Shannon’s entropy)** 
 
   
 
Notes: *Higher educated workers are defined as those with at least higher tertiary education (HBO 
or university degree). **A high value implies that the economy is relatively diversified, a low value 
implies a specialized regional economy. 
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3.5 Estimation of the Mincer equation 
In Section 3.2, we discussed three broad explanations for regional wage 
disparities. The composition of regional labor markets relates to the characteristics 
of individual workers that live in a region, whereas regional endowments and 
agglomeration economies result in higher productivity for a given labor market 
composition. A method that is often used in economics to analyze wage 
differences is the Mincerian wage regression (cf. Mincer, 1974).20 The estimation 
of the Mincer equation relates the wage earned to a series of factors, starting with 
personal characteristics, but also including job characteristics, sectoral 
characteristics and regional characteristics. To estimate the regional component of 
wages, we include dummy variables (40 in case of NUTS-3 regions, 367 in case 
of municipalities) for the region (     ). Furthermore, we include 58 industry fixed 
effects (      ) and year fixed effects (       ). To estimate the effect of agglomeration 
variables in the second stage of our econometric approach, we replace these 
separate region, industry and year fixed effects by combined region-industry-year 
fixed effects. The latter can then be further analyzed in a second stage, where we 
can assume that (observed) worker characteristics no longer play a role. 
To control for education, we use dummy variables for the highest 
qualification that was obtained by workers, (      ). This allows for differences in 
both the quality and quantity of education.21 We also include age (as a proxy for 
experience), age-squared to allow for nonlinear effects, as well as dummies for 
gender (         ), for migrant status (          ), and for part-time workers (which are 
defined as workers working less than 32 hours per week),22 (            ). Dependent 
                                                 
20 Although often applied, it should be noted that the causal relationship between the variables in 
the Mincer regression and the wages earned is actually not very strong. There exists an extensive 
literature on this subject, often using instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods in natural 
experiments where an exogenous shock affects the wages at a specific moment. Some of the 
contributions to this literature are Griliches (1977); Ashenfelter et al. (1999); Heckman et al. 
(2003) and Webbink (2004). 
21 We distinguish seven levels of education. The first is primary education (which is the omitted 
category in our Mincer regressions). We have two levels of secondary education, a lower level (in 
Dutch: VMBO and MBO1) which has a more practical orientation, and a higher level (HAVO and 
VWO), which are theoretical and focussed on later enrolment in higher tertiary education. We 
distinguish two different types of lower tertiary education, whereby MBO2 and MBO3 remain to 
be mostly practically oriented, while MBO4 has also a theoretical orientation. Finally, we 
distinguish two levels of higher tertiary education. One with HBO (which is positioned just below 
the level of universities) and university Bachelors, and one including university Masters and PhDs. 
22 Statistics Netherlands defines a part-time worker as an employee working 12–32 hours per 
week. 
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variable is the log real hourly wage, ,log( )i tw , of individual i in year t. The 
regression equation is formally denoted by: 
 
 2, 1, , 2 , 3 , 4 5log( )
edu gender migrant
i t edu i t i t i t i i
edu
w D age age D D? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ??   
-
6 , 7, , 8, , 9, ,
part time ind r year
i t ind i t r i t year i i t
ind r year
D D D D? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?  .     (3.5) 
 
The estimated education dummies do not perfectly reflect the effects of education, 
as education is correlated to unobserved variables like ability. Therefore, our use 
of education is to be considered as a more general proxy for the ‘knowledge’ of a 
worker, such that we estimate how much the knowledge of workers is rewarded. It 
is, however, possible that individuals might also be clustered according to non-
observed characteristics. Even though we do correct for the possibility that higher 
educated workers are attracted to some regions, it is also possible that the most 
able among the higher educated are more attracted to cities. Our estimated spatial 
residual in part captures this clustering. We leave it for further research to address 
this issue. It is, however, important to bear in mind that simply including worker 
fixed effects will not correct for this type of unobserved worker heterogeneity, as 
becoming one of the most able in a field is typically a process that evolves over 
time rather than something fixed at birth. 
Table 3.3 presents the regression results for the years 2000 and 2005 
separately, and for a regression on the pooled cross-sections from 2000 to 2005. 
We find that the impact on wages of the different worker characteristics that were 
evaluated has remained fairly constant during the reference period. Estimated 
coefficients for the effects of education and age/experience are comparable to the 
values that are generally found in the literature (see, for example, Chapter 2). The 
region dummies estimated for each NUTS-3 area represent the spatial residual, 
and are presented in Figure 3.2. This represents the regional wage, after correcting 
for differences in worker heterogeneity and sectoral composition. As estimation 
required us to omit an arbitrary region, we have subtracted the spatial residual of 
the average region from that of other regions to allow for a more straightforward 
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interpretation. The values are thus interpreted as expected log wage differentials 
relative to the average region, of workers with given characteristics. 
 
Table 3.3. Mincer regression (dependent variable: log of individual wage) 
Dependent: Log hourly wage 2000 2005 
Pooled 
2000–2005 
    
# Observations 17,317 44,556 190,497 
    
Age 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (27.0) (45.3) (94.1) 
Age-squared –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** 
 (19.4) (35.5) (72.2) 
Female –0.167*** –0.140*** –0.148*** 
 (31.1) (40.8) (90.5) 
Immigrant –0.081*** –0.091*** –0.084*** 
 (9.9) (17.9) (34.3) 
Part-time worker –0.004 –0.032*** –0.026*** 
 (0.7) (9.4) (15.9) 
Education dummies    
Lower secondary education 0.028* 0.060*** 0.051*** 
  (VMBO, MBO 1) (2.5) (7.3) (14.0) 
Higher secondary education 0.248*** 0.245*** 0.256*** 
  (HAVO, VWO) (20.7) (28.6) (66.6) 
Lower tertiary education 0.144*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 
  (MBO  2 + 3) (13.4) (20.9) (45.9) 
Lower tertiary education 0.214*** 0.238*** 0.237*** 
  (MBO 4) (20.0) (30.7) (68.3) 
Higher tertiary education 0.385*** 0.420*** 0.415*** 
  (HBO, BA) (36.1) (54.5) (120.0) 
Higher tertiary education 0.580*** 0.605*** 0.607*** 
  (MA, PhD) (50.3) (74.6) (164.7) 
    
Industry dummies yes yes yes 
Year dummies no no yes 
Region dummies yes yes yes 
    
R² 0.50 0.48 0.49 
 
Notes: t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported in parentheses. Education dummies denote the 
highest qualification obtained, with as omitted category those individuals who have only primary 
education. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Zuidwest-Friesland is the region with the lowest wages after correcting for the 
spatial sorting of workers. This also happens to be the region where the lowest 
average wages are paid. The highest premium is paid in the Amsterdam region, 
where a typical worker can expect to earn 7.4 percent more than if he would have 
been located in the average region.  
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When we compare the results presented in Figure 3.2 with those on the 
distribution of average wages presented in panel A of Figure 3.1, it can be 
observed that the spatial residual is generally higher in the Randstad. The 
distribution of the spatial residual across regions looks very similar to the 
distribution of average wages that have not been corrected for worker 
heterogeneity, as might be expected given the rather high correlation between the 
two (see Table 3.2). However, the distribution of the wages is far more 
compressed after correcting for worker heterogeneity than before. Before (after) 
correction for worker heterogeneity, the log wage differential between the region 
with the highest and the region with the lowest wage is 0.232 (0.121), while the 
standard deviation calculated on regional averages is 0.053 (0.028). 
 
Figure 3.2. Average spatial residual by NUTS-3 region, 2000–2005 
 
Notes: Spatial residuals represent average regional wages after correcting for (observed) worker 
heterogeneity, as well as regional heterogeneity in sectoral composition. Presented values are 
relative to the average Dutch region, and are measured as dlogs. 
 
 
Rotterdam
Amsterdam
Utrecht
Eindhoven
Groningen
The Hague
Legend
Less than -0.04
-0.04 to -0.02
-0.02 to 0.00
0.00 to 0.02
0.02 to 0.04
More than 0.04
50
Kilometers
3.6. Explanation of the spatial residual    |   61 
 
 
 
3.6 Explanation of the spatial residual 
This section performs the second stage of our empirical approach, by further 
exploring the part of variation in wages that is not explained by employee 
characteristics (see Section 3.3 for a discussion of our empirical strategy). We 
start by re-estimating the Mincer equation (3.5), but instead of separate region, 
year, and industry dummies, we include a dummy for each combination of 
industry, region and year: 
 
 2, 1, , 2 3 4log( )
edu gender
i t edu i t i i i
edu
w D age age D? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ??   
5 6 , , , , ,
immigrant part time ind r year
i i ind r t i t i t i i t
ind r year
D D D D D? ? ? ??? ? ? ????   .     (3.6) 
 
We repeat the same procedure using municipalities instead of NUTS-3 regions. 
Estimated coefficients are very comparable to those estimated in the previous 
section. 
In the second stage of our analysis, we explain the resulting residual by a set 
of geographical variables, to test for the presence of different types of 
agglomeration externalities. Here we include the log of employment density in 
each region (urbanization effect), the log employment share of each industry and 
region (specialization effect), surface area, Shannon’s entropy (Jacobs diversity 
effect), and a Hirschman-Herfindahl based index on the distribution of 
employment over firms (Porter competition effect).  
The measures we use for the different agglomeration forces have been 
introduced more extensively in Section 3.2. We thus estimate the following 
equation: 
 
 , , 1 , 2 , , 3 ,ind r t r t ind r t r tDensity Specialization Diversity? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?       (3.7) 
           
4 , , 5 , 6, , 7, , , ,log
ind year
ind r t r t ind r t year ind r ind r t
ind year
Competition Area D D? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
. 
 
We estimate equation (3.7) both on the regional level of NUTS-3 regions and on 
municipalities. A classical estimation problem when attempting to estimate 
agglomeration economies is that region size is likely to be endogenous to local 
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wages. If we estimate equation (3.7) using normal OLS, it is therefore not clear 
whether causality runs from higher population density to higher productivity, or 
whether higher productivity merely attracts more workers thus increasing density. 
Following Ciccone and Hall (1996), historical population densities have been 
used to instrument for current density. As historical population is unlikely to have 
been altered by current productivity, while historical and current density are at the 
same time highly correlated, this provides a suitable instrument. We therefore 
estimate the impact of agglomeration both using OLS and Instrumental Variables 
(IV), whereby we use the density in 1840 as an instrument for present density. 
Furthermore, to obtain robust standard errors we have clustered estimated 
standard errors by region.23 
The results of our four specifications are presented in Table 3.4. Our 
preferred specification is the one estimated on the NUTS-3 level using 
instrumental variables (IV). The interpretation of the most important findings 
from this specification is that doubling the density of employees working in a 
region is associated with a 4.8 percent higher wage on average. Doubling the 
share of an industry in a region results in a 2.9 percent higher wage for the 
workers in that region. The effects of employment density and specialization are 
slightly higher when using IV compared to our OLS regressions, which implies 
that endogeneity has not resulted in an upward bias of our OLS estimates. 
Additionally, we find a statistically significant negative relation between the 
residual wage component and both competition and diversity (albeit the latter 
becomes statistically insignificant in our IV-specification), contradicting the 
presence of Porter and Jacobs externalities (and consistent with insights from the 
efficiency wage literature; see, for example, Krueger and Summers, 1988, 
amongst many others). 
                                                 
23 Another estimation issue results from using a two-stage estimation strategy. As the standard 
errors of the estimated fixed effects (?ind,r,t) depend on the number of observations within each 
industry-region-year group in the first stage, using ?ind,r,t as dependent variable introduces some 
heteroscedasticity (Combes et al., 2008a). To correct for this issue, Combes et al. (2008a) use a 
feasible generalized least-squares estimator (FGLS). However, their results show that the effects of 
sampling errors in the first stage have little effect on the estimates at the second stage, and they 
therefore ignore them when dealing with endogeneity for computational simplicity. Consequently, 
we will refrain from using FGLS. 
If we compare the results estimated for NUTS-3 regions with those for 
municipalities, which are presented in the two right hand columns in Table 3.4, it 
emerges that agglomeration effects are found to be considerably smaller. For 
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municipalities, the employment density-wage elasticity is 0.021, while it was 
0.048 for the NUTS-3 regions. A possible explanation for these lower estimates is 
that agglomeration economies operate on a larger spatial scale than that of 
municipalities. As Briant et al. (2010) show, it is important that the chosen scale 
of a regional classification corresponds with the level of aggregation at which the 
researched phenomenon is expected to operate. As different municipalities within 
the same local labor market function as integrated economies, where large 
differences in productivity cannot persist, variety in agglomeration measures
within those local labor markets may have less relevance and is also likely to 
introduce noise. Therefore, our preferred estimations are those on the NUTS-3 
level. 
In addition to the results presented in Table 3.4, we have performed an array 
of robustness checks on our estimates. Because the number of hours worked 
(which was included in the first stage of our estimation strategy) might be 
endogenous, we have re-estimated our model considering only full-time 
employees. This yields very similar results: all estimates are qualitatively the 
same and the estimated agglomeration density – using IV estimation on NUTS-3 
regions – becomes 4.9 percent. Even though theory suggests that directly 
estimating the effects of agglomeration would result in biased estimates (see 
Section 3.3 or Moulton, 1990), we have compared the results from the two-stage 
approach to single-stage OLS and IV estimates. This resulted in comparable 
regression coefficients, but far lower (though most likely biased) standard errors.  
In underlining the importance of using micro data for the identification of 
agglomeration externalities, it has often been pointed out that aggregate regional 
data (especially average sectoral composition and worker characteristics) do not 
sufficiently correct for worker and firm characteristics (Combes et al., 2008a and 
2008b, Puga, 2010). Insufficiently controlling for worker heterogeneity will result 
in an upward bias when estimating agglomeration economies. Melo et al. (2009) 
support this observation in their meta-analysis of 34 studies, finding that the use 
of aggregate data generally results in higher elasticities than the use of micro data, 
as does Smit (2010) in a meta-analysis of 73 studies. 
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Table 3.4. Explaining the spatial residual 
Dependent: NUTS-3 regions Municipalities 
1st-stage spatial residual (?ind,r,t) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV) 
     
# Observations 7,412 7,412 25,881 25,643 
     
Log employment density 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (6.8) (6.8) (8.7) (4.3) 
Specialization (industry share) 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (6.6) (6.7) (8.2) (8.2) 
Diversity (Shannon’s entropy) –0.094* –0.075 –0.030** –0.027* 
 (2.0) (1.4) (2.6) (2.3) 
Competition (1–HHI) –0.060* –0.075** –0.013 –0.016 
 (2.3) (2.7) (1.4) (1.3) 
Log(area) 0.017* 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.011* 
 (2.5) (3.4) (3.3) (2.1) 
     
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
R² 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.19 
 
Note: t-statistics and z-values (in absolute values) are reported in parentheses. 
Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
In view of this discussion, our data allow us to compare our work with previous 
research that did not use micro data, by aggregating all variables used in the micro 
regressions to regional averages. Table 3.5 (left) shows an employment density 
elasticity of 0.043 for NUTS-3 regions. This implies that doubling the number of 
workers on a given area results in a 4.3 percent increase of productivity. This 
figure is within the range of the 3–8 percent found in the meta-analysis of Melo et 
al. (2009), but much lower than the 18 percent found by Gorter and Kok (2009), 
who also use Dutch aggregate data. However, Gorter and Kok use production 
density instead of employment density, while not controlling for worker 
heterogeneity.24 Estimating our equation using aggregated data on municipalities 
results in an employment density elasticity of 2.5 percent, when correcting for 
average age and education. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24  If we do not include the average level of education and the average age in our macro 
specification, we find an elasticity of 5.7 percent on the NUTS-3 level. 
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Table 3.5. Explaining regional productivity differences using aggregate data 
Dependent: Average Log regional wage NUTS-3 regions Municipalities 
 (OLS) (OLS) 
   
# Observations 7,412 25,881 
   
Average age 0.019 0.009*** 
 (1.3) (3.7) 
Average education 0.047*** 0.062*** 
 (4.2) (13.0) 
Log employment density 0.043*** 0.025*** 
 (4.0) (7.8) 
Specialization (industry share) 0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.4) (4.7) 
Diversity (Shannon’s entropy) –0.117* –0.027 
 (2.5) (1.6) 
Competition (1–HHI) –0.019** –0.014** 
 (2.7) (2.7) 
Log(area) 0.015 0.019** 
 (1.6) (2.7) 
   
Sector dummies yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
   
R² 0.72 0.53 
 
Notes: t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported in parentheses. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 
and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Even if a certain worker characteristic has been identified as a strong determinant 
of individual wages, its contribution to explaining regional wage differences can 
be limited if its distribution over space is more or less uniform. Table 3.6 
therefore presents some information about the economic implications of the 
findings presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. The economic implications are 
illustrated by multiplying the Mincer estimates (for both NUTS-3 regions and 
municipalities) with the standard deviation of the regional averages of each of the 
independent variables in the analysis. One standard deviation gives us a 
reasonable proxy for the variation of explanatory variables across space. 
Even though the male-female wage gap is substantial (14.8 percent, according 
to Table 3.3), it has a relatively small regional economic impact due to the fact 
that the distribution of the share of females on the labor market is fairly uniform 
across regions. A one standard deviation increase in the share of females in a 
NUTS-3 region is associated with a 0.48 percent decrease in the average regional 
wage. As there is large regional diversity in the share of high skilled workers, 
while education is at the same time one of the most important wage determinants, 
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variation in the share of high skilled workers has a much stronger explanatory 
power. Employment density – even between NUTS-3 regions – can be considered 
as an important determinant of observed wage differences between regions. Due 
to the fact that variety in worker characteristics is larger between municipalities 
than between NUTS-3 regions, the economic impact of the estimated coefficients 
is in most of the cases larger for municipalities. Even though agglomeration 
variables also vary more between municipalities than between NUTS-3 regions, 
they have less explanatory power for wage differences between municipalities 
because the estimated size effects are smaller. 
 
Table 3.6. Economic impact of estimates on regional wage differentials 
Effect of a one standard deviation 
change on expected average wage NUTS-3 regions Municipalities 
   
Age 0.54 1.79 
   
Share of highly educated workers 1.70 3.27 
   
Share of part-time workers –0.12 –0.30 
   
Share of female workers –0.48 –1.72 
   
Share of immigrant workers –0.22 –0.31 
   
Log employment density 4.47 2.67 
   
Diversity (Shannon’s entropy) –0.67 –0.57 
   
Area 1.65 0.98 
 
Notes: Economic impact is calculated as the expected percentage change in average wage resulting 
from a one standard deviation increase of the respective variables. Specialization and competition 
are not included in this table, as they are sector-specific measures. Detailed results for individual 
sectors are available upon request. 
 
To conclude, Table 3.7 presents the expected and actual wage differences between 
urbanized and non-urbanized areas (as percentage deviations, which are – for 
convenience – calculated by multiplying expected log wage differentials by 100). 
Urbanized areas are taken as the 22 agglomerations that are defined by Statistics 
Netherlands. The rest of the country is classified as non-urban. In total, the 22 
urbanized areas cover about half of the Dutch population. All values are relative 
to the (weighted) average of municipalities outside the agglomerations. The 
expected log wage differential is decomposed into different components. 
Expected log wage differentials were calculated by multiplying the coefficients 
that were estimated for municipalities (using the IV estimations) by averages of
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the independent variables within each agglomeration (in deviation from their non-
urbanized counterparts). 
The columns in the right part of Table 3.7 present the contribution of each 
component to the expected wage differential. On average, wages are 7 percent 
higher in agglomerations than in peripheral municipalities. In all agglomerations, 
both the actual average wage and expected wages are above zero (e.g. above the 
average wage and expected wage in municipalities outside the 22 largest 
agglomerations). The variables that explain the largest part of the expected wage 
differential between agglomerations and the periphery are the level of education 
and density. Other variables do not provide a structural explanation, with the 
exception of the share of non-native workers, which are relatively overrepresented 
in the large cities and earn a lower wage ceteris paribus. 
The explanatory power of the models that were estimated in this chapter is 
substantial. The correlation between actual wages and expected wages is 0.90 for 
the 22 agglomerations in Table 3.7, and 0.79 for all 467 Dutch municipalities. 
Amsterdam and The Hague have a relatively large difference between the 
expected wage and the actual wage. This suggests that these cities – the capital 
and the government seat – have something ‘extra’ that is not captured in any of 
the variables in our regression model. 
The findings presented in Table 3.7 once more illustrate the relatively flat and 
polycentric geographic and economic landscape in the Netherlands. Combes et al. 
(2008a) report a 60 percent wage differential between Paris and rural France, and 
a 35 percent differential between Paris and mid-sized French cities. In the 
Netherlands, wages in Amsterdam and The Hague are only about 20 percent 
higher compared to non urbanized regions. Furthermore, there are multiple 
agglomerations where wages are relatively high, rather than just one. 
 
3.7 Robustness 
As we discussed in Section 3.2, there is discussion in the literature regarding the 
empirical proxies that are to be used to identify the importance of agglomeration 
externalities. In a meta-analysis, De Groot et al. (2009) found that different 
proxies can lead to substantially different results, ceteris paribus; the use of a 
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location quotient to measure specialization, for example, makes it more likely that 
a significantly positive agglomeration effect is found. 
The proxies we used in the previous sections are our own preference, and also 
commonly used in the literature. We will now investigate the robustness of our 
results (and those found in the agglomeration literature more in general) by 
varying the specification of the agglomeration variables used in the second stage. 
Our original estimates (Table 3.4) included employment density and area as 
urbanization variables, the industry share for specialization, a Hirschman-
Herfindahl index for competition, and Shannon’s entropy as a diversity variable. 
We will now test three different proxies for specialization, competition and 
diversity, which we will use in our estimations once together with urbanization 
effects, and once without controlling for urbanization. This results in 32 estimates 
for each proxy of one of the agglomeration variables. The variables chosen are 
presented in Table 3.8. To ease comparison, the variables are defined such that a 
higher value corresponds to more specialization, competition or diversity.  
 
Table 3.8. Agglomeration variables and their correlations 
Type variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sp
ec
ia
liz
at
io
n (1) 
Ellison-Glaeser 
index 1.00         
(2) Location quotient 0.06 1.00        
(3) Local industry employment –0.06 –0.01 1.00       
C
om
pe
tit
io
n (4) 
1–HHI on firm 
employment shares –0.06 –0.24 0.24 1.00      
(5) Firms per employee in sector-region 0.02 –0.20 –0.11 –0.05 1.00     
(6) Number of firms in local industry –0.07 –0.06 0.82 0.33 –0.09 1.00    
D
iv
er
si
ty
 
(7) 1–HHI on industry employment shares 0.08 –0.03 –0.08 0.05 0.04 –0.04 1.00   
(8) Shannon's entropy 0.07 –0.03 –0.04 0.05 0.02 –0.02 0.93 1.00  
(9) Glaeser’s largest sectors index 0.11 0.05 –0.50 0.26 –0.07 0.42 0.58 0.58 1.00 
 
Note: Specialization refers to the proxies for MAR-externalities, competition to Porter externalities 
and diversity to Jacobs externalities. 
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Results of the robustness analysis are presented in the form of box-and-whisker 
plots in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. A similar plot for the urbanization variables 
can be found in Figure 3.5. We note that some variables are highly robust to the 
inclusion of other agglomeration variables: for example, the Ellison-Glaeser index 
hardly varies across the 2×9 estimations, which is in line with its low correlation 
with the other variables (see Table 3.8). 
 
Figure 3.3. Box-and-whisker plot of repeated regressions with different 
specifications of the variables, controlling for urbanization. 
 
 
           Specialization               Competition          Diversity 
S-ellis: Ellison-Glaeser index C-hhi: 1–HHI on firm 
employment shares 
D-hhi: 1–HHI on industry 
employment shares 
S-lq: Location quotient C-fpe: Firms per employee  
in sector-region 
D-shann: Shannon's entropy 
S-emp: Local industry  
employment share 
C-firms: Number of firms in 
local industry 
D-glae: Glaeser’s largest 
sectors' index 
 
The variation of the results that are found is larger when urbanization variables are 
not included, and significance levels are higher. However, no variable changes 
sign (see Figure 3.4), although the Ellison-Glaeser index and Glaeser’s largest 
sectors index become insignificant when controlling for urbanization. Glaeser’s 
largest sectors index is the measure for diversity that Glaeser et al. (1992) use: it 
takes for every region the share of the largest six sectors (minus the sector under
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Figure 3.4. Box-and-whisker plot of repeated regressions with different 
specifications of the variables, not controlling for urbanization. 
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S-ellis: Ellison-Glaeser index C-hhi: 1–HHI on firm 
employment shares 
D-hhi: 1–HHI on industry 
employment shares 
S-lq: Location quotient C-fpe: Firms per employee  
in sector-region 
D-shann: Shannon's entropy 
S-emp: Local industry  
employment share 
C-firms: Number of firms in 
local industry 
D-glae: Glaeser’s largest 
sectors' index 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Box-and-whisker plot for urbanization variables 
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observation) in total regional employment, and interprets a large number as 
evidence of little diversity. Note that the other two measures for diversity, in 
contrast, seem quite insensitive to the inclusion of urbanization variables. 
Results differ widely within each group of measures. For both competition 
and diversity, some proxies render quite consistently positive results (the number 
of firms in the local industry), while others show negative results (the number of 
firms per employee in the sector-region and the HHI index on industry 
employment shares). These results confirm the findings of De Groot et al. (2009), 
who concluded in their meta-analysis that the specification of variables matters 
for the effect that will be found. This implies that even where some studies claim 
to look at the same variable, their results will actually not be comparable but 
depend on the proxies they included. There are a few proxies that give similar 
results between them, at least for our data and method: those are for example local 
industry employment and the location coefficient as measures for specialization, 
or, in most cases, all three diversity variables. Our results suggest that estimations 
from studies using these variables can sensibly be compared, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter described differences in wages between NUTS-3 
regions in the Netherlands. We confirm that wages are substantially higher in the 
urbanized Randstad area than in the rest of the Netherlands. Also, average wages 
show a clear pattern of positive spatial association among neighboring NUTS-3 
regions. A geographical representation of the spatial residual showed that, after 
correcting for regional differences in human capital, workers in densely populated 
areas get paid a premium. The spatial residual, which is the regional average wage 
corrected for observed worker heterogeneity, is strongly correlated to average 
regional wage. 
At the heart of the analysis is the explanation of the spatial residual. We find 
that the total size of the regional labor market has a statistically significant and 
positive effect on wages, even though this explains a relatively small part of the 
spatial residual. Using the Mincer residuals on the NUTS-3 level, we find an 
employment density elasticity of 4.8 percent, and also clear evidence for the 
presence of MAR externalities. Doubling the share of an industry results in a 2.9
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percent higher productivity level. In our main specification, we find evidence for 
small negative effects of Porter and Jacobs externalities. However, we show in an 
extensive robustness test that the specification of these variables matters to a large 
degree for the effects found. 
The estimated agglomeration economies are lower than those estimated in 
previous work for the Netherlands by Gorter and Kok (2009), but correspond to 
what is found in the existing international literature by Combes et al. (2008a) and 
Melo et al. (2009). The current study for the Netherlands supports the finding that 
the size of estimates of agglomeration externalities are to a large extent 
determined by the ability of the data and methods that are used to correct for 
regional and individual heterogeneity. 
An issue that remains unaddressed in most of the current literature, and in this 
chapter as well, is the endogeneity problem caused by local endowments. The 
presence of universities, infrastructure and local institutions all increase local 
productivity while being highly correlated with density. Due to a lack of good 
instruments, it has proven difficult to isolate the effect of density. Even though 
agglomeration externalities that have been estimated in the current literature are 
insightful, the causal relation between agglomeration and productivity will remain 
unclear until this endogeneity issue has been solved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
75 
4 THE EDUCATIONAL BIAS IN COMMUTING 
PATTERNS 
 
4.1 Introduction25 
The past few decades have been characterized by several socioeconomic changes 
with important consequences for patterns of travel behavior and residential 
location. Many economic and residential activities have decentralized from old 
centers to the suburbs of metropolitan and urban areas, and people have begun to 
travel – on average – longer distances than in the past. Commuting time, in 
contrast, has remained rather constant, because workers use increasingly faster 
modes of transport. This phenomenon is known as the ‘commuting time paradox’ 
(Van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2005). Of a relatively recent date is a revival of 
cities with attractive amenities, which seem to be particularly attractive for high 
skilled people (e.g., Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Glaeser, 2011). These trends are 
related to a complex set of developments that occurred in the last few decades, 
among which are the increase in per capita income, an increase in the number of 
part-time workers and two-earner households, and the wide diffusion of private 
cars and technological progress which is most visible in the advent of ICT. 
The increase in per capita income and in the number of workers – where the 
latter is also related to the increase in female participation rates – are important 
aspects to be taken into account to understand the changing commuting 
                                                 
25 This chapter is based on Groot et al. (2012). 
patterns. These facts have made time scarcer, inducing individuals to trade-off 
money for time (Levinson and Kumar, 1995). This need for substitution, in turn, 
has increased the number of transactions and the consequent need to travel, 
affecting both localization patterns and individual travel behavior. At the same 
time, the income elasticity of demand for housing may increase commuting time 
because individuals with higher incomes want to live in more spacious housing. 
As argued by Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2004), commuting is the result of a 
network economy in which individuals look for earning opportunities outside their 
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place of residence. As a matter of fact, the spatial organization of earning 
capabilities – the physical separation between home and fulfilling workplaces – 
and individual characteristics are the main determinants of commuting patterns. 
Travel behavior is affected by both individual attributes and characteristics of 
the context in which individuals live. Among the individual attributes that are 
thought to influence travel patterns, education has been often included in 
empirical analyses as a mere control in order to disentangle the role of other 
attributes. The goal of this chapter is to understand the role of education as a 
determinant of differences in travel behavior across individuals in the 
Netherlands. The empirical literature shows with substantial clarity that more 
educated workers commute longer and further than low-skilled workers. 
However, explanations are scarce. Moreover, given the fact that average education 
is increasing, the implications in terms of the spatial dimension of the labor 
market and the connected commuting patterns are worth investigating. 
The reasons why education can play a role in explaining differences in travel 
behavior are diverse. In fact, investments in human capital can strongly influence 
both job and home location. Search frictions in both the labor market and the 
housing market may be related to the level of education. As higher educated 
workers are more likely to own, rather than rent housing, residential mobility is 
likely to be lower. This results – ceteris paribus – in longer commutes. On the 
labor market, search frictions could be relatively high for higher educated workers 
because of the more specialized nature of their work, which would again increase 
commuting time. Another reason why commuting distance and time might be 
higher for workers that are more educated is that educated people are more willing 
to travel longer distances to realize their human capital investments as well as 
their professional expectations. Moreover, higher educated people are on average 
paid more than low-skilled workers, such that the choice of residence also could 
be influenced by the desire to live in higher quality houses in the low-density 
hinterland of urban areas. The fact that the largest Dutch cities have a relatively 
high share of social housing is likely to contribute to this. The full set of factors at 
the base of the role of education for travel behavior are analyzed in the following 
sections, trying to disentangle the role of individual attributes from that of the 
spatial characteristics of the places of residence and work. 
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The empirical part of this chapter is aimed at finding empirical evidence on the 
specific role of education on commuting patterns, trying also to disentangle such a 
role from the effect of higher wages. In fact, despite the always-present 
correlation between the level of education and the wage of workers, education 
could have a specific role in terms of commuting behavior that goes beyond its 
effect on wages. Differences in commuting patterns between well-paid and well-
educated workers may occur for several reasons. First, as it was argued before, the 
spatial extent of the job-search area is wider for highly educated workers, since 
they are relatively more likely to find a fulfilling job when travelling further 
relative to lower educated workers. This is because the job market for highly 
educated workers is more concentrated in large urban centers. Second, highly 
educated workers may prefer to use public means of transport, since they have the 
possibility to carry out part of their work during the trip. The successful 
introduction of Office Buses in some countries, like Finland, is useful to 
understand that there is a value in the possibility to work during the commute. 
It is also possible that the higher use of public transport by higher educated 
workers is to some extent institutionalized. Many public institutions (such as 
universities), promote the use of public transport among their employees. While 
there is often no compensation for the use of personal cars, these public 
institutions fully or partially compensate their employees when they use public 
transport for their commutes. As the share of higher educated workers is 
somewhat higher in the public sector compared to the market sector, this would 
result in a positive correlation between level of education and the use of public 
transport. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature on the determinants of commuting behavior, as well as previous findings 
about the role of education. Theories that help to interpret the reason behind the 
role of education for commuting are also discussed in this section. Section 4.3 
describes our dataset, as well as commuting patterns in the Netherlands and 
presents some stylized facts about the differences between commutes of higher 
and lower educated workers. Section 4.4 specifies the empirical settings that are 
employed in order to understand the implications of education for commuting 
patterns and the factors explaining these differences. Section 4.5 gives some 
concluding remarks, and discusses possible policy implications. 
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4.2 Related literature and theoretical background 
The link between individual education level and commuting behavior is complex, 
especially if mode choice, distance travelled and time spent travelling are all taken 
into account simultaneously. There is quite a large amount of scientific work that 
investigates the role of individual attributes on commuting behavior. Compared 
with other non-individual characteristics, such as spatial structure, housing 
markets, and the balance between jobs and residents, individual attributes seem to 
account for a large part of commuting behavior (Giuliano and Small, 1993). 
Among these individual attributes, the level of education has often been included 
as a control, but its nature and the implications of its role have rarely been 
discussed in detail. 
The empirical literature devoted to understanding the determinants of 
commuting behavior finds that a higher level of education is associated with 
longer trips in terms of distance (Lee and McDonald, 2003; Papanikolaou, 2006; 
Vance and Hedel, 2008; Prashker et al., 2008). Similar results are found with 
regard to commuting time (Lee and McDonald, 2003; Shen, 2000). More 
specifically, Shen (2000) finds that highly educated people travel longer while 
low educated people tend to work closer to home. In addition, it has been argued 
that highly educated people have a higher probability to be long-distance 
commuters (Öhman and Lindgren, 2003). This may be explained from the fact 
that the disutility associated with distance travelled is smaller for the highly 
educated (Rouwendal, 2004). 
On the other hand, by taking into account alternative modes of transport, 
Burbidge et al. (2006) and Coogan (2003) show that highly educated individuals 
walk significantly more than poorly-educated ones. Dieleman et al. (2002) in their 
analysis of Dutch commuting patterns find that more educated people are more 
likely to use private cars for their commutes. They also find that education is 
relatively important for shopping trips than for work related commutes, since 
shopping activities are more affected by the type of residential environment. 
Hence, higher educated workers – which tend to live in the residential suburbs – 
travel on average longer distances than people living in more central and more 
shop-served locations. Furthermore, they find that the most educated people travel 
longer distances by public transport for leisure activities. On the whole, the 
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positive association between the level of education and the length of the commute 
– both in terms of time and distance travelled – is almost a stylized fact in the 
empirical literature. 
 
Understanding the role of education 
In order to understand the role of individual education on commuting patterns, 
many factors should be taken into account. The distance and time travelled 
depend on residential and work location, both of which are chosen by individuals. 
Some studies have investigated these individual choices using a joint utility 
approach that considers choices among combinations of residence and job 
localizations that maximize individual utility (Yapa et al., 1971). Put differently, 
this approach explains commuting behavior as the minimization of commuting 
and migration costs, given a certain income level. 
As the Dutch housing market is relatively regulated, the costs of migration 
may be relatively high, thus positively affecting commuting distance and time. 
However, a possible shortcoming of this hypothesis is that the bulk of workplaces 
are located within cities, so that the choice of work location is particularly 
bounded by the localization of firms. In addition, commuters are not identical and 
individual characteristics are central in explaining observed travel behavior. Of 
particular importance in the Netherlands are relatively high transaction costs on 
residential mobility.  
Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn (2005) have estimated that a 1 percent-
point increase in transaction costs decreases residential mobility rates by at least 8 
percent. The 6 percent ad valorem tax on buying housing (reduced to 2 percent in 
2011) is likely to have resulted in a substantial reduction of the mobility of house 
owners. As this increases the costs of reducing commuting time by changing 
residential location, this is likely to result in higher commuting time. Furthermore, 
higher educated workers are more likely to own a house relative to lower educated 
workers (see, for example, Hood, 1999), this is likely to increase the average 
commuting time of higher educated workers relative to the lower educated. 
The joint utility approach does not provide an explanation for excess 
commuting, e.g. the phenomenon that actual commuting is substantially larger 
than the amount of commuting that would be optimal given the spatial distribution 
of the quality of housing and jobs. Van Ommeren and Van der Straaten (2008) 
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estimate that excess commuting due to search imperfections accounts for about 
half of total commuting. Because of imperfect information regarding all available 
jobs, workers will regularly accept a job at a certain location that does not 
optimize their wage and commuting costs, because they do not know if and when 
better job offers will arrive. As the activities of higher educated workers tend to 
be more specialized relative to the those of lower educated workers, it is likely 
that the job arrival rate will be lower for more educated people, which will result 
in a suboptimal match and thus higher commuting distance and time. 
The spatial distribution of activities within regions and urban areas can 
contribute significantly to explaining the role of education in commuting patterns. 
In fact, it has been argued that the central cities within metropolitan areas remain 
to have a good accessibility to less educated jobs, even in those regions that 
experienced a drastic decentralization of jobs (Shen, 1998). In addition, graduates 
are becoming less spatially mobile, in the sense that they migrate less toward 
other regions in order to find a job. However, this trend is mainly explained by 
macroeconomic factors such as regional economic development rather than by a 
changing role of education for individuals (Venhorst et al., 2011). Regarding 
individual characteristics, a higher level of education is associated with a higher 
income, which in turn has been found to be correlated with longer trips (Giuliano 
and Small, 1993).  
Besides being related to income, education is related to the spatial scale of 
individuals' social networks and with the area of job search (Holzer, 1987; 
Wilson, 1987). Educated individuals carry out their daily activities, including the 
choice of jobs and the related commuting, in a wider space. In addition, it has 
been argued that well educated individuals travel longer distances because they 
look for more desirable residential locations, paying relatively less attention to the 
length of the travel (Prashker et al., 2008). In other words: as the level of 
education increases, the sensitivity to the distance travelled decreases due to 
residential preferences. An additional cause for the longer commutes of well-
educated individuals is that people with a higher level of education are more 
likely to find interesting and gratifying jobs, hence they can accept a longer travel 
(Ory et al., 2004). As a matter of fact, they could value the travel to work less than 
people with low education levels. Consistently with this idea, Giuliano (1989) 
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argues that education may influence home locations and the ability to absorb 
transportation costs. 
 
4.3 Data and stylized facts 
The empirical part of this chapter builds upon linked micro data from Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS). The source for data on worker and job characteristics (except 
for wages) and commuter behavior are the 2000 to 2008 cross-sections of the 
Dutch labor force survey (EBB, Enquête Beroeps Bevolking). As wages are not 
available through the labor force survey, we have used data from the Dutch tax 
authority (compulsory employer reported), which is available through the CBS 
Social Statistics database (SSB, Sociaal Statistisch Bestand). For workers with 
multiple jobs, we include only the (self-reported) most important job. The CBS 
consumer price deflator (CPI, Consumenten Prijs Index) has been used to deflate 
wages. For most of the analysis in this chapter, we use the natural logarithm of 
real pre-tax hourly wages. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing the employer 
reported pre-tax annual wage from SSB (e.g., the fiscal wage) by the self-reported 
number of hours an employee works in a typical week (from EBB) and the 
number of weeks the employee worked during a year, which is calculated from 
the (employer reported) start and end date of the job. Due to methodological 
revisions of both SSB and EBB, there is a discontinuity between 2005 and 2006, 
though its effect on outcomes seems to be minor. It is important to note that wages 
do not include compensation for travel expenses.26 
To make sure that only workers with a sufficiently strong attachment to the 
labor market are included, we have dropped some observations. Workers must be 
aged 18–65 (e.g., older than 18 on January 1st and younger than 65 on December 
31st of each year), and work at least 12 hours per week.27 We have dropped all 
observations with an hourly wage less than 10 percent of the median hourly
                                                 
26  If we would have included employers compensation for travel expenses, this would have 
resulted in several econometric issues. As many employers in the Netherlands compensate 
employees for their commuting expenses, this would result in a spurious regression when, for 
example, estimating the relation between wages and commuting distance. 
27 Statistics Netherlands defines workers with a working week of at least 12 hours as employed, 
workers with a working week of at least 36 hours are considered full-time employees. Jobs 
occupied by teenagers are often side-line jobs that would be outliers in our dataset.  
wage. Such observations are unlikely to be regular wages, as they are below the 
minimum wage. Worker characteristics are the level of education (we can 
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distinguish eight different levels), age, municipality of residence, country of birth 
(a binary variable that indicates whether a worker is born in the Netherlands or 
not), gender, and whether a worker is employed part-time or full-time. For each 
job, the self-reported municipality where the employee works is available, as well 
as the industry (we use the 2-digit NACE industry from the ABR registry). On the 
commute of each worker, we have data on the (self-reported) mode of transport, 
average travel distance and travel time. The resulting dataset of nine cross-
sections contains 154,238 observations (an average of 17,138 per year). The 
number of observations is somewhat lower compared to other chapters, because 
information on commuting is available for only a subsection of the labor force 
survey. 
 
Commuting distance and time 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics concerning the variables that are related to 
commuting behavior. The average distance of a (one-way) commute is 17 
kilometers, the average commuting time 22 minutes. The choice for a mode of 
commuting is strongly biased towards private means of transport (accounting for a 
90.3 percent share). Table 4.1 reveals a strong dependence of commuting distance 
and time on the employed mode of transport. Most commutes by pedestrians or 
cyclists are short distances. Cars are used for somewhat longer distances (on 
average 21 km and 23 minutes). Public transport is – on average – used for longer 
distance commutes. 
Compared to other motorized means of transport, buses, trams, and the 
underground are relatively slow, taking an average time of 37 minutes for a 16 km 
average trip. Trains are used for particularly long commutes, with an average 
distance of 41.1 km and a commuting time of 55 min. The figures from Table 4.1 
are consistent with what is generally found in the literature (see, for example 
OECD, 2010). Compared to other countries, commuting times are relatively long 
in the Netherlands. According to international comparative research Dutch 
workers spend an average of 51 minutes28 on commuting per day in 2005 (the 
longest commuting time in their sample of 31 European countries), compared to 
42 minutes in the EU-27 (Parent-Thirion et al., 2007; OECD, 2010). 
                                                 
28 If we take into account that our figures refer to single trips per job, while part of the working 
population have multiple jobs, this figure is very similar to what we find.  
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics, 2000–2008 
Mode Commuters Distance Time 
observations %-share km min 
     
Pedestrian 3,561 2.3 1.0 8.1 
Bicycle 41,023 26.6 4.4 12.5 
Motorbikes or scooter 3,741 2.4 13.0 17.4 
Personal car 90,925 59.0 21.2 23.4 
     
Private transport 139,250 90.3 15.5 19.6 
    
Bus, tram, underground 6,300 4.1 16.0 36.8 
Train 8,688 5.6 41.1 54.6 
     
Public transport 14,988 9.7 30.5 47.1 
    
Total 154,238 100.0 17.0 22.3 
 
Note: Travel distance and time correspond to one-way trips. 
 
The interdependence between the commuting distance, commuting time, and 
private versus public mode of transport is presented in Table 4.2. Whereas only 
2.6 percent of all commutes by private means of transport take more than one 
hour, this figure is almost one fifth for public transport. A major share of 81.9 
percent of commutes by private transport take 30 minutes or less, whereas this 
figure is only 33.5 percent for public means of transport. The most likely 
explanations for this observation are that public transport is less efficient over 
shorter distances, possibly because of the distance between location of residence 
and the nearest bus stop or railway station, and that public means of transport are 
used more often in densely populated areas that are more congested and are 
characterized by generally lower speed. At the same time, commuting by foot or 
bicycle is suitable only for short distances. 
 
Table 4.2. Commuters and distance by commuting time, 2000–2008 
Time Private transport Public transport 
minutes %-share distance (km) %-share distance (km) 
     
0-15 66.0   7.1 14.1   9.9 
16-30 15.9 19.8 19.4 15.6 
31-60 15.4 37.0 47.0 29.2 
> 60 2.6 72.2 19.5 64.3 
 
Note: Travel distance and time correspond to one-way trips. 
 
The average distance of a single trip is relatively stable over time, and ranges from 
16 km in 2000 to 17.7 km in 2007. Commuting time ranges from 21.5 minutes to 
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23.3 minutes (in 2000 and 2007, respectively). Even though commuters live about 
as far from their work in 2000 as in 2008, there are some shifts in the use of 
different modes of transport. In particular, commutes by bike have become less 
popular over time (from a 29.0 percent share in 2000 to a 24.9 percent share in 
2008), while the share of car users increased somewhat. In 2000, the car was used 
for 56.7 percent of commutes; in 2008 this figure was 61.2 percent. However, it is 
important to note that most changes occurred between 2005 and 2006 such that it 
cannot be ruled out that the observed trends are the result of a data revision. 
 
Commuting behavior and education in Dutch agglomerations 
Figure 4.1 shows commuter flows of higher educated commuters (left) and lower 
educated commuters (right) between municipalities that represent 1,000 or more 
commuters. The largest commuter flows are within agglomerations, between the 
central municipalities and their surrounding suburban municipalities, as well as 
between peripheral municipalities. Although small in relative size, there are also 
substantial commuter flows between the largest agglomerations. Even though the 
Randstad 29  is sometimes considered as a unique polycentric urban region, 
commuting patterns indicate that the agglomerations in this region are best seen as 
separate local labor markets, albeit with strong connections between some 
agglomerations in the area and with some overlapping boundaries. 
Commuting patterns are not only asymmetric in direction (e.g., with a much 
higher inflow than outflow of commuters or vice versa); there is a strong 
interdependence between agglomeration and the level of education as well. The 
shades in Figure 4.1 represent the balance index of highly educated commuters 
(defined as the net inflow of highly educated commuters divided by the sum of the 
inflow and outflow) towards each agglomeration (which we refer to as in-
commuters). Because of sample size, we have pooled all municipalities by 
agglomeration, and by NUTS-3 region in the periphery (see Appendix A for a 
map with the 40 Dutch NUTS-3 regions). In most agglomerations, the inflow of 
highly educated workers is larger than the outflow. 
Table 4.3 shows the share of private versus public transport by level of 
education, as well as the average commuting distance and time. While workers 
                                                 
29 The Randstad refers to the area in the Netherlands where the four largest agglomerations – 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht – are located. 
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with only primary education commute just over 10 km on average, this figure is 
about twice as high for workers with a University (Master) degree. Higher 
educated workers are also more likely to use public transport. Workers with the 
lowest education levels, however, are somewhat more likely to use public 
transport than those with average education. This may be related to budget 
constraints, as lower educated employees are disproportionately likely to use 
public transport for short-distance commutes. 
 
Figure 4.1. Commuters and balance index of higher educated (left) and lower 
educated (right) commuters, 2008 
 
Notes: Balance index is defined as (inflow of commuters – outflow) / (inflow + outflow). Higher 
educated workers are those with at least higher tertiary education, lower educated workers are 
defined as all other workers. Stroked areas represent the 22 agglomerations (GSA) defined by 
Statistics Netherlands. 
 
Table 4.3. Commuting distance and time by type of education, 2000–2008 
Type of education Private transport Public transport 
%-share distance 
km 
time 
min 
%-share distance 
km 
time 
 min 
       
Primary education 92.0 10.5 15.5 8.0 15.7 38.0 
Lower secondary education (VMBO, MBO 1) 92.7 12.3 16.6 7.3 21.6 41.1 
Higher secondary education (HAVO, VWO) 97.2 15.3 20.4 12.8 27.0 45.2 
Lower tertiary education (MBO 2, 3) 93.0 13.5 17.2 7.0 24.3 41.8 
Lower tertiary education (MBO 4) 93.7 15.5 19.2 6.3 28.6 45.4 
Higher tertiary education (HBO, BA) 91.3 17.5 21.8 8.7 33.4 49.5 
Higher tertiary education (MA, PhD) 82.6 20.0 24.9 17.4 41.1 54.3 
 
Note: Travel distance and time correspond to one-way trips. 
?
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4.4 Econometric analyses 
The attractiveness of locations as a place of residence (due to amenities) and the 
attractiveness of locations as a place to work (due to higher productivity and 
wages) are two major driving forces behind commuting patterns. As a location 
becomes, ceteris paribus, more attractive as a place of residence, land rents will 
go up and the net-inflow of workers will decrease. If a location becomes more 
attractive to work, land rents will go up as well, but (because of the trade-off 
between migrating and commuting) the net-inflow of workers will go up. 
Interestingly, theory predicts that the actual outcomes in terms of commuter flows 
may differ substantially between low and highly educated workers.  
If we assume that higher educated workers can pay more for better residential 
locations compared to lower educated workers, it is to be expected that better 
locations to live have a relatively low net-inflow of highly educated compared to 
the inflow of lower educated workers because of spatial sorting. The effect of 
productivity is likely to be asymmetric to the level of education as well, but in 
opposite direction. Agglomeration economies are generally thought to be larger 
for higher educated workers (explaining the high concentration of jobs for higher 
educated workers in cities). Therefore, productivity effects are likely to increase 
the net-inflow of higher educated workers stronger than the net-inflow of lower 
educated workers. 
 
Direction of flows 
Table 4.4 presents the share of highly educated workers in the flow of in-
commuters towards each of the 22 Dutch agglomerations, the flow of out-
commuters, and the flows within the same municipality. Furthermore, it shows 
balance indexes for both higher and lower educated commuters, and land rents. 
The average share of highly educated commuters (e.g., with at least higher tertiary 
education) is 38 percent for workers who live and work in the agglomeration, 44 
percent in the flow of commuters towards the agglomerations, and 47 percent in 
the outflow. Higher educated workers are thus far more likely to commute than 
lower educated, regardless of the direction. 
We find that commuters that live in an agglomeration but work somewhere 
else are relatively highly educated. This is clearly consistent with the prediction 
that higher educated workers are more likely to find a better paid job further away 
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than lower educated. Even though the finding that the flow of out-commuters 
from the largest agglomerations consists of such a high share of highly educated 
workers is puzzling at first sight, it is in fact rather intuitive. As lower educated 
workers living in the larger agglomerations are very likely to work close by – they 
have little incentive to commute due to relatively high costs of commuting relative 
to their wage and because of a less complex job match – the remaining out-
commuters from the large cities are highly educated workers. This is particularly 
the case for agglomerations that are far away from other agglomerations, like 
Groningen. 
 
Table 4.4. Share of highly educated workers by type of commuter, 2000–2008 
Agglomeration Share of higher tertiary educated (percent) Balance index Land rent 
    
 in-
commuters 
out-
commuters 
Within 
municipality 
higher 
educated
lower 
educated 
Euro/m2 
       
Amsterdam 47.0 49.7 44.8 0.386 0.431 582 
The Hague 53.8 47.4 40.3 0.337 0.218 568 
Haarlem 41.2 51.7 34.7 –0.263 –0.055 542 
Leiden 45.9 52.3 40.4 –0.155 –0.027 478 
Utrecht 48.9 56.1 45.7 0.187 0.321 389 
Rotterdam 39.6 35.8 30.6 0.237 0.160 292 
's-Hertogenbosch 45.2 56.3 34.0 0.282 0.473 277 
Amersfoort 46.2 51.7 32.4 –0.093 0.016 259 
Maastricht 46.0 52.8 41.1 0.400 0.508 242 
Zwolle 38.3 51.5 38.5 0.359 0.567 234 
Eindhoven 46.2 48.8 41.9 0.260 0.307 233 
Groningen 43.7 64.4 49.2 0.312 0.633 225 
Breda 40.9 59.0 36.3 0.021 0.370 225 
Dordrecht 32.2 33.6 28.3 –0.126 –0.095 217 
Tilburg 43.2 49.2 32.7 0.048 0.168 213 
Leeuwarden 40.5 47.0 35.6 0.586 0.667 197 
Nijmegen 45.0 68.5 50.8 0.142 0.560 192 
Arnhem 43.6 50.8 38.6 0.420 0.531 187 
Periphery 35.3 36.5 26.2 –0.181 –0.157 143 
Enschede 44.1 39.1 31.6 0.388 0.297 118 
Geleen/Sittard 31.8 38.6 32.2 –0.031 0.119 110 
Apeldoorn 40.6 43.0 29.7 0.269 0.313 103 
Heerlen 37.4 28.5 25.5 0.214 0.015 89 
 
Notes: Persons who live and work in the same municipality. The periphery is defined as all 
municipalities outside the 22 agglomerations defined by Statistics Netherlands. For the periphery, 
this can be either from another peripheral municipality or from a municipality in one of the 
agglomerations, but not from the same municipality. Balance index is defined as (inflow of 
commuters – outflow) / (inflow + outflow). 
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Even though most agglomerations have a substantial net-inflow of higher 
educated workers, there are a few notable exceptions to this. Haarlem and Leiden, 
which have the lowest balance indexes for highly skilled commuters in the 
Randstad, are amongst the top four agglomerations with the highest land rents. 
Both Haarlem and Leiden are known as particularly attractive residential 
locations. Also interesting are the stylized facts for the four largest Dutch 
agglomerations. Amsterdam and Utrecht are generally considered to be cities 
where people want to live because they are attractive in terms of amenities, while 
people go to Rotterdam and The Hague for work. Not coincidental (as further 
analyses later in this chapter will show), Amsterdam and Utrecht have a relatively 
high share of highly educated workers that both live and work locally, while out-
commuters are higher educated than in-commuters. For Rotterdam and The Hague 
these figures are the exact opposite. The same holds for the balance indexes: 
Amsterdam and Utrecht attract relatively more lower educated commuters, while 
Rotterdam and The Hague attract higher educated commuters that prefer to live 
elsewhere. 
Figure 4.2 presents two scatter diagrams that show the relation between land 
rents and the balance index for higher educated workers (left panel) and lower 
educated workers (right panel). Generally, municipalities with higher land rents 
have a higher balance index, which implies that there are relatively more 
incoming than outgoing commuters. As the size of the data points indicate, 
however, this is mostly explained by the fact that larger municipalities have both 
relatively high land rents and more commuters arriving from the surrounding area. 
To disentangle the effects of productivity and amenities, we have estimated 
two (OLS) regressions that explain the direction of commuter flows (as measured 
by the balance index) for 445 Dutch municipalities; one for lower educated 
workers, and one for higher educated workers. To control for agglomeration, we 
have included (the natural logarithm of) population and density. As an indicator 
for productivity, we have included the wage premiums that were estimated by 
Groot et al. (2011b). 30  As an indicator for land rents, we have included the 
estimates of De Groot (2011).  
                                                 
30 These are obtained by estimating a Mincerian wage regression, and represent the regional 
component of the part of individual wages that is not explained by observed individual 
characteristics (see Chapter 3). 
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We thus estimate the following equation: 
 
1 2log( ) log( )i i iBalance population density? ? ?? ? ?  
3 4 log(  )i i iwage land rent? ? ?? ? ?  .        (4.1) 
 
It is important to note that our methodology considers labor supply as exogenous. 
In reality, however, it is well possible that a worker considers commuting distance 
and supply of labor simultaneously. Even though we do not account for this, 
empirical evidence shows that the effect of distance on the supply of labor (both 
in terms of total labor supply and number of working days per week) is rather 
weak (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and Van Ommeren, 2010). Therefore, endogeneity of 
labor supply is unlikely to result in biased estimation results. 
 
Figure 4.2. Land rents and balance index of higher educated (left) and lower 
educated (right) commuters by municipality, 2008 
 
Notes: Balance index is defined as (inflow of commuters – outflow) / (inflow + outflow). Higher 
educated workers are those with at least higher tertiary education, lower educated workers are 
defined as all other workers. The size of the data points represents population size. 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.5. As predicted, agglomeration has 
a stronger effect on commuting of higher educated workers relative to lower 
educated workers. Doubling population in a given area (such that both population 
and density double), is expected to result in a 26 percent increase in the net-inflow 
of higher educated workers while this figure is only 13 percent for lower educated 
workers. Furthermore, the symmetry of the flow of lower educated workers is 
insensitive to the wage premium, while it is positive and statistically significant 
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for the flow of higher educated workers. The effect of land rents on the net-inflow 
of commuters is negative and statistically significant for higher educated workers, 
and positive and significant for lower educated workers. Even though the 
regressions may be somewhat vulnerable to multicollinearity (because the 
independents are correlated), regressions with additional control variables that 
were estimated as a robustness check yield similar results as those presented here. 
 
Table 4.5. Regression results, direction of commuter flows 
Dependent variable: 
balance index  Lower educated Higher educated All workers 
 workers workers  
    
# Observations 437 437 437 
    
Log population 0.147*** 0.199*** 0.165*** 
 (7.0) (11.1) (10.1) 
Log population density –0.015 0.060** 0.015 
 (0.8) (3.1) (0.8) 
Wage residual 0.096 0.596* 0.451 
 (0.3) (2.2) (1.9) 
Land rent 0.090*** –0.094*** 0.012 
 (3.4) (3.7) (0.5) 
    
R² 0.272 0.362 0.333 
 
Notes: t-values (in absolute values) are in parentheses. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Explanation of commuting distance and time 
In the previous sections, several stylized facts on commuter distance and time 
were presented. We have seen that higher educated commuters travel longer 
distances on average, while commutes towards the larger agglomerations tend to 
have a longer commuting time on average as well. Furthermore, the previous 
section has presented the results of regression analyses on the meso (municipality) 
level to gain insight in asymmetries in the direction of commuter flows that are 
related to education. We now revert to micro level analyses, to explain commuting 
behavior of individual employees. 
This section uses OLS regressions to estimate the impact on distance and time 
travelled of personal characteristics of commuters and of characteristics of the 
municipality of destination. To account for the latter, we include employment 
density of the destination municipality and the population density and ratio 
between job and population of the residence municipality. Because the latter 
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variable is endogenous – as a lower ratio between job and population 
automatically implies that more residents have to commute – we estimate our 
regression equation both including and excluding this variable. Dependent 
variables are the natural logarithm of distance and time (of a one-way commute). 
We thus estimate four similar regression equations: 
 
8
1, 2, 3 4 5
1
( )i edu edu age age female part time married
edu
Log dist D D D D D? ? ? ? ? ??
?
? ? ? ? ? ??  
4
6 7, 8 9
1
log( ) log( . ) log( . )i ind ind i i
ind
w D emp density pop density? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ??        (4.2) 
9
10 11 12 13,
1
log(  ) log(  )i i i year year i
year
ratio wage premium land rent D? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ??  . 
 
To account for both the quantity and the quality of education, we include a set of 
dummies for each level of education. Additional dummies are included for 5-year 
age groups (to account for nonlinearities in the effect of age), female gender, part-
time work, whether a commuter is married or not, and the industry of 
employment. As an additional control variable we include the log of the hourly 
wage. It is, for example, well possible that differences in commuter behavior of 
workers with different levels of education that were observed in the previous 
section are in fact due to wage differences (where high paid workers have a 
stronger incentive to commute). Hence, by controlling for the wage, education 
variables can take into account the system of preferences that can be shaped by 
education. 
While there is no strong relationship between commuting distance and wages 
(Manning, 2003; Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and Van Ommeren, 2010), wages are 
often thought to be endogenous with respect to commuting time. Workers with a 
higher wage are likely to travel faster because they have a higher opportunity cost 
of time. We must therefore be careful not draw any conclusions from the 
estimated wage effect but rather include the individual wage as a control. The log 
of the density of the municipality where each employee works is calculated by 
dividing total employment in this municipality by area. The ratio between jobs 
and population is calculated by dividing total employment in the municipality 
where a worker lives by the total working population. Because of the trade-off 
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between commuting time and wage, we include the regional wage residual (at the 
work location) that was introduced earlier in this section. Also, we include land 
rents at the residence location. As we use pooled data, we include year dummies 
to account for year specific effects. 
The results of the estimated models are presented in Table 4.6. Males 
commute further distances than females. Older workers make shorter commutes 
and part-time workers somewhat shorter commutes as well. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, given the literature that was discussed earlier, the (log) hourly wage 
has a rather strong effect on commuting distance. Workers with higher wages 
commute further. The effect of individual wages on commuting time is much 
weaker, about half of the effect on distance. Taking into account that most 
explanatory variables have a similar effect on commuting time and distance, a 
straightforward interpretation of this difference would be that workers with higher 
wages indeed travel faster. Even when hourly wages are included, however, the 
level of education has a strong effect of its own.  
The higher the level of education, the longer the distance from home to work 
and the time needed to travel. Whether a worker is married or not has almost no 
effect on commuting. This is consistent with the finding of Rouwendal and Van 
der Straaten (2004) that dual earners do not have a higher commuting time 
compared to single earners, because they have a relatively high willingness to pay 
for housing close to large labor markets. For almost all variables, the effects of the 
independents on commuting distance are similar to that on commuting time. The 
employment density of the job location is, however, an exception to this. Workers 
who travel to more densely populated municipalities commute considerably 
further in terms of commuting time, but only slightly further in terms of distance. 
A one percent higher economic density results in a 0.16 percent longer 
commuting time. The effect of population density in the residence municipality on 
commuting distance is opposite: workers who live in densely populated areas 
commute over shorter distance. Congestion provides a possible explanation for 
the differences in the effect on commuting distance versus travel time. It is, 
however, also possible that workers who commute to or from more densely 
populated municipalities are more likely to use less efficient modes of transport 
(like bicycles or public transport instead of cars). 
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Table 4.6. Regression results: commuting distance and time, 2000–2008 
Dependent variable: Log distance Log time 
    
(I) (II) (III) (IV) 
    
# Observations 118,757 67,606 146,759 83,343 
     
Female –0.147*** –0.146*** –0.143*** –0.143*** 
 (24.4) (17.6) (25.1) (18.2) 
Part-time worker –0.074*** –0.083*** –0.066*** –0.081*** 
 (12.7) (10.2) (12.1) (10.5) 
Log hourly wage 0.287*** 0.269*** 0.161*** 0.154*** 
 (34.7) (23.3) (20.6) (14.1) 
Married –0.039*** –0.050*** –0.023*** –0.033*** 
 (7.0) (6.8) (4.3) (4.7) 
Manufacturing* 0.145*** –0.073 0.180***   –0.003 
 (4.3) (1.1) (5.7) (0.1) 
Private services 0.275*** 0.097 0.235***     0.085 
 (8.2) (1.4) (7.5) (1.3) 
Public services 0.147*** –0.059 0.144***   –0.037 
 (4.4) (0.9) (4.6) (0.6) 
Log employment density 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.163***   0.167*** 
   (job location) (14.5) (11.3) (60.0) (45.9) 
Log population density –0.087*** –0.078*** –0.060*** –0.061*** 
    (residence location) (21.6) (14.4) (15.6) (11.6) 
Ratio jobs to population –0.201***  –0.157*** 
   (residence location)  (17.9)  (14.8) 
Wage residual 4.227*** 4.562*** 4.856***   5.166*** 
   (job location) (63.1) (51.2) (76.7) (61.5) 
Land rent –0.193*** –0.181*** –0.140***   –0.129*** 
   (residence location) (29.8) (21.0) (22.8) (15.9) 
     
Lower secondary education 0.035* 0.056** –0.007 0.014 
   (VMBO, MBO 1) (2.4) (2.9) (0.5) (0.8) 
Lower tertiary education 0.113*** 0.139*** 0.063***   0.094*** 
   (MBO 2, 3) (8.1) (7.6) (5.0) (5.7) 
Lower tertiary education 0.185*** 0.206*** 0.165***   0.193*** 
   (MBO 4) (13.5) (11.3) (13.3) (11.8) 
Higher secondary education 0.200*** 0.215*** 0.204***   0.220*** 
   (HAVO, VWO) (13.0) (10.7) (14.7) (12.1) 
Higher tertiary education 0.287*** 0.303*** 0.274***   0.282*** 
   (HBO, BA) (20.4) (16.5) (21.6) (17.1) 
Higher tertiary education 0.379*** 0.411*** 0.387***   0.416*** 
   (MA, PhD) (24.7) (20.3) (27.6) (22.6) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age dummies (5-year groups) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R² 0.135 0.154 0.145 0.161 
 
Notes: t-values (in absolute values) are in parentheses. Omitted industry is agriculture; omitted 
education category is primary education. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted 
by *, ** and ***, respectively. In model (1), the regression coefficients by age group are as follows: 
–0.02 (20–25), 0.01 (25–30), 0.00 (30–35), –0.06 (35–40), –0.11 (40–45), –0.16 (45–50), –0.18 
(50–55), –0.21 (55–60) and –0.24 (60–65). As the estimated effect of age is comparable across 
models, we do not report our estimations for all models. 
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Workers who commute towards municipalities that offer relatively high wages 
(after correcting for worker characteristics, as measured by the wage residual) 
have on average a far larger commuting distance and time. This effect is 
economically very significant: a one percent increase in the non-competitive wage 
component is associated with a 4.2 (4.8) percent longer commuting distance 
(time). At the same time, workers who live in municipalities where land rents are 
low tend to live further from their work. This is consistent with the view that there 
is a trade-off between commuting time (and thus costs including opportunity costs 
of time) and residential location choice. 
There is no strong relationship between commuter distance and time and the 
industry in which a worker is employed, although workers in private services 
commute somewhat further and those in agriculture somewhat less. Including 
industry dummies at the 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1 level, as a robustness check, did 
not have a substantial effect on the key variables in our regression model. Trends 
in the year dummies that were included in all regressions indicate changes over 
time in commuting behavior after correcting for composition effects. Across all 
estimated models, however, there is almost no year-specific trend in travel 
distance and time. 
It is well possible that the effect of income on commuting distance and time 
depends on the level of education of workers. For example, it is well possible that, 
even at a given level of income, higher educated are more often able to work 
while commuting. This would explain their higher use of the train as a mode of 
transport (as a train is more suitable as a working environment compared to other 
modes of transport). To account for this possibility, we have added interaction 
effects between wages and education in our regression models.31   
Figure 4.3 graphically displays the estimation results of a model that is 
similar to model (I) in Table 4.6 on all accounts other than the inclusion of wage-
education interaction effects. Independent of income, higher educated workers 
travel further. The effect of wage on travel distance, however, is particularly high 
for lower educated workers while it almost disappears for university graduates. 
 
                                                 
31 As a robustness check, we have also estimated models that include interaction effects between 
education and other variables. These, however, did not show strong interaction effects. 
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Figure 4.3. Education dummies (left) and interaction of education and wage 
(right) 
Dependent variable: log commuting distance 
   
Note: Bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients. Estimates are 
obtained by adding interaction effects to regression (I) in Table 4.6 and removing log wage and the 
constant term. 
 
As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, there is a strong 
interdependency between regional productivity on the one hand, and the structure
of the work force on the other (see also, for example, Combes et al., 2008a and the 
previous chapter of this thesis). Even though we include several control variables 
to account for regional characteristics (in particular for the attractiveness of 
regions), we cannot rule out the possibility that spatial sorting of workers – 
resulting in a correlation between level of education and other worker 
characteristics – has resulted in biased estimates due to multicollinearity. To 
check whether the relation between education and commuting still holds 
independently of residence and work municipality, we re-estimate equation (4.2) 
with fixed effects for residence municipality and work municipality, thus 
controlling for all region-specific effects. Estimation results are shown in Table 
4.7. Including fixed effects does not result in any notable change in parameter 
estimates. The results once more indicate that higher educated workers commute 
substantially further than lower educated workers, both in terms of distance and 
time. Also, the effects of level of education on commuting distance and time are 
again quantitatively similar, which indicates that higher educated workers do not 
commute faster.  
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Table 4.7. Regression results with region fixed effects, 2000–2008 
Dependent variable: Log distance Log time 
     
# Observations 118,757 146,759 
   
Female –0.129*** –0.128*** 
 (22.2) (23.1) 
Part-time worker –0.068*** –0.057*** 
 (12.0) (10.7) 
Log hourly wage 0.278*** 0.148*** 
 (34.9) (19.5) 
Married –0.040*** –0.016** 
 (7.3) (3.1) 
Manufacturing* 0.165*** 0.190*** 
 (5.0) (6.1) 
Private services 0.256*** 0.190*** 
 (7.8) (6.2) 
Public services 0.143*** 0.112*** 
 (4.3) (3.6) 
   
Lower secondary education (VMBO, MBO 1) 0.026 –0.010 
    (1.9) (0.8) 
Lower tertiary education (MBO 2, 3) 0.096*** 0.077*** 
    (7.2) (5.4) 
Lower tertiary education (MBO 4) 0.168*** 0.144*** 
    (12.6) (11.9) 
Higher secondary education (HAVO, VWO) 0.178*** 0.173*** 
    (12.1) (12.8) 
Higher tertiary education (HBO, BA) 0.270*** 0.249*** 
    (19.9) (20.2) 
Higher tertiary education (MA, PhD) 0.384*** 0.364*** 
    (25.8) (26.7) 
   
R² 0.168 0.100 
 
Notes: t-values (in absolute values) are in parentheses. Omitted industry is agriculture; omitted 
education category is primary education. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted 
by *, ** and ***, respectively. Specifications include fixed effects for year, age (5-year groups), 
residence municipality and municipality of job location. 
 
Explanation of the choice of mode of transport 
In this section, we employ multivariate logit models to explain the use of five 
different modes of transport by a total of 139,127 commuters. 32  Our basic 
specification is the same as equation (4.2) that was estimated in the previous 
section. Additionally, we include the commuting distance. We have calculated 
marginal effects for the pedestrians (column I), the use of bicycles (column II), 
                                                 
32 For computational reasons we have chosen to use multinomial logit rather than multinomial 
probit. As a robustness check, we compared the two estimators on a 5% subsample of our dataset. 
Both methods yield qualitatively comparable results. 
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personal cars (column III), bus, tram and underground (column IV) and the train 
(column V). The estimated marginal effects are reported in Table 4.8. 
The distance of commutes is the variable with the strongest explanatory 
power. Doubling the distance of a commute decreases the probability that the 
bicycle is used by 25 percent, while it increases the probability that a car is used 
by 22 percent. For all modes of transport, with the exception of trams, buses and 
the underground, distance has a very strong effect on the probability that each 
mode is used. Females are somewhat less likely to commute by bike, and more 
likely to commute by car or bus, tram or underground. There is no relation 
between age and mode of commuting, hence we do not report the estimated 
results for the nine age dummies that were included. Workers commuting to 
higher paid jobs are more likely to commute by car, and less likely to commute by 
bicycle. 
As noted in the introduction, the higher use of public transport by higher 
educated individuals could be to some extent institutionalized because public 
sector employees (who are somewhat higher educated on average) often receive 
compensation for commuting expenses when they use public transport, but not 
when using personal cars. Our empirical results are, however, inconsistent with 
this hypothesis. There is no statistically significant difference between the effects 
of working in private services and working in public services on the probability 
that busses, trams, underground railways or trams are used. Public servants do, 
however, seem to use bicycles somewhat more often than workers in other 
sectors. 
The results in Table 4.8 should be interpreted as the expected marginal effect 
of a change in the independents by one on the probability that a commuter uses 
each respective mode of transport. The level of education has almost no effect on 
the probability that an individual will walk from home to work. Higher educated 
workers are more likely to commute by bike or by train, but less likely to 
commute by personal car or bus, tram or underground. Having a university degree 
is associated with a ceteris paribus 26 percent higher probability to commute to 
work by bicycle compared to having only finished elementary school, while the 
probability to commute by personal car is 27 percent lower and the probability to 
use the train is 2.6 percent higher. 
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Table 4.8. Regression results: multinomial logit by mode of transport, 2000–2008 
Marginal effects by  
mode of transport 
Pedestrian Bicycle Personal 
car 
Bus, tram, 
underground 
Train 
      
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
      
# Observations 3,292 38,577 83,122 5,918 8,217 
      
Female –0.001 –0.094*** 0.072*** 0.021*** 0.003***
 (6.1) (28.5) (20.6) (14.4) (5.3) 
Part-time worker 0.000** 0.022*** –0.019*** –0.003* 0.001
 (0.8) (6.8) (5.7) (2.4) (1.1) 
Log hourly wage –0.002** –0.125*** 0.156*** –0.025*** –0.004***
 (10.0) (26.4) (31.4) (12.3) (4.6) 
Log travel distance –0.006*** –0.250*** 0.219*** 0.009*** 0.028***
 (27.9) (161.3) (122.1) (16.6) (58.3) 
Married –0.001*** 0.009** 0.017*** –0.018*** –0.007***
 (7.0) (2.8) (5.4) (12.7) (11.3) 
Manufacturing –0.001** 0.029 –0.181** 0.043 0.111
 (1.8) (0.9) (2.8) (1.4) (1.2) 
Private services 0.000 –0.030 –0.177*** 0.086** 0.121
 (0.1) (1.2) (3.4) (2.9) (1.7) 
Public services 0.001 0.074*** –0.228*** 0.068*** 0.085*
 (1.6) (3.4) (6.7) (3.3) (2.0) 
      
Lower secondary education –0.001** 0.028*** –0.005 –0.018*** –0.004*
   (VMBO, MBO 1) (3.1) (3.5) (0.6) (9.6) (2.2) 
Lower tertiary education –0.001*** 0.036*** –0.010 –0.024*** –0.001
   (MBO 2, 3) (4.3) (4.6) (0.3) (13.9) (0.5) 
Lower tertiary education –0.001** 0.076*** –0.047*** –0.029*** 0.001
   (MBO 4) (3.0) (10.9) (5.7) (16.7) (0.6) 
Higher secondary education 0.001 0.110*** –0.116*** –0.010*** 0.016***
   (HAVO, VWO) (1.3) (10.9) (11.7) (4.4) (4.6) 
Higher tertiary education 0.000 0.145*** –0.120*** –0.031*** 0.005*
   (HBO, BA) (0.9) (16.4) (13.6) (15.8) (2.4) 
Higher tertiary education 0.001 0.255*** –0.266*** –0.017*** 0.026***
   (MA, PhD) (1.6) (22.8) (25.3) (7.5) (6.4) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.268 
 
Notes: z-values (in absolute values) are in parentheses. Omitted category when estimating the 
model was pedestrian. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. Year and age (5-year groups) fixed effects are included. 
 
These results are consistent with the hypotheses formulated in Section 4.3. Even 
when controlling for wages, well-educated workers do not only travel more than 
lower educated, they are also less willing to use the car and other private means of 
transport, except for the bicycle. The finding that higher educated workers are 
(ceteris paribus) more likely to take the train supports the view that higher 
educated workers are better able to use time spent in a train (for either work or 
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leisure). The finding that workers with higher wages are more likely to use the car 
is consistent with the view that there is a positive relation between income and 
speed. As was the case for the regressions on commuting distance and time from 
the previous section, an analysis of the time specific effect showed that the choice 
for different modes of transport remained fairly constant between 2000 and 2008. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The level of education of individuals has almost always been treated as a 
statistical control in the empirical literature on commuting, but it rarely has been 
the object of a specific analysis and discussion. This chapter has made an attempt 
to analyze the effects of education on travel behavior of Dutch employees, trying 
also to understand the difference between higher levels of education and high 
wages, which are often strongly correlated. Results show that, even after 
controlling for their wage, commutes of highly educated workers are substantially 
longer compared to commutes of lower educated workers. At the same time, we 
find strong interaction effects between wages and education on commuting time 
and duration. For lower educated workers, we find a strong relation between 
wages and commuting distance and time. For higher educated workers this 
relation is less strong, while it has almost no effect for university graduates. There 
is no effect of education on the speed of commuting. Across different 
specifications, the effect of education on commuting distance is similar to the 
effect on commuting time. In addition, higher educated workers are more frequent 
users of public transport and of bicycles. 
Many factors could explain observed heterogeneity in commuting patterns 
between lower and higher educated workers. Even though future research will 
need to address this more thoroughly, the empirical evidence in this chapter 
provides some preliminary insights. First of all, we find that higher educated 
workers are more likely to commute towards agglomerated areas and areas that 
pay higher wages compared to less educated. As was discussed in Chapter 3, there 
is substantial sorting of employees across regions, whereby higher educated 
workers are more likely to work in locations with a high economic density and 
productivity. Productivity thus attracts high skilled employment to the cities. 
Supply of housing and heterogeneity in demand for housing, on the other hand, 
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tend to have the opposite effect. Because higher educated workers have on 
average relatively high incomes. The largest Dutch cities (that are the most 
attractive for higher educated employees as a location to work because of 
productivity advantages) are characterized by a relatively high share of social 
housing. This is likely to – at least to some extent – explain the finding that higher 
educated individuals are relatively more likely to commute from a low density 
municipality towards a high density municipality. Furthermore, higher educated 
workers are more often house owners, which reduces their labor mobility. 
Sorting of employees is not only taking place due to differences in 
productivity or the kind of houses people want to live in, but also due to 
differences in the willingness to pay for amenities. If, at a given density and 
average productivity level, housing prices go up, lower educated workers are 
more likely to commute towards this municipality than from. For higher educated 
workers this is opposite. Furthermore, whereas it is rather unlikely for lower 
educated workers to commute between larger cities, there are many higher 
educated workers that commute even between the largest Dutch agglomerations.  
A possible explanation for both the finding that higher educated workers 
commute more than lower educated, and the finding that higher educated workers 
are more likely to commute between the largest cities, are relatively higher search 
frictions. Because higher educated workers perform generally more specialized 
work, the probability to find a good match close to the current residence location 
is relatively low. Such specialized workers are therefore more likely to accept a 
job offer further away, giving them the choice between commuting or moving. 
Particularly excess commutes is an indication for the existence of search frictions. 
The large bidirectional flows of highly educated commuters between pairs of 
cities are likely to be excess commuting (though in theory they could represent 
local scarcity of certain types of very specialized high skilled labor) is consistent 
with the view that higher search frictions for high skilled employees causes their 
commutes to be longer.   
The finding that higher educated workers are more likely to commute by train 
could be explained by, for example, the possibility to carry out part of their work 
while commuting. However, it is also possible that the locations where higher 
educated workers are employed are generally closer to a train station. A healthier 
lifestyle may explain their preference for the use of bicycles. Besides the other 
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mentioned factors, it could be worth considering possible effects on the set of 
individual’s preferences driven by education, which could also affect the disutility 
associated with the use of non-motorized or non-private means of transport.  
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5 ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF TRADE, 
OFFSHORING AND MULTINATIONALS ON 
JOB LOSS AND JOB FINDING 
 
5.1 Introduction33 
Advancements in information and communication technology as well as the 
removal of formal and informal barriers to international trade and investments 
have resulted in supply chains that are more international and less vertically 
integrated. Lower costs of communication and coordination reduce the need to 
perform manufacturing stages within close vicinity. This has enabled firms to 
benefit from increased international specialization, by further breaking up the 
production process, and by participating in global supply chains in which the 
many tasks required to manufacture goods and services are performed at locations 
with a comparative cost advantage. 
The ongoing integration of the world economy has given rise to some 
concerns among politicians and the general public. The recent recession has 
exacerbated these concerns, resulting in widespread public attention for 
multinational firms that are downscaling operations, the supposed danger of firms 
losing market share due to competition from the BRIC countries, and employees 
losing their jobs due to outsourcing. According to an OECD poll, even before the 
financial crisis far more people considered globalization to be a threat rather than 
beneficial (OECD, 2007). Unfounded fear for globalization could result in a 
demand for protectionist measures, which could result in a reduced growth 
potential of the economy.  
At the same time, the general consensus that international trade in products 
and tasks is beneficial for the average individual does not necessarily imply that it 
is good for everyone. The effects on workers with different levels of education, or 
different industries and occupations, are far from trivial. Furthermore, the general 
                                                 
33 This chapter is based on Groot et al. (2013).  
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consensus among economists regarding the long-run positive effects on higher 
productivity, increased incentives to innovate, and higher economic growth (see 
Crino, 2008) does by no means exclude the possibility that there are some short-
term – both positive and negative – transition effects along the way. Even though 
the public fear for these transitional effects is related mostly to unemployment, the 
empirical literature has focused largely on aggregate employment and wages of 
workers who stayed fixed within certain industries or occupations (e.g., Feenstra 
and Hanson, 1996; Autor et al., 2003; Crino, 2010; Goos et al., 2009). 
This chapter aims to answer two questions. First, we estimate the extent to 
which the probability to become unemployed is related to different dimensions of 
globalization and worker characteristics. Second – in case an individual has been 
fired – we estimate how unemployment duration is related to the interaction of 
globalization (related to the old job) and worker characteristics. We devote 
attention to the impact of several dimensions of globalization, which are exporting 
behavior of firms, offshoring, and the presence of multinational companies. 
Empirical evidence shows that the task composition of occupations has 
changed substantially during recent decades (Borghans and Ter Weel, 2006), and 
that the observed trend of increased fragmentation and internationalization of 
production processes could be a major explanation behind increased wage 
inequality and polarization in some countries (Autor et al., 2006; Goos et al., 
2009; Van Reenen, 2011; Fortin et al., 2011). Even though Chapter 2 showed that 
aggregate wage inequality did not change much in the Netherlands, it also showed 
substantial heterogeneity between different types of workers. This heterogeneity 
could be – at least to some extent –related to globalization. 
Studies that address the relationship between globalization and 
unemployment at the individual level are relatively rare (e.g., Egger et al., 2007; 
Munch, 2010). This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by following 
individual workers over time and by investigating the factors that affect job loss 
and job finding. By applying Cox proportional hazard models and Cox regression 
models (Cox, 1972) – which are tools for duration and survival analysis – we 
estimate the effects of these three dimensions of globalization on job-to-
unemployment and unemployment-to-job transitions. By combining several large 
Dutch micro datasets regarding workers, unemployment benefits, and firms, we 
are able to relate both worker characteristics and employment characteristics to 
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the probability that an individual will become unemployed and the probability that 
a new job will be found. Our data set includes the full employment record of 
workers, containing information on wages in previous and current jobs as well as 
number of days spent unemployed. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the recent literature 
on globalization and unemployment specifically focusing on research conducted 
at the individual level. The next section explains the data in detail and presents 
summary statistics and stylized facts. Our empirical framework is discussed in 
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the results of the empirical estimations. Section 
5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 Globalization and unemployment 
There is a clear link between the three indicators for globalization – offshoring, 
multinationals, and export activities – that we take into consideration.34 Even 
though the activities of multinationals could be limited to strictly horizontal 
multinational activities (for example, to evade trade barriers and transportation 
costs), an important part of the activities of multinationals involves vertical 
interdependencies where each location is specialized in certain tasks according to 
local comparative cost advantages. This vertical component involves both the 
relocation of tasks, and trade linkages when intermediate products are shipped 
between subsidiaries. Offshoring can also take place outside multinationals, 
although in that case international trade is still involved. 
In total, the Dutch input-output table for 2009 (as published by Statistics 
Netherlands) shows that 62 percent of Dutch imports (excluding imports that are 
transferred or re-exported) are used as intermediary inputs, while only 38 percent 
consists of final goods. Empirical evidence shows that the importance of imported 
intermediaries as a share of the total use of non-energy intermediaries – which is 
often used as a raw indicator for offshoring – is increasing across virtually all 
industrialized economies (Crino, 2008). Apart from international task 
specialization, export activities can be considered as a proxy that indicates the 
extent to which firms face foreign competition. 
                                                 
34 Even though the use of imports by firms is at least as relevant as exports, we have to limit this 
chapter to exports as the only trade measure, due to a lack of firm level import data. 
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There has been a recent surge of interest in the labor market effects of 
globalization. As early as the 1990s, researchers studied the role of international 
trade and increasing imported inputs on employment and productivity (e.g., 
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996 and 2001; Brainard and Riker, 1997; Anderton and 
Brenton, 1999). The recent literature argues that the globalization processes, 
together with advances in technology, has resulted in job and wage polarization.  
Relatively simple extensions of Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson 
trade models predict increased demand for the abundant factor (which are tasks 
that require high skilled labor), and a shift in relative factor prices that increases 
the wages of high skilled workers. Contrary to the expectations of the basic 
Heckscher-Ohlin arguments, this trend is also observed in less developed 
countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). 
In contrast, the task-based literature argues that technological advancements 
permit the breaking up of jobs into small pieces of tasks, such that offshoring 
affects employment through its effects on task demand rather than on demand for 
low skilled versus high skilled workers (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). 
The skill biased technological change (SBTC) literature argues that technology 
complements skills, which implies that skilled labor demand and wages increase 
at the expense of low skilled jobs (Acemoglu, 1998; Berman et al., 1998). Autor 
et al. (2003) argue that the decrease in the demand for manual routine tasks may 
explain job polarization in the US. The main argument of the task-based 
explanations of polarization is that some tasks are separable from the occupation 
bundle (which is defined as the set of tasks that composes an occupation), which 
later can be offshored to low-wage locations (e.g., Blinder, 2009; Akçomak et al., 
2011).  
The empirical evidence regarding these theories is mixed. Some researchers 
have found evidence that is consistent with a negative relationship between 
offshoring and job and wage polarization (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 2001; 
Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Crino, 2010; Baumgarten et al., 2010; Fortin et al., 
2011; Goos et al., 2009), while others found negligible or zero effects (Amiti and 
Wei, 2005; Mankiw and Swagel, 2006; Liu and Trefler, 2008; Koller and Stehrer, 
2009; Criscuolo and Garicano, 2010). 
The empirical literature discussed above mostly relies on aggregate data at the 
industry or occupation level. Only a few studies employed worker level data to 
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assess the impact of the globalization process on employment. These studies have 
combined industry level offshoring measures with individual level data, which 
makes it possible to follow workers for a specific time period.35 Researchers 
investigated the impact of offshoring on job displacement in general and 
transitions to unemployment, weeks spent unemployed between two jobs and 
earnings differentials in particular. This strand of literature is related to previous 
research on job turnover at the worker level (e.g., Royalty, 1998; Gomes, 2012). 
One of the first studies that assesses the short-run employment effects of 
offshoring in a longitudinal setting is the work of Egger et al. (2007). Using 
Austrian data between 1998 and 2001, they estimated a dynamic fixed effect 
multinomial logit model. They find that offshoring reduces the probability to 
remain in the manufacturing sector, as well as the probability of switching to the 
manufacturing sector. 
Liu and Trefler (2008) have used US data from 1996 to 2006 to assess the 
impact of offshore outsourcing in the service sector to India and China on four 
labor market outcomes. They consider switching of employees between industries 
and occupations, number of weeks spent unemployed, and the earnings difference 
between two jobs. They find small negative or zero effects of offshoring on all 
labor market outcomes that were taken into consideration. These results validate 
earlier findings of Eberstein et al. (2009), regarding the small negative impact of 
offshoring to low wage countries on employment levels in the US.  
In a later study for the years 1996 to 2007, Liu and Trefler (2011) 
differentiated between upward and downward switching (i.e., switching to an 
occupation that pays less on average). They find that the cumulative 10-year 
impact of imports of services from India and China caused downward occupation 
switching to rise by 17 percent and transitions to unemployment to rise by 0.9 
percentage points. In the studies above, much of the negative impact of offshoring 
on earnings is observed when workers in the manufacturing sector had to switch 
to a job in services that pays less on average. 
                                                 
35 Most studies use measures that are similar to those introduced by Feenstra and Hanson (1996), 
where offshoring is proxied by the intermediate imported inputs as a share of total inputs. 
Within the existing empirical literature, the study that is perhaps closest to 
our approach is Munch (2010). He used Danish manufacturing sector data from 
1990 to 2003 to investigate the effect of offshoring on short-run job displacement. 
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The work focuses on unemployment spells that end with a transition into a new 
job and considers three outcomes: occupation switching, job to unemployment 
and job to non-participation transitions. They find that there are small effects of 
offshoring on unemployment. Offshoring increases the unemployment risk by one 
percent. However, this effect is much larger for men, workers above 50 and low 
skilled workers.  
We assess the short-term relation between offshoring and unemployment 
duration using longitudinal data at the worker level. Egger et al. (2007) have used 
a somewhat similar setting, but controlled only for age thus failing to account for 
worker heterogeneity. Munch (2010) estimated a duration model controlling for 
various individual characteristics such as age, education and gender. One of the 
contributions of this chapter is that we not only estimate job-to-unemployment 
transition but unemployment-to-job transition as well. Offshoring and other 
individual characteristics may increase unemployment duration and at the same 
time may decrease the probability of finding a new job. For instance our 
estimations show that foreign workers are more likely to become unemployed and 
once they are unemployed they are also likely to remain unemployed for a much 
longer time. 
 
5.3 Data and stylized facts 
 
Data 
This chapter uses micro data that are available through Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS). For data on worker characteristics – like date of birth, gender, country of 
birth, and the wage – we rely on census data and tax data from registers, available 
through the CBS social statistics database (SSB, Sociaal Statistisch Bestand). We 
use two branches of the social statistics database of Statistics Netherlands, one 
regarding jobs (SSB Banen) and one regarding unemployment benefits (SSB WW). 
Of each job, we have the (employer reported) exact date when a worker starts 
working for a certain establishment of a firm, and (if this applies) the date when 
the job ends, as well as the pre-tax wage an employee earned in a job in a given 
year (the fiscal wage). As this dataset covers all Dutch employees and firms with 
employees, we use this data source to calculate the number of employees per firm 
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and per municipality. Data are available for 2000–2008. Country of birth is used 
to determine whether a worker is native, non-native born in a developed country 
(with at least a GDP of US$ 20,000 in 2010),36 or non-native born in any other 
country. 
For each person with unemployment benefits, we use the codified social 
security number combined with the date when they were first entitled to 
unemployment benefits – as well as the date when entitlement ended – to match 
unemployment benefits to the end date of the previous and (if applicable) the 
starting date of the next job. The unit of observation is thus a job of an employee, 
that may or may not end in unemployment. Even though the cause of 
unemployment is unknown, is has to be involuntary, as only involuntary 
unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefits according to Dutch law. 
Because the registration processes of the end date of a job and the start of 
entitlement to unemployment benefits are independent (and rather imprecise, as 
turned out), we consider a merge successful if the difference between the two is at 
most two months. 
A rather large part of individuals that receive unemployment benefits, do not 
have a strong attachment to a previous job. Some workers have many succeeding 
jobs that do not last long, or multiple jobs at the same time, while others even 
seem to start receiving unemployment benefits when their job has not ended.37 
Including these workers would generate noise in the dataset for two reasons. First, 
the environment and occupation of the last job are not well defined. Second, it is 
well possible that workers who get unemployed frequently are fired not because 
of the characteristics of their last jobs, but rather due to some (unobserved) worker 
characteristics. It is unclear in these cases whether unemployment is related to 
globalization. To exclude this source of noise, we have limited our dataset to only 
those workers who were employed by one single employer for at least two years 
prior to losing their job. When an unemployed worker has found a new job, we 
require that it lasts for at least two months before we consider it a successful exit 
                                                 
36 According to the World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund these 
include Luxembourg, Norway, Qatar, Switzerland, Denmark, Australia, Sweden, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Singapore, 
Belgium, Japan, France, Germany, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Italy, Kuwait, Hong Kong, New 
Zealand, Spain, Brunei, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Slovenia, Portugal, the Bahamas and South Korea. 
37 This can happen, for example, when the number of working hours of a worker with a flexible 
contract is reduced. 
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from unemployment. Another difficulty is to obtain a good estimate of the last 
wage earned by an employee. As employees who get fired may receive a bonus 
when getting fired, this may result in an overestimation of their wage. We 
therefore use the fiscal wage of the year prior to getting unemployed. This implies 
that we do not include workers who entered unemployment in 2000 in our 
analyses, the first year for which we have data available, as their jobs cannot be 
observed in the year before they were fired.  
To make wages comparable over time, we have corrected all wages for the 
change in average wage (the base year is 2008).38 The wage differential between 
the wage of a worker prior to getting unemployed and the wage earned from the 
next job is thus based on the relative position of the worker in the wage 
distribution. Because we have no reliable indicator for hours worked (though we 
have an indicator for the number of days worked, the so-called social insurance 
days which are employer reported and available through SSB), we limit our 
dataset to jobs of at least 0.8 fte (fulltime employment equivalents), which are 
calculated by dividing the number of social insurance days reported for an 
employee by the total number of social insurance days. Finally, we exclude all 
employees younger than 20 or older than 60 (as they may enter into an early 
retirement schedule) when getting unemployed, and we have excluded all jobs 
earning less than the equivalent of the minimum yearly wage in 2008 (corrected 
for inflation). Table 5.1 shows the results of this matching process. 
To compare workers who entered unemployment to workers who remained 
employed, we applied the same criteria to workers remaining employed. The 
resulting dataset includes 4.41 million employees (representing 35 percent of the 
total Dutch labor force) working at some point in time during the 2000–2008 
period. 163 thousand out of those 4.41 million employees were fired at least once 
with the individual entitled to unemployment benefits. This accounts for 7.1 
percent of total unemployment benefits. Even though our dataset is thus more or 
less representative for a typical full-time employee with a stable employment 
relationship, it is not representative for the typical unemployed. Information about
                                                 
38 The advantage of this approach compared to, for example, using real wages is that the wage 
difference between the last full year an individual worked prior to unemployment, and the first 
year in a new job, is not affected by growth in real wages. This is especially important as the time 
between jobs is not fixed. 
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the last known job is a necessary condition when estimating the effect of 
characteristics of this job on job loss. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
determinants of job loss of workers outside our sample are at least to some extent 
similar to the determinants of job loss of workers with similar observed 
characteristics that are in our sample. It is possible that workers outside our 
sample have less favorable unobserved characteristics, or that the lack of stability 
in the employment records of the workers outside our sample itself is caused by 
globalization, but this falls beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
Table 5.1. Results of matching jobs to unemployment benefits 
Year 
 
New entrants entitled to 
unemployment benefits 
Successfully merged to a job of at least 0.8 fte, paying 
at least minimum wage during the previous 2 years 
    
2001 224,055 10,474 4.7% 
2002 279,697 20,051 7.2% 
2003 358,049 27,294 7.6% 
2004 370,517 31,459 8.5% 
2005 332,913 27,702 8.3% 
2006 287,179 18,101 6.3% 
2007 245,423 15,124 6.2% 
2008 203,750 13,949 6.8% 
    
Average 287,698 20,519 7.1% 
 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics concerning key variables of interest for 
workers that had at least one job between 2001 and 2008, while never being 
unemployed (left column), as well as for workers who experienced at least one 
episode of unemployment during the same period. Workers who enter 
unemployment are somewhat younger than the average employee in our sample. 
Furthermore male workers and non-natives (both those born in developed and 
those born in developing countries) are substantially overrepresented in the group 
of workers who have experienced unemployment. An interesting finding that 
emerges from Table 5.2 is that almost 20 percent of workers that experienced 
unemployment had been previously working at a foreign firm, while less than 14 
percent of all workers who were never unemployed worked at a foreign firm. 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics of workers and unemployed, 2001–2008 
  Never unemployed Unemployed at least once 
Observations (N) 4,245,683 163,091 
   
Age 43.30 42.58 
 (10.61) (9.78) 
Female 0.280 0.239 
 (0.449) (0.427) 
Non-native (developed) 0.024 0.032 
 (0.152) (0.175) 
Non-native (other) 0.070 0.118 
 (0.255) (0.322) 
Last wage (2008 euros) 42,957 41,731 
 (24,457) (23,819) 
Foreign firm 0.138 0.197 
  (0.345) (0.398) 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All differences are statistically significant at 
significance levels far beyond 0.001. 
 
Stylized facts by industry, level of education, and occupation 
Table 5.3 presents a number of descriptive statistics by industry. All data on 
industries and firms relate to the job an individual had before getting unemployed. 
The highest incidence of unemployment can be observed among workers that 
were previously employed in the manufacturing industry, where 3.6 percent of the 
workforce has received unemployment benefits at least once. In manufacturing, 
workers are much more often fired during mass layoffs compared to any other 
industry.39 Workers in other private industries have a lower probability to become 
unemployed, generally between 2 and 3 percent. The lowest incidence of 
unemployment is observed in public services, particularly amongst government 
employees. 
There is no strong relationship between the incidence of unemployment and 
average unemployment duration. However, unemployment duration of individuals 
that were fired from a manufacturing job is notably higher than in all other 
industries (except for the relatively small mining sector), indicating relative
                                                 
39 We define a mass layoff as a situation in which at least 20% of the work force is being fired in a 
single year for firms with 20 or more employees (prior to the layoff), 40% for firms with 10 to 20 
employees, and 60% for firms with 5 to 10 employees. The reason to use a somewhat higher 
percentage for smaller firms is that in small firms 20% of the work force corresponds to just a few 
employees. Though this definition is somewhat arbitrary, it could be interesting to see whether lay 
offs are random within industries, or whether they are concentrated within some specific firms. 
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difficulty in the job search process. There is a strong (negative) correlation 
between average unemployment duration within industries and the share of 
unemployed that will eventually succeed in finding a new job. The largest average 
wage differential between the job prior to unemployment and the next job is found 
for construction workers, who earn about 6 thousand euro less. Workers who were 
employed within the education sector, on the other hand, gain about 8 thousand 
euro annually if they succeed to find a new job. 
 
Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics by industry, 2001–2008 
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Agriculture 
82,447 34,354 2.04 10.5 75.9 –16 2.9 
 (13,088)  (15.5)  (9,624)  
Mining and quarrying 
10,894 73,394 1.94 15.1 70.1 –3,410 4.3 
 (40,712)  (19.5)  (25,404)  
Manufacturing 
1,152,705 42,163 3.63 14.9 71.4 –2,286 18.6 
 (21,662)  (18.2)  (13,251)  
Construction 
536,943 40,355 2.95 10.7 75.6 –6,238 6.3 
 (14,842)  (15.4)  (9,644)  
Trade 
637,211 43,826 3.30 11.3 77.8 –562 5.1 
 (27,075)  (14.8)  (16,306)  
Hotels and Restaurants 
101,734 31,972 3.05 9.1 79.8 –842 1.7 
 (15,118)  (11.6)  (9,769)  
Transport 490,893 42,725 2.21 13.3 71.7 –2,293 4.3 
 (22,439)  (16.7)  (16,313)  
Commercial services 1,330,582 53,256 2.73 11.9 76.4 –381 4.3 
 (34,414)  (15.0)  (18,113)  
Government 671,872 43,196 0.64 11.7 72.5 –1,662 0.6  (15,159)  (16.0)  (10,787)  
Education 
362,978 42,401 1.64 13.0 63.1 8,122 0.8 
 (14,279)  (16.9)  (13,190)  
Healthcare 
547,297 37,868 1.62 11.1 70.8 1,466 2.5 
 (19,074)  (13.0)  (14,619)  
Other 
197,589 40,861 3.33 11.5 72.0 –366 3.9 
 (22,228)  (14.4)  (14,514)  
Total 6,123,175 44,155 2.56 12.5 73.8 670 8.0  (24,619)  (16.1)  (15,121)  
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *Compares the normalized annual fiscal wage 
differential between the job prior to unemployment and the job after unemployment. Differentials 
larger than 100,000 euro are excluded. 
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Additional data on worker characteristics (viz. education and occupation on the 2-
digit Statistics Netherlands occupation classification) are drawn from different 
cross-sections of the annual labor market survey (EBB, Enquête Beroeps 
Bevolking), 2000–2008. We distinguish eight different levels of education and 90 
different occupations. After merging the dataset with data on employees and 
unemployed – which was constructed as described above – with EBB, about 159 
thousand observations remain (2 thousand of these jobs end in unemployment).40 
Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics by level of education. Indeed, workers 
with a university Master degree earn about twice as much as workers with only 
primary education. However, the relation with unemployment is nontrivial. Even 
though workers with only primary education have the highest probability to get 
unemployed and have the highest average unemployment duration, workers with 
intermediate levels of tertiary education have the lowest probability to get fired 
and have the shortest unemployment duration. These types of schooling are often 
focused on a specific (skilled) profession. Workers with a PhD or university 
Master degree are somewhat in between on both accounts. The share of workers 
who find a new job before 2009 (e.g., within our period of observation) is average 
for individuals with the highest level of education, while it is much higher for 
individuals educated at the intermediate levels. 
Table 5.5 presents key statistics on unemployment for workers previously 
employed in 24 different 2-digit ISCO-88 occupations. Not surprisingly, there are 
substantial differences between occupations. Teaching professionals (ISCO code 
23) and life science and health associate professionals (ISCO code 32) have the 
lowest unemployment incidence. Within our dataset, unemployment is observed 
for only 0.3 to 0.4 percent of the employees with these occupations. Occupations 
with the highest unemployment incidence are precision, handicraft, craft printing 
and related trade workers (ISCO code 73), followed by machine operators and 
assemblers (ISCO code 82). 
                                                 
40 Note that only 1.23 percent of the observed individuals is fired according to the dataset that 
resulted after merging with the labor force force survey, whereas this figure was 2.56 percent prior 
to merging. This implies that workers with comparable jobs have a relatively smaller probability to 
be included in the labor force survey if they are fired at some point in time. The main explanation 
for this is that workers who are fired are only in the labor survey at a moment they were still 
employed when they were inverviewed prior to their being fired. If we assume that both the 
probability to be fired and the probability to be interviewed at a certain day in a year are random, 
this results in an underrepresentation of workers who get fired. However, as this probability is 
unrelated to what determined their unemployment, it does not bias our results. 
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Table 5.4. Descriptive statistics by level of education, 2001–2008 
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Primary education 
7,651 34,634 1.56 16.3 66.4 16.0 
 (11,729)  (18.7)   
Lower secondary education  
  (VMBO, MBO 1) 
8,132 38,338 1.71 15.5 67.6 10.1 
 (17,735)  (18.8)   
Lower tertiary education  
  (MBO 2, 3) 
26,703 38,329 1.22 11.8 74.8 7.1 
 (13,562)  (16.2)   
Lower tertiary education  
  (MBO 4) 
33,837 41,286 1.06 9.6 80.7 7.8 
 (16,213)  (12.7)   
Higher secondary education   
  (HAVO, VWO) 
11,137 44,906 1.39 11.2 81.9 7.1 
 (23,009)  (13.0)   
Higher tertiary education   
  (HBO, BA) 
33,257 52,070 1.05 11.3 75.1 3.1 
 (23,956)  (13.3)   
Higher tertiary education  
  (MA, PhD) 
17,721 68,414 1.21 11.6 76.2 2.8 
 (38,982)  (14.3)   
Total 159,170 45,158 1.23 10.7 75.6 7.3  (23,501)  (12.4)   
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
It has often been suggested that rigid labor markets in Europe have resulted in a 
more compressed wage distribution with higher unemployment as compared to, 
for example, the United States (see, for example, Nahuis and De Groot, 2003; 
Acemoglu and Newman, 2002). As the upward pressure from labor market 
institutions on wages is particularly large for lower paid jobs, this would be likely 
to result in higher unemployment in lower paid occupations, as wages are not 
allowed to sufficiently adjust to clear the labor market. However, in the 
Netherlands this cannot be observed, as the correlation between the average wage 
within occupations and the risk of unemployment is close to zero. That is: it 
cannot be observed for the workers in our sample, who all managed to hold jobs 
for at least several years prior to getting fired. There is also a substantial pool of 
workers who do not manage to hold steady jobs, or who are structurally 
unemployed. It is possible that one of the reasons of their unemployment is that 
the type of jobs they could have done have been outsourced. As this chapter 
addresses only transitional unemployment (because we need to know the previous
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Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics by 2-digit ISCO-88 occupation, 2001-2008 
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12. Corporate managers 15,967 62,308 1.42 12.4 71.4 8.4 (37,838) (15.5)   
13. Managers of small enterprises 6,055 59,488 1.39 12.0 70.2 1.2  (35,633)  (13.6)   
21. Physical, mathematical and engineering  
      science professionals 
9,374 55,974 1.23 9.5 82.6 7.0 
 (21,967)  (12.3)   
22. Life science and health professionals 2,172 60,199 0.78 10.1 NA NA  (35,385)  (11.1)   
23. Teaching professionals 7,435 46,410 0.32 19.0 NA NA  (13,696)  (24.8)   
24. Other professionals 7,131 52,602 1.67 12.6 69.7 1.7  (25,466)  (13.2)   
31. Physical and engineering science  
      associate professionals 
9,622 45,695 1.05 13.5 74.3 10.9 
 (20,417)  (19.3)   
32. Life science and health associate  
      professionals 
4,170 34,375 0.38 8.1 NA NA 
 (9,416)  (11.1)   
34. Other associate professionals 14,165 45,516 1.15 13.4 74.2 2.5  (21,333)  (15.8)   
41. Office clerks 11,627 38,033 1.26 13.3 78.9 2.7  (13,527)  (17.0)   
42. Customer services clerks 1,613 31,870 1.74 11.0 NA NA  (11,949)  (14.5)   
51. Personal and protective services  
      workers 
5,751 34,284 0.90 12.9 63.5 0.0 
 (12,890)  (15.8)   
52. Models, salespersons and demonstrators 4,335 38,027 1.48 9.9 85.9 0.0  (20,306)  (11.3)   
61. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 2,084 30,435 0.86 7.1 NA NA  (8,056)  (10.5)   
71. Extraction and building trades workers 9,431 36,596 1.86 9.0 83.3 8.0  (7,880)  (14.3)   
72. Metal, machinery and related trades  
      workers 
9,338 36,723 1.18 11.5 80.0 14.5 
 (9,443)  (15.4)   
73. Precision, handicraft, craft printing and  
      related trades workers 
905 36,036 2.32 17.8 NA NA 
 (9,867)  (18.4)   
74. Other craft and related trades workers 1,430 32,496 1.61 6.4 NA NA  (18,721)  (5.9)   
81. Stationary plant and related operators 1,964 45,241 0.87 11.8 NA NA  (13,885)  (9.6)   
82. Machine operators and assemblers 4,224 34,893 1.92 12.9 77.8 33.3  (9,143)  (15.6)   
83. Drivers and mobile plant operators 7,760 37,444 0.86 8.4 79.1 10.4  (8,180)  (11.8)   
91. Sales and services elementary  
      occupations 
1,885 29,694 1.33 10.5 NA NA 
 (7,750)  (11.0)   
93. Laborers in mining, construction,  
      manufacturing and transport 
357 38,813 1.68 3.0 NA NA 
 (8,237)  (2.5)   
Total 138,820 44,964 1.22 11.7 75.4 7.4  (23,483)  (15.0)   
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. We report no results (NA) if less than 50 individuals 
in an industry were fired. 
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job to observe the covariates of individuals getting fired), we leave the quest for
the determinants of this structural unemployment for future research. At the same 
time, however, we must note that what determines unemployment of individuals 
who were recently employed is likely to be related to what determines 
unemployment of those without steady employment records. 
Employees fired from manufacturing have a higher probability to find a new 
job, and relatively low average unemployment duration compared to many of the 
services industries. It is, however, likely that there are some selection effects in 
place. For workers with occupations where many individuals are fired, or where 
there are relatively many mass layoffs, their individual performance may be less 
related to their being fired. On the other hand, when a police officer – working in 
an occupation where unemployment is relatively rare – is fired, this may be more 
likely due to personal characteristics, which may make it more difficult to find a 
new job. 
 
Indicators for trade, offshoring and activities of multinationals 
We use three measures for exposure to globalization. On the firm level, we 
determine whether a firm is foreign owned or not, using the Statistics Netherlands 
indicator on the home country of the Ultimate Controlling Institute (UCI) of each 
firm. This indicator draws on multiple data sources. It is important to note that 
subsidiaries of foreign firms can be considered part of a multinational firm, but do 
not cover Dutch owned firms that have activities in multiple countries. Also on 
the firm level, we have used the Dutch production Statistics to calculate exports as 
share of total turnover. For our third measure, offshoring, we use four different 
and detailed indicators, which have been constructed for 374 occupations (on the 
4-digit ISCO-88 level).  
Three of these indicators are based on the O*NET database, a database 
developed for the US Department of Labor on the nature of work, as well as 
required skills, abilities and knowledge for 862 US occupations.41 Many recent 
papers that use the task content of jobs and offshorability rely on this database 
(Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009; Crino, 2010; Blinder, 2009; Fortin 
et al., 2011). A concordance table has been used to map the SOC classification to 
                                                 
41 This database is available at http://online.onetcenter.org. 
118    |   Chapter 5. Impact of trade, offshoring and multinationals on job loss and job finding 
 
 
 
the ISCO-88 classification. Autor et al. (2003) use the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (DOT), which is the predecessor of O*NET, to construct a measure of 
routine vs. non-routine occupations. We use a routine measure similar to that 
developed by Fortin et al. (2011) “in the spirit of Autor” (Fortin et al., 2011, p. 
11), using the “degree of automation”, “importance of repeating same tasks”, 
“structured versus unstructured work”, and “pace determined by speed of 
equipment” (which are variables that are included in the O*NET database).  
Our second offshoring indicator captures face-to-face contact. The need for 
face-to-face personal contact is a key determinant of the offshorability of jobs 
(Blinder, 2009; Fortin et al., 2011), as jobs that require regular meetings with 
customers (e.g., doctors, social workers, sales persons) cannot be offshored. Our 
face-to-face index is similar to the one used by Jensen and Kletzer (2010) and 
Fortin et al. (2011), using “coaching and developing others”, “face-to-face 
discussions”, “assisting and caring for others”, “performing for or working 
directly with the public”, and “establishing and maintaining interpersonal 
relationships”. 
The information provided by the O*NET database is not suitable to capture 
another defining characteristic that determines whether a job is bound to a specific 
location: the importance of proximity. Both the task routine index and the face-to-
face index therefore consider jobs such as cleaners, construction workers, mail 
carriers and garbage collectors to be quite offshorable. Hence, Blinder (2009) 
creates a subjective classification of offshorability, using the job descriptions and 
characteristics of O*NET, but applying subjective judgment rather than 
mathematical rules. We use the resulting Blinder index as third indicator for 
offshorability. As this data is also reported using the SOC classification, we use a 
concordance table to map it to the 4-digit ISCO-88 level. As the Blinder index is 
unavailable for some occupations, this results in a dataset with about 240 
occupations, thereby reducing the number of observations somewhat. 
To benefit from the advantages of an objective mathematical classification 
while at the same time addressing some of the critique on such measures, we have 
created a new offshorability measure that combines the O*NET based routine task 
and face-to-face indexes with a subjective list of occupations that are bound to a 
specific location. While the overall offshorability of occupations is rather difficult 
to observe – which makes a subjective ranking difficult to reproduce (see, for 
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example, Blinder, 2009) – we argue that making a list of occupations that are non-
tradable because of an inherent need to be performed at a specific location is 
rather straightforward. This list includes 112 occupations, such as waiters, 
plasterers, haircutters, police officers, government officials, cleaners, medical 
personnel, library clerks, and athletes.  
We consider only occupations that are tied directly to the end user as being 
tied to a location. For example, it is not clear how different a farmer is from a 
factory worker in terms of being tied to a specific location. While it may be true 
that (as Blinder, 2009, argues) the work at a specific piece of US land cannot be 
done from abroad, the same holds for the work inside a specific US factory. 
However, both agricultural and manufactured products can be traded, and the 
domestic production and employment structure may change accordingly. Our 
offshorability indicator is constructed as follows. We start by normalizing the task 
routine and face-to-face indexes (to a 0 mean and 1 standard deviation). 
Subsequently, we subtract the face-to-face index (which is a negative 
offshorability index) from the task routine index, and standardize the result 
between 0 (least offshorable) and 1 (most offshorable). Changing offshorability of 
all occupations that are bound to a location to 0 results in our offshorability 
indicator. 
The four panels of Figure 5.1 relate the different offshoring indicators to the 
probability of becoming unemployed. The size of the circles reflects the share of 
each occupation in total employment in our dataset. There is no apparent relation 
between the Blinder index and unemployment. In contrast, the importance of face-
to-face contact – which is presented in the second panel of Figure 5.1 – is clearly 
associated with less unemployment (with a correlation coefficient of –0.42). Task 
routine is associated with higher unemployment, although this relation is not as 
strong as was the case for face-to-face contact (correlation 0.17). Our newly 
constructed overall offshorability index associates higher offshorability to higher 
unemployment, with a correlation coefficient of 0.42.  
It has been argued that many lower paid occupations are not easily offshored 
or replaced by technology (see, for example, Autor et al., 2003 and 2006). While 
occupations with many routine tasks are generally occupations that pay low 
average wages (correlation –0.43), and occupations that require face-to-face 
contact are generally higher paid occupations (correlation 0.56), combining those 
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two indicators and correcting for occupations that are location bound results in an 
offshorability index that is in fact negatively correlated to the average wage 
(correlation –0.10). Indexes that are highly correlated to other (favorable) 
characteristics of occupations may find a negative spurious relation between 
pretended offshorability and unemployment due to omitted variable biases. 
 
Figure 5.1. Share of workers becoming unemployed by offshorability of 
occupations, 2001–2008 
 
 
Notes: Size of circles denotes total employment within each occupation. The occupation codes 
correspond to those in Table 5.5. All offshorability measures have been standardized at 0 mean 
and a standard deviation of 1. 
 
Table 5.6 presents the exposure to different indicators for globalization for 
workers with different levels of education. Both the lowest and the highest 
educated workers are somewhat less likely to work in foreign owned firms. For 
exporting this pattern is opposite: workers with higher tertiary education on 
average work in firms with a relatively high share of exports in turnover. For 
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comparison, all four offshorability measures have been standardized at 0 mean 
and a standard deviation of 1. The Blinder index is generally higher for higher 
educated workers, implying that their jobs are generally more easily offshored. 
There is a strong relationship between both the importance of face-to-face contact, 
and task routine, and level of education: the least educated workers are less likely 
to have face-to-face contact, and much more likely to do routine work, relative to 
educated workers. Our combined offshorability index is mostly unrelated to level 
of education. As some offshorability measures are highly correlated with the level 
of education, it is interesting to see whether our empirical section will reveal any 
interaction effects between globalization indicators and the level of education. 
 
Table 5.6. Globalization indicators by level of education, 2001–2008 
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Primary education 
14.2 24.7 –0.394 –0.635 0.387 0.200 
(32.9) (32.6) (1.12) (0.81) (0.99) (1.09) 
Lower secondary education     
   (VMBO, MBO 1) 
13.7 24.3 –0.237 –0.523 0.210 0.119 
(34.3) (32.7) (1.07) (0.82) (0.99) (1.07) 
Lower tertiary education  
   (MBO 2, 3) 
12.6 25.9 –0.086 –0.200 0.106 –0.021 
(33.2) (34.6) (0.94) (0.96) (0.97) (1.05) 
Lower tertiary education  
   (MBO 4) 
14.3 23.5 0.055 –0.044 0.130 0.116 
(35.0) (33.2) (0.99) (0.95) (0.92) (0.96) 
Higher secondary education  
   (HAVO, VWO) 
15.5 23.6 0.100 0.051 0.280 0.101 
(36.2) (33.3) (0.97) (0.94) (0.93) (0.97) 
Higher tertiary education  
   (HBO, BA) 
13.3 27.2 0.087 0.473 –0.370 –0.165 
(34.9) (34.7) (0.97) (0.95) (0.98) (0.93) 
Higher tertiary education  
   (MA, PhD) 
12.3 28.2 0.132 0.626 –0.580 –0.292 
(32.9) (34.7) (0.96) (0.93) (0.90) (0.89) 
       
Total 13.6 25.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (34.2) (33.7) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
5.4 Empirical framework 
This section provides a description of the Cox proportional hazard models and 
Cox regression models (Cox, 1972) that are used to estimate the impact of human 
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capital and a number of variables that are related to internationalization on 
employment spells and unemployment spells. In particular we would like to see 
whether offshoring and multinational activity affect the worker’s occupation 
switching from employment to unemployment and vice versa. An overview of the 
methodology and application of duration and survival analysis can be found in, 
for example, Therneau and Grambsch (2001) or Klein and Moeschberger (2005). 
Even though the application of survival and duration models in economics is far 
from novel, they are – with few exceptions (e.g., Munch, 2010) – not regularly 
applied in the empirical literature that focuses on the effects of offshoring, 
international trade, and multinational firms on unemployment. 
Part of the literature (for example, Liu and Trefler, 2008) focuses on shifts in 
aggregate wages and employment within occupations or industries (that differ on 
dimensions of globalization), thus not optimally exploiting the possibilities 
offered by micro data. Other studies (such as Liu and Trefler, 2011) do use 
individual level unemployment data, but apply probit or logit specifications in 
which the probability that a worker with certain characteristics will become 
unemployed is estimated. Duration models make much more efficient use of the 
available data, because they allow for a flexible relation between job spell and the 
probability that a worker gets fired (or is hired again). As this relationship is 
rather strong (e.g., workers are much more likely to be fired in the first few years 
after being hired, compared to when they have been working for the same 
employer for several decades), this has a potentially large effect on estimation 
results. 
The central variable used to model the transition from a job to unemployment 
is the exit or hazard rate, which is in essence the conditional probability density 
function of becoming unemployed given that one has been working in a job for a 
certain number of years. If we denote the survival time (e.g., in the case of the 
transition from a job to unemployment this is the duration of the job in years) by 
T, the distribution function P that measures the probability of survival up to time t 
is given by: 
 
( ) ( )P t P T t? ? .            (5.1) 
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The survival function, which denotes the probability that the spell is of at least 
length t, can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) 1 ( )S t P T t P t? ? ? ? .          (5.2) 
 
The hazard function gives the probability that, given that the spell has lasted until 
time t, it will end in the next short time interval t? , and is known as the hazard 
rate, h: 
 
0
( | )( ) lim
t
P t T t t t Th t
t? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ? .         (5.3) 
 
An increasing hazard rate implies a higher probability that an event occurs.  
Figure 5.2 shows (as an example) the hazard time path for workers employed 
in Dutch owned firms, as compared to those working in foreign owned firms. On 
the horizontal axis is tenure (in years), on the vertical axis the probability to 
become unemployed in a year. There is a substantial difference between Dutch 
and foreign firms: across the entire career the probability to enter unemployment 
is higher in foreign firms. 
Throughout most of their careers, the probability of becoming involuntary 
unemployed is less than 0.5 percent per year. After about 25 years of service, the 
probability starts to increase, to about 1.5 percent. 42 This is a somewhat 
unexpected result, as the Dutch system is such that it becomes progressively more 
expensive to fire workers as they become older. Hassink (1999) and Gielen and 
Van Ours (2004) independently find that the probability to become unemployed 
increases for older workers in the Netherlands. Though they do not provide a full 
explanation for this phenomenon, it is attributed to the fact that older workers are 
relatively expensive, while their productivity decreases because of their – 
supposedly – out-dated knowledge and insufficient abilities regarding 
technological advancements (the so-called efficient layoff rule of Lazear, 1995).
                                                 
42  As a robustness check, we have estimated the econometric models in this section while 
excluding employees with a tenure that is above a certain number of years (20, 25, 30 and 35). 
This does not result in substantial changes in parameter estimates, which could be explained by the 
fact that the number of workers with a high tenure (e.g., above 20 years) is rather limited. 
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As older workers experience relative difficulty to find a new job, it is likely that 
the probability that they will find a job in the months that pass between being 
informed about them being fired and actually being fired is lower as well. 
Furthermore, older workers are less likely to leave the firm in advance when they 
notice business is going bad. Therefore, the probability to be fired and receive 
unemployment benefits is likely to increase more than the probability to be fired. 
  
Figure 5.2. Hazard rates of the transition to unemployment  
 
 
In duration analyses, the (natural logarithm of the) hazard rate is generally the 
dependent variable. The Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is a semi-
parametric approach to estimate the effect of different covariates on the hazard 
rate. The base regression equation that is estimated in Section 5.5, regarding the 
transition from a job to unemployment is: 
 
1 2 3log ( ) ( ) ...
female
i i i i k ih t t D age offshorability x? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? .     (5.4) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the hazard rate. The right hand 
side variables are a flexible base-hazard rate (which models the hazard rate as a 
function over time), and a number of covariates that enter the model linearly. In 
this model, the base-line hazard function: 
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is unspecified. Its function is similar to that of the constant in a normal regression 
model, but instead of having a single value it represents the change in the hazard 
rate as a function of time. The covariates, in contrast, express the hazard rate as a 
time invariant function of the independent variables. The estimated model is semi-
parametric, because while the baseline hazard function is flexible, the other 
variables in the model are linear. The regression model is estimated using the 
partial likelihood estimator developed by Cox (1972). The interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients is that an increase in the value of the independent variable 
by one results in a change of the log hazard ratio by ?, and thus a change in the 
hazard ratio by e?. All coefficients reported in Section 5.5 are exponents of ?, and 
can therefore be interpreted as hazard ratios. As we include a number of firm level 
variables in our regressions, the reported results are based on robust standard 
errors that are clustered within firms. 
 
5.5 Empirical results 
 
From employment to unemployment 
This section applies the hazard models that were introduced in the previous 
section to estimate the impact of human capital and a number of variables that are 
related to internationalization on employment spells. 
The dependent variable in this section is always the natural logarithm of the 
hazard rate (e.g., the hazard to become unemployed). We have estimated six 
different models. Model (I) is estimated without education or occupation 
variables. This gives us the advantage of a large number of observations. Model 
(II) repeats the estimation of model (I) for workers that are present in the labor 
force survey, and adds education dummies, while the models (III) to (VI) add our 
four occupation based offshoring indicators. Because of multicollinearity we 
estimate separate models for these indicators. Including our offshoring indicators 
slightly reduces the number of observations, as the job specification was not 
known for all workers in the labor force survey. Model (III) includes the Blinder 
index (Blinder, 2009). Model (IV) includes the face-to-face index, (V) the task 
routine index, and (VI) our combined offshorability index that takes into account 
both the need for face-to-face contact, task routine, and whether an occupation is 
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bound to a specific location. For presentational reasons, we present the main 
results (Table 5.7), the estimated education dummies (Table 5.8) and industry 
dummies (Table 5.9) in separate tables. 
The results indicate that women have a somewhat higher probability to 
become unemployed relative to males. In a given year, the probability is about 16 
percent higher in specification (I) and – for unknown reasons – about 45 percent 
higher in all other specifications.43 The finding that females are more likely to be 
fired is somewhat surprising. A possible explanation that would be consistent with 
this finding is that the variance in productivity of females (at a given wage offer) 
is larger compared to males. This would result in a larger fraction of females 
performing less than expected, who might be fired. Discrimination could 
theoretically also provide an explanation, but it is not clear why discriminating 
firms would first hire female employees to subsequently fire them. Productivity 
differences are unlikely to provide an explanation, as in that case this should also 
be reflected in wages. 
Older workers have a substantially lower probability to become unemployed 
(please note that this is after correcting for tenure, so the reported effect is an 
isolated effect of age). The effect of age is very robust across specifications. 
Foreign-born workers have a much higher probability to become unemployed than 
Dutch workers. The probability is about two-thirds higher for foreign workers 
who were born in advanced nations, and more than twice as high for foreign 
workers from less developed countries. Even in the specifications that correct for 
level of education (non-western born immigrants are on average lower educated 
relative to natives), the probability of becoming unemployed remains far higher. 
Again, we suspect that the predictability of the productivity of workers might be 
related to this. In the case of foreign workers, it might also be a problem that they 
are less flexible compared to natives because of their lack of language skills. As 
was the case with the gender differential, the large difference between natives and 
foreign workers is an interesting topic for further research. If the probability to get 
fired is twice as large in a single year, the probability to get fired over a longer
                                                 
43 As a robustness check, we have also estimated equation (II) without education dummies, which 
implies estimating the specification of (I) on the population of (II). Except for gender, all estimates 
are robust. This implies that the relatively high female unemployment risk found in specifications 
(II) to (VI) is not explained by the addition of education, but rather due to sampling. 
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period of time will be a multiple of that. As this has consequences for the net 
fiscal contribution of foreign workers, it may have implications for policies that 
aim at attracting high skilled foreign workers. Even though substantial positive 
externalities are known to be associated with the presence of high skilled workers 
in general, the findings of this chapter call for more thorough research into the 
specifics of foreign workers. 
Workers who work at larger firms have a lower probability to become 
unemployed. Workers who are employed at foreign owned firms have a slightly 
higher probability to become unemployed (although this becomes insignificant 
once we control for education), as have workers in firms that export relatively 
more. Workers who live in more densely populated areas have a lower probability 
to become unemployed. 
We do not find any relationship between the Blinder index and 
unemployment. This implies that having a job that is relatively easy to offshore – 
according to the ranking of Blinder (2009) – does not seem to result in a higher 
probability to become unemployed. Even though the stylized facts presented in 
Section 5.3, and in particular Figure 5.1, showed that both the face-to-face index 
and task routine index are related to unemployment, the results in Table 5.7 
indicate that almost nothing of this relationship is left once we correct for other 
worker and job characteristics. Our combined offshorability index is negatively 
related to unemployment (e.g., higher offshorability of a job results in a lower 
probability of unemployment), although it is only marginally statistically 
significant given the size of our dataset, particularly when compared to other 
determinants of unemployment. 
The effect of education – which is presented in Table 5.8 – is rather linear, 
but little (statistically) significant. Workers with lower secondary or tertiary 
education have the lowest probability to become unemployed. These are usually 
more practically oriented types of education, which aim at a specific profession 
(for example, electrician or nurse). University graduates, on the other hand, have 
the highest probability to become unemployed. Workers with only primary 
education are somewhat in the middle. As the wages of workers is strongly 
correlated to their level of education, these findings may indicate that the Dutch 
labor market is working rather efficient, such that demand and supply on the labor 
market is cleared by the wages rather than by unemployment. 
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Table 5.7. Estimation results for the transition to unemployment 
Dependent: Log hazard rate (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
       
# Observations 6,396,518 159,167 97,666 142,488 142,488 142,488 
# Transitions to unemployment 164,136 1,950 1,336 1,767 1,767 1,767 
       
Female 1.16*** 1.45*** 1.57*** 1.46*** 1.47*** 1.46*** 
 (8.4) (5.9) (6.4) (5.8) (5.9) (5.7) 
Age 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 
 (–28.5) (–13.6) (–10.8) (–12.9) (–12.9) (–13.0) 
Foreign-born worker 1.75*** 1.52** 1.48* 1.55** 1.55** 1.56** 
   from advanced country (25.4) (2.8) (2.2) (2.8) (2.8) (2.8) 
Other foreign worker 2.23*** 2.09*** 2.31*** 2.13*** 2.13*** 2.14*** 
 (52.8) (8.5) (8.5) (8.3) (8.3) (8.3) 
Blinder index   1.01    
   (0.2)    
Face-to-face index    1.03   
    (0.8)   
Task routine index     0.97  
     (–1.0)  
Offshorability index      0.93** 
      (–2.5) 
Log firm size 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 
 (–14.8) (–8.1) (–8.4) (–8.1) (–8.0) (–8.0) 
Foreign firm 1.08*** 1.11 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.17 
 (4.5) (1.0) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) 
Share of export 1.56*** 1.30 1.14 1.31 1.32 1.32* 
 (5.9) (1.7) (0.8) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) 
Log residence density 0.96 0.91** 0.95 0.89*** 0.89** 0.89** 
 (–3.3) (–2.6) (–1.2) (–3.1) (–3.1) (–3.1) 
       
Education dummies (Table 5.8) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies (Table 5.9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: z-values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-values indicate a positive (negative) effect 
on the hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. For computational reasons, clustered robust standard errors reported in column (I) are 
based on subsamples. We have calculated clustered robust standard errors for subsamples of 10, 
20, 30, 40, 50 and 60 percent of the total sample, and extrapolated them to 100 percent. As the 
estimated parameters are more precise when estimated on the full sample, and do not depend on 
whether standard errors are clustered or not, we present estimated coefficients for the full sample. 
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Table 5.8. Estimation results for the transition to unemployment – education 
Dependent: Log Hazard rate (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
      
Lower secondary education 0.91 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.91 
   (VMBO, MBO 1) (–0.9) (–0.2) (–0.8) (–0.8) (–0.8) 
Lower tertiary education 0.85 1.03 0.84 0.84 0.84 
   (MBO 2, 3) (–1.5) (0.2) (–1.5) (–1.5) (–1.5) 
Lower tertiary education 0.75** 0.82 0.75* 0.75* 0.76* 
   (MBO 4) (–2.6) (–1.4) (–2.4) (–2.4) (–2.4) 
Higher secondary education 1.05 0.98 1.09 1.10 1.11 
   (HAVO, VWO) (0.4) (–0.1) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) 
Higher tertiary education 1.01 1.10 1.03 1.03 1.04 
   (HBO, BA) (0.1) (0.6) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) 
Higher tertiary education 1.41** 1.42* 1.37* 1.37* 1.38* 
   (MA, PhD) (2.7) (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (2.4) 
 
Notes: Omitted category is primary education. z-values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-
values indicate a positive (negative) effect on the hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 
0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Table 5.9 presents the coefficients that correspond to the industry dummies that 
have been estimated simultaneously with the results presented in Table 5.7 and 
Table 5.8. While the stylized facts presented in Section 5.3 indicated a 
substantially higher incidence of unemployment within the manufacturing 
industry, most of this difference disappears when controlling for worker and firm 
heterogeneity. Unemployment, however, remains rare within the public sector, 
and particularly among government employees. Employees working in 
commercial services are relatively likely to become unemployed. Interestingly, 
when including the Blinder index (specification III), this effect disappears. 
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Table 5.9. Estimation results for the transition to unemployment – industry 
 
Notes: Omitted industry is agriculture. z-values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-values 
indicate a positive (negative) effect on the hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Because it is widely acknowledged that effects of globalization could be different 
for higher than for lower educated workers, we have re-estimated some of the 
regressions whilst adding interaction terms between education and our 
globalization indicators. The regression coefficients for these interaction effects 
are presented in Table 5.10. Note that these results are based on different 
regressions than those in Table 5.7, Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 (the regression 
equation has been extended by adding interaction effects). In contrast to, for 
example, Munch (2010) we do not find any evidence for interaction effects. This 
suggests that, consistent with the task-based literature, the effects of globalization 
are rather independent from education (if present at all). 
Dependent: Log Hazard rate (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
       
Mining and quarrying 0.90 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.44 
 (1.0) (–1.4) (–1.1) (–1.2) (–1.2) (–1.2) 
Manufacturing 1.27*** 0.96 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.03 
 (4.3) (–0.3) (–0.7) (0.0) (0.0) (0.3) 
Construction 1.23*** 1.21 1.08 1.27 1.26 1.23 
 (3.9) (1.5) (0.4) (1.8) (1.8) (1.5) 
Trade 1.16** 1.10 1.06 1.15 1.14 1.17 
 (2.9) (0.8) (0.3) (1.1) (1.0) (1.2) 
Hotels and Restaurants 1.21** 1.31 1.29 1.35 1.36 1.30 
 (3.2) (1.3) (0.9) (1.4) (1.5) (1.3) 
Transport 0.91 0.70* 0.61* 0.72 0.72 0.73 
 (–0.8) (–2.1) (–2.2) (–1.8) (–1.8) (–1.7) 
Commercial services 1.46*** 1.29* 1.09 1.36* 1.36* 1.38** 
 (7.6) (2.1) (0.6) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) 
Government 0.35*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (–4.7) (–6.9) (–5.8) (–7.0) (–7.0) (–7.0) 
Education 0.97 0.47*** 0.83 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 
 (0.9) (–3.9) (–0.7) (–4.2) (–4.2) (–4.4) 
Healthcare 0.73** 0.52*** 0.58** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 
 (–2.7) (–4.1) (–2.6) (–3.4) (–3.4) (–3.6) 
Other 1.53*** 1.47** 1.40 1.57** 1.57** 1.58** 
 (7.5) (2.5) (1.8) (2.9) (2.9) (2.9) 
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Table 5.10. Interaction effects between education and globalization indicators 
 Dependent: Log Hazard rate 
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Lower secondary education   
   (VMBO, MBO 1) 
1.12 1.08 1.06 1.16* 0.99 0.93 
(0.6) (0.3) (0.8) (2.0) (–0.1) (–1.3) 
Lower tertiary education  
   (MBO 2, 3) 
1.11 1.12 1.14 0.96 1.03 0.95 
(0.6) (0.4) (1.7) (–0.7) (0.6) (–0.8) 
Lower tertiary education  
   (MBO 4) 
0.90 1.24 1.05 0.96 0.90 0.89 
(–0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (–0.6) (–1.6) (–1.9) 
Higher secondary education  
   (HAVO, VWO) 
1.35 0.87 0.97 1.03 0.95 0.83* 
(1.4) (0.3) (–0.3) (0.3) (–0.6) (–2.0) 
Higher tertiary education  
   (HBO, BA) 
1.17 1.59 0.89 1.07 0.93 0.94 
(1.0) (1.9) (–1.9) (1.0) (–1.1) (–0.8) 
Higher tertiary education  
   (MA, PhD) 
0.87 1.29 0.93 1.03 1.06 1.06 
(–0.6) (0.8) (–0.9) (0.3) (0.7) (0.7) 
      
Notes: Omitted category is primary education. The effects of exporting and foreign owned firms 
are estimated by extending model (II) with interaction terms, the effects of offshorability, the 
Blinder index, and the task routine index are estimated by extending respectively (III) to (VI). z-
values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-values indicate a positive (negative) effect on the 
hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
From unemployment back to a job 
After considering the transition from a job to unemployment, we now apply the 
same methodology to explain unemployment duration. Because we now model 
the transition from unemployment back to a job, the hazard rate represents the 
probability that an employee finds a job in a given month. The average incidence 
rate is 5.8 percent per month. It is important to note that all job related 
characteristics – including those related to globalization – represent the job an 
individual had before getting fired. 
The dependent variable in this section is again the natural logarithm of the 
hazard rate (e.g., the hazard to find a job). We have estimated six different 
models. Model (I) is again estimated on our full data set, without merging to the 
labor force survey for education or occupation variables. Model (II) adds 
education dummies, while model (III) includes the Blinder index (Blinder, 2009), 
(III) the face-to-face index, (V) the task routine index and (IV) our combined 
offshorability index. Again, all offshoring indicators have been standardized. The 
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main results are presented in Table 5.11, the estimated education dummies in 
Table 5.12 and industry dummies in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.11. Estimation results for the transition from unemployment to a new job 
Dependent: Log Hazard rate (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
       
# Observations 162,131 1,930 1,324 1,748 1,748 1,748 
# Transitions to a new job 119,480 1,455 992 1,313 1,313 1,313 
       
       
Female 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.97 
 (0.0) (–0.1) (0.1) (–0.2) (–0.5) (–0.4) 
Age 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
 (–56.1) (–15.9) (–13.7) (–14.9) (–15.0) (–15.2) 
Expat 0.87*** 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.72* 
 (–7.9) (–1.8) (–1.7) (–1.9) (–1.8) (–2.0) 
Other foreign worker 0.75*** 0.75** 0.77* 0.72** 0.72*** 0.72*** 
 (–27.7) (–3.1) (–2.4) (–3.3) (–3.3) (–3.3) 
Blinder index   0.98    
   (–0.6)    
Face-to-face index    0.91**   
    (–2.6)   
Task routine index     1.08**  
     (2.5)  
Offshorability index      1.11** 
      (3.2) 
Log firm size 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.95** 0.96** 0.96** 0.96** 
 (–5.2) (–3.3) (–3.0) (–3.0) (–3.0) (–3.0) 
Foreign firm 1.10*** 1.01 1.08 1.02 1.01 1.01 
 (3.8) (0.1) (0.8) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) 
Share of export 0.87*** 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.79 
 (–2.8) (–1.5) (–1.6) (–1.5) (–1.5) (–1.5) 
Log residence density 0.97*** 1.01 1.05 1.00 1.01 1.00 
 (–5.1) (0.2) (1.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Fired during a mass layoff 1.10*** 1.20 1.20 1.16 1.17 1.15 
 (4.2) (1.7) (1.6) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3) 
       
Education dummies (Table 5.12) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies (Table 5.13) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: z-values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-values indicate a positive (negative) effect 
on the hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***. 
 
While we showed earlier that females have a relatively high probability to become 
unemployed, gender does not matter for unemployment duration. Even though 
Section 5.2 showed that older workers have a relatively lower probability to 
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become unemployed, once they are unemployed they have a low probability to 
find a new job. Foreign-born workers, and particularly foreign workers that were 
not born in advanced nations, have a substantially lower probability to find a new 
job. They are thus not only far more likely to become unemployed, once 
unemployed they are also likely to remain unemployed for a relatively long time. 
Workers who worked for larger firms before getting unemployed have a 
somewhat lower probability to find a new job. Workers who were fired during a 
mass layoff have a relatively high probability to find a new job. It is likely that 
employees with low unobserved skills (which may have been unknown to the 
employer during wage negotiations) generally have a higher probability to be 
fired. During mass layoffs, however, unemployment is mostly exogenous to the 
abilities of the employee, which could result in a higher average ability of workers 
that were fired. 
The effects of globalization do not show a clear pattern. When correcting for 
the level of education, having worked for a foreign firm does not seem to have 
any effect. Workers who were previously employed at a firm with relatively high 
exports seem to have a somewhat lower probability to find a new job, but this 
effect is statistically insignificant in all specifications except (I). While 
offshorability of the previous job as measured by the Blinder index is almost 
completely unrelated to the probability of finding a new job, the face-to-face 
index, task routine index and combined offshorability index indicate that higher 
offshorability of the previous occupation (thus indicating that the occupation 
could be offshored more easily) results in a significantly higher probability to exit 
unemployment. This implies that offshorability is related to less difficulty, rather 
than more, to finding a new job once an individual has been fired. Even though 
this might seem somewhat unexpected at first sight, this could be explained by a 
less complex matching process for routine jobs and jobs that require little face-to-
face contact. For instance, teaching professionals have rather specific skills and 
thus may have longer unemployment duration because it may be difficult to find a 
new job that match their skills (see, for example, the work of Gathmann and 
Schönberg, 2010, on task specificity). The fact that certain jobs allow for a 
relatively simple match between employer and employee is likely to result in a 
ceteris paribus quicker transition back to a job domestically, while this simple 
matching also increases offshorability. 
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Table 5.12 shows the estimation results for the education dummies that were 
included in regression models (II) to (VI). Higher educated workers have a higher 
probability to find a job relative to lower educated. University graduates, 
however, do not have a higher hazard rate towards a new job than other workers 
with at least the highest level of tertiary education (MBO 4). This means that they 
experience more unemployment: they have a higher probability to become 
unemployed and once they are unemployed they do not find a job faster than other 
workers with an above average level of education. 
 
Table 5.12. Estimation results for the transition to unemployment – education 
Dependent: Log Hazard rate (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
      
Lower secondary education 1.23 1.32 1.29 1.30 1.29 
   (VMBO, MBO 1) (1.7) (1.6) (1.9) (2.0) (1.9) 
Lower tertiary education 1.25 1.56** 1.26 1.29 1.29 
   (MBO 2, 3) (1.8) (2.6) (1.7) (1.9) (1.9) 
Lower tertiary education 1.47** 1.65** 1.47** 1.50** 1.48** 
   (MBO 4) (3.1) (3.1) (3.0) (3.1) (3.0) 
Higher secondary education 1.41* 1.72** 1.44* 1.43* 1.44* 
   (HAVO, VWO) (2.3) (2.9) (2.4) (2.3) (2.4) 
Higher tertiary education 1.41** 1.63** 1.50** 1.50** 1.45** 
   (HBO, BA) (2.7) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0) (2.8) 
Higher tertiary education 1.41** 1.50* 1.41* 1.40* 1.35* 
   (MA, PhD) (2.6) (2.3) (2.4) (2.3) (2.1) 
 
Notes: Omitted category is primary education. z-values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-
values indicate a positive (negative) effect on the hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 
0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Table 5.13 presents the estimated industry dummies. As the stylized facts 
presented in Section 5.3 indicated, employees that were fired from a job in the 
education sector have a relatively low probability to find a new job. However, the 
effect is no longer statistically significant when reducing the number of 
observations and correcting for education. Other former public sector employees 
have somewhat less chances on the labor market as well. Apart from having 
worked in the government sector, it does not matter from what industry an 
individual was fired. 
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Table 5.13. Estimation results for the transition to unemployment – industry 
Dependent: Log Hazard rate (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
       
Mining and quarrying 0.91 2.84 3.28 2.80 3.09 2.75 
 (–1.1) (1.5) (1.7) (1.5) (1.6) (1.5) 
Manufacturing 0.98 0.94 1.02 0.91 0.92 0.86 
 (–0.8) (–0.5) (0.1) (–0.7) (–0.6) (–1.2) 
Construction 0.95 0.90 1.00 0.88 0.91 0.92 
 (–1.8) (–0.7) (0.0) (–0.9) (–0.8) (–0.6) 
Trade 1.04 0.88 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.84 
 (1.9) (–1.0) (–0.4) (–1.0) (–0.8) (–1.3) 
Hotels and Restaurants 1.01 0.99 1.17 1.01 0.99 1.00 
 (0.2) (–0.1) (0.5) (0.0) (–0.1) (0.0) 
Transport 1.01 1.02 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.93 
 (0.4) (0.2) (–0.2) (–0.2) (–0.1) (–0.5) 
Commercial services 0.99 0.96 1.02 0.96 0.97 0.93 
 (–0.3) (–0.3) (0.1) (–0.4) (–0.3) (–0.6) 
Government 0.92 0.75 1.08 1.00 0.99 0.96 
 (–1.6) (–1.3) (0.3) (0.0) (0.0) (–0.2) 
Education 0.75*** 0.74 1.09 0.78 0.80 0.77 
 (–7.0) (–1.6) (0.3) (–1.2) (–1.0) (–1.2) 
Healthcare 1.04 0.81 1.01 0.89 0.89 0.88 
 (1.4) (–1.3) (0.0) (–0.7) (–0.7) (–0.8) 
Other 0.84*** 0.62** 0.76** 0.65** 0.66** 0.63** 
 (–6.2) (–3.1) (–1.3) (–2.8) (–2.7) (–3.0) 
 
Notes: Omitted industry is agriculture. z-values are in parentheses. Positive (negative) z-values 
indicate a positive (negative) effect on the hazard rate. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
International trade, offshoring and the activities of multinationals are generally 
thought to result in increased productivity in the long run, because they allow for 
increased specialization and economies of scale. However, in the short run such 
forces of internationalization may have adverse labor market effects for some 
groups of workers. This chapter employs a large micro dataset of Dutch matched 
firm-worker data to analyze the effects of different dimensions of globalization on 
unemployment.  
We find that females and foreign-born workers (who also have a lower 
probability to find a new job once unemployed) have a higher probability of 
getting fired, while older workers (at a given tenure) are somewhat less likely to 
become unemployed, but also less likely to find a new job when unemployed. 
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Both the lowest educated workers (e.g., those with only elementary education) 
and university graduates have a somewhat higher probability to get unemployed. 
Workers employed at exporting firms have a significantly higher probability 
of getting fired. The effect is, however, not very strong. Our estimates imply that 
an average worker has a 0.8 percent point higher probability of getting fired 
during a 10-year employment spell when the share of exports in total turnover 
goes up by 10 percentage point. We find some limited evidence for a higher 
unemployment incidence among workers employed at foreign owned firms, but 
its effect becomes insignificant once we control for human capital.   
The estimated effects of offshoring on unemployment risk consistently fail to 
associate offshorability to higher unemployment incidence. We find no 
statistically significant effect of the Blinder index (Blinder, 2009), the need for 
face-to-face contact, and task routine, while we find that a higher score on a 
proposed offshorability index that combines face-to-face contact, task routine, and 
whether a job is bound to a specific location is negatively related to 
unemployment (although this effect is not strong). We do not find any evidence 
for interactions between international trade, offshoring, or activities of foreign 
firms and level of education on the risk of unemployment. 
Without correcting for level of education of workers that have been fired, our 
data seem to suggest that individuals fired from foreign owned firms have a 
somewhat higher probability to find a new job, and those fired from firms with 
higher exports a somewhat lower probability. However, once we correct for level 
of education these effects disappear. While offshorability as measured by the 
Blinder index is unrelated to the probability to find a new job, our (three) other 
offshoring indicators indicate that employees fired from occupations that are 
relatively offshorable are somewhat more likely to leave unemployment. The 
findings thus imply that offshoring is unlikely to have a negative effect on 
unemployment incidence and duration. 
To conclude, our findings suggest that the short-term effects of globalization 
on unemployment are either absent or ambiguous, and have a relatively small 
effect on unemployment compared to other worker and firm related predictors of 
unemployment and the probability of finding a new job. This implies that the 
short term transitional effects of globalization are most likely small. 
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6 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN KNOWLEDGE 
WORKERS ON PRODUCTIVITY 
 
“Great cities have always been melting pots of races and cultures. Out of the 
vivid and subtle interactions of which they have been the centers, there have 
come the newer breeds and the newer social types.” 
Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925) 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s, nearly five decades of increased cross-border labor mobility have 
transformed Europe’s cities into a melting pot of cultures. Even though such 
cultural diversity may result in a mismatch of (social) skills or Babylonian 
confusion of languages, a variety of knowledge, skills and cultures may also 
enhance productivity and innovation. For example, the Dutch economic successes 
during the Golden Age are often (at least partially) attributed to migrants (cf. 
Esser, 2007). Relatively wealthy migrants, such as the Huguenots, brought 
knowledge and social (trade) networks, which resulted in a positive contribution 
to GDP (Foldvari et al., 2012). 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it aims to provide an overview 
of the literature that is concerned with the effects of diversity on productivity. 
Second, we estimate the wage differential between highly educated natives and 
foreign workers with similar observed worker characteristics, as well as the 
relationship between the presence of highly educated foreign-born workers from 
advanced countries and the wages of other Dutch workers. For this purpose, we 
rely on an extensive set of micro data. 
This chapter considers foreign knowledge workers as a special type of highly 
educated workers, who have certain characteristics that are not captured by the 
observed level of education. These characteristics may either increase or decrease 
the productivity and wages of foreign workers compared to natives with similar 
other characteristics. As knowledge is to some extent transferrable, it is also 
possible that the productivity of workers that interact with foreign knowledge 
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workers increases, due to the exchange of knowledge or skills. In contrast, 
because of the need for communication and coordination, the presence of foreign 
workers that are not familiar with local language and culture may also decrease 
the performance of natives.  
In addition to making foreign labor more valuable (resulting in a higher 
wage), knowledge spillovers could result in higher productivity and wages of 
other workers in firms or regions. This would result in a ceteris paribus wage 
differential between similar workers that differ only in the number of foreign 
knowledge workers within the firm (intra-firm spillovers) or region (intra-regional 
spillovers) where they work. 44  As knowledge and skills are relatively more 
important for educated workers, the focus in this chapter is on the effects of the 
presence of highly educated foreign workers, which we define as workers with at 
least higher secondary education or tertiary education. 
As is argued by, for example, Bellini et al. (2008), the use of a more 
disaggregated spatial level seems more appropriate as relevant interactions 
between individuals are far more likely to occur within cities. We propose to go 
one step further. Because the exchange of knowledge that is relevant for the 
productivity of workers is even more likely to occur on the work floor, the most 
straightforward level of aggregation is that of the firm. Not only do workers spend 
a large share of their time on the work floor, it is also likely that conversations 
that take place within firms are more often work related compared to talks with 
family, friends or neighbors. In addition to this, colleagues – being insiders – are 
far more likely to be in the possession of skills or knowledge that are relevant.  
Even though we focus only on knowledge spillovers that take place within 
firms, our findings will have implications for the effects of diversity on the 
regional level, as the average diversity of firms in a region is highly correlated to 
the average diversity of the region.  
                                                 
44 A changed productivity level may not be fully transferred through the wages, but could also 
change the profitability of firms. However, if firms discriminate against foreign workers, this 
implies that their competitors can hire an all-foreign work force that does the same work for less 
money. The resulting cost differences will cause some firms to prosper, while firms that 
discriminate cannot sell at competitive prices. As this results in non-discriminating firms gaining 
market share, thus increasing demand for foreign labor, wages of foreign workers will increase. 
Micro evidence on the relationship between wages and productivity supports the assumption often 
made by economists that wages reflect productivity (see, for example, Hægeland and Klette, 
1999).  
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The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. The next section 
discusses theoretical and empirical insights from the existing literature on 
migration and knowledge spillovers. Section 6.3 introduces the data and 
methodology used to identify the relationship between the presence of foreign 
knowledge workers and wages. This section will also present several stylized facts 
and descriptive statistics. The empirical findings will be presented in Section 6.4, 
where augmented Mincerian wage equations are used to estimate the wage 
differential between foreign knowledge workers and comparable natives, as well 
as the effect of the presence of foreign knowledge workers in the same firm on the 
wages of other workers. Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Theories and evidence on diversity and knowledge spillovers 
The idea that diversity may have a positive effect on productivity is certainly not 
new, and translates back to – at least – the seminal work of Jane Jacobs (1969). 
The concept is traditionally applied to industries, where it is thought that cities 
with a more diverse sectoral structure provide more opportunities for spillovers 
between these sectors. Empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis (see 
De Groot et al., 2009, for a meta-analysis). More recently, the concept of Jacobs 
externalities has been generalized to the context of migration studies, arguing that 
a diverse mix of languages, cultures and other knowledge is beneficial for 
productivity. 
Cox et al. (1991, p. 827) describe this as the “value-of-diversity hypothesis”, 
and put the focus on the potential positive effects that diversity can have for 
organizations, arguing that heterogeneous groups are more likely to produce a 
variety of creative ideas than homogeneous groups. Alesina et al. (2000) introduce 
a model where more variety of human capital increases productivity in a Dixit-
Stiglitz production function. 
Lazear (1999), in contrast, argues that organizational diversity imposes a 
trade off. On the one hand, a firm can benefit from diversity because certain 
elements of skills and knowledge are specific to ethnicity or culture. On the other 
hand, combining workers from different cultures, legal systems, and languages 
introduces costs for firms due to coordination problems or conflict. The gains of 
diversity are determined by the difference between the information possessed by 
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the representatives of different groups, the relevance of that information, and the 
ability to communicate. One of the goals of a firm operating in today’s global 
economy is thus to optimize the costs and benefits of diversity. 
 
Micro foundations of positive diversity effects 
Let us elaborate a bit more on the channels through which the presence of foreign 
knowledge workers could cause a change in the productivity level of firms. From 
the literature on diversity, we know that foreign workers may have access to 
knowledge that is different (and possibly complementary) to that of local workers. 
As more skilled and knowledgeable workers are more productive, they will most 
likely earn a higher wage (these are the private returns to their knowledge). To 
assess the broader impact of such workers on their environment, we borrow from 
the human capital literature. 
Rauch (1993) proposes that individuals do not fully capture the benefits from 
their human capital, and that the average local level of human capital can thus be 
considered as a public good. Formal and informal interaction results in the sharing 
of knowledge, skills and ideas between workers (see Jovanovic and Rob, 1989). 
As these knowledge spillovers result in a higher (lower) productivity of identical 
workers in an environment where human capital is relatively abundant (scarce), a 
wage differential is likely to occur. Citing the work of Jacobs (1969), Lucas 
(1988) and Rauch (1993) argue that interactions between educated and skilled 
individuals generate externalities. Moretti (2004b and 2004a) finds empirical 
evidence in support of these theories on the firm and regional level. Canton (2009) 
uses micro data to test whether a higher presence of highly educated individuals in 
firms or regions results in knowledge spillovers. He finds a positive and 
significant relation on the regional level, but it disappears when the firm’s 
knowledge stock is included. The extension of this generic work on human capital 
spillovers to migration studies is a small one, as the knowledge possessed by 
workers from abroad is likely to be more diverse than that of native workers. In a 
globalized world, however, there are more reasons why an ethnically diverse 
workforce could increase productivity. 
Dekker et al. (2006) show that cultural diversity in the EU restricts 
international trade, in a way similar to physical distance. As firms – in particular 
in a small and open economy like the Netherlands – operate on global rather than 
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national markets, the insider information of foreign employees about their home 
countries is likely to be of high value. There is little empirical evidence on the 
micro foundations of local knowledge spillovers through diversity, and studies 
that find a positive association are often related to diversity of task specific skills 
or fields of discipline in problem solving, rather than broader diversity in terms of 
race or gender (see O'Reilly et al., 1997, for an overview). 
 
Micro foundations of negative diversity effects 
While the evidence on the positive effects of diversity is mixed, empirical 
evidence has shown that there can also be negative effects of diversity. As 
workers with different mother tongues have to communicate in a foreign 
language, information is lost almost by definition. Empirical evidence of Vinke 
(1995) shows that as much as 30 percent of all information can get lost when two 
non-native English speakers communicate in English.45 In organizations where 
communication is important, the presence of diverse languages can therefore be 
costly. 
Language barriers are not the only factor that may reduce productivity in 
diverse organizations. As culture – which may be defined as fundamental 
assumptions, values, behavioral norms and expectations, and larger patterns of 
behavior (Rousseau, 1990) – plays a crucial role in group processes, cultural 
heterogeneity may increase the incidence of misunderstanding, tension, and 
conflict.  
It has been shown that being different is generally considered as a deficiency, 
while people that are (by self categorization) perceived as similar in terms of 
characteristics such as ethnicity, gender and age, are seen as more trustworthy, 
honest, and cooperative (Brewer, 1979, Tajfel, 1982, and Loden and Roserer, 
1991). Dekker et al. (2006) show that cultural distance is strongly related to trust, 
while Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) show that trust is an important determinant of 
economic outcomes. Empirical evidence has shown negative associations between 
                                                 
45 The work of Vinke (1995) is based on the communication between Dutch university lecturers 
and their students, such that both senders and recipients had a far above average English language 
proficiency. The average amount of information loss in the entire society is thus likely to be even 
higher than the estimated 30 percent. 
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heterogeneity and conflict (Jehn, 1997), absenteeism (Tsui et al., 1992) as well as 
a less open communication and more distortion of messages (Rogers and 
Bhowmik, 1971).46 As a result, productivity is likely to be lower in more diverse 
environments. 
The theoretical and empirical evidence presented above strongly supports the 
tradeoff theorem of Lazear (1999): in order to receive net benefits from diversity 
it is important for organizations to optimize diversity in areas that provide 
maximum opportunity for knowledge spillovers – and thus productivity gains – 
while minimizing the negative effects of diversity it in other areas. O'Reilly et al. 
(1997) investigate 32 project teams from a large corporation with a highly diverse 
work force, and find a positive effect of diversity on group performance, but an 
even larger negative effect due to increased conflict. This indicates that the net 
effect of diversity can easily become negative. 
 
Macro level empirical evidence 
Apart from the diverse literature on the micro foundations of the relationship 
between diversity and productivity (mostly originating from the social and 
organizational sciences), economists have produced a large literature that attempts 
to estimate this association in a more indirect manner. This literature often models 
the effects of migrants on wages through supply and demand – for example by 
assuming that foreign and native workers with similar education and experience 
are either perfect substitutes (Card, 1990, Borjas, 2003), or imperfect substitutes 
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2005b). This approach, however, ignores the fact that 
migrants may not only change the price of distinct types of labor, but may also 
affect productivity itself. Ottaviano and Peri (2005a) find that cultural diversity in 
American cities is associated with substantially higher wages in diverse cities 
compared to relatively homogeneous cities. For European regions in twelve 
countries, Bellini et al. (2008) show that cultural diversity is positively related to 
productivity. 
Many recent studies on the returns to diversity have used country level, or 
regional data (for example, Easterly and Levine, 1997; Glaeser et al., 1995; 
                                                 
46 A distinct but related example of the impact of diversity on social interactions is provided by 
Becker et al. (1977), who show that divorce is more likely for couples from different cultures, 
languages or religions. 
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Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a; and Bellini et al., 2008). A disadvantage of this type of 
data is, however, that it is difficult to control for unobservable heterogeneity or to 
find suitable instruments when using panel estimations. This type of research is 
therefore likely to run into reverse causality problems: as foreign workers do not 
have an existing bond with a certain region in a destination country, they are more 
likely to locate themselves in regions with a high level of wages and productivity 
(see Manski, 1993, for a discussion of some of the problems related to the 
identification of social interactions). 
Another pitfall in estimating the returns to diversity is related to migrant 
heterogeneity. Even though the present literature has extensively addressed the 
fact that the effects of foreign workers are heterogeneous across different groups 
of native workers (see, for example, Ottaviano and Peri, 2005b), it is also 
plausible that different types of migrants have a different effect on native wages. 
The current literature tends to focus on the effects of migration in general, albeit 
acknowledging differences in terms of education, gender and age. The reality is, 
however, that ‘the’ migrant as such does not exist, but represents a heterogeneous 
mix ranging from highly skilled expats to refugees from war zones and illiterate 
migrants from low-income countries. Not addressing this issue thus implies that 
an engineer from Canada working for an American university is expected to have 
the same effect on wages as an engineer who fled a war zone and is now working 
as a cleaner.  
As the composition of migrants present in the US is different from that in 
Europe, it is well possible that the net effects of migration are different as well. 
We therefore focus on just one type of migrants in our empirical analysis: highly 
educated foreign-born workers from advanced countries. As we have seen that the 
most likely cause of a positive productivity effect of diversity would be the 
contribution of valuable knowledge, either directly or through knowledge 
spillovers, we expect that the probability to find such effects is the highest among 
high skilled foreign knowledge workers. Additionally, higher educated workers 
are likely to have a higher ability to learn foreign languages and the basics of a 
different culture, which reduces the costs of ethnic diversity. 
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6.3 Data and stylized facts 
 
Data 
This chapter relies on the 2000–2008 cross sections of the Dutch labor force 
survey (EBB, Enquête Beroeps Bevolking), combined with complementary data 
originating from tax-records to construct a linked employer-employee database 
(SSB, Sociaal Statistisch Bestand and ABR, Algemeen Bedrijfs Register). All data 
were made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). It is important to note that 
our data include only workers who pay taxes in the Netherlands, and who 
currently have an address in the Netherlands. Our results do thus not apply to 
expats who are sent abroad while still being paid in their home countries. 
We use employer reported pre-tax real hourly wages (e.g., the so-called fiscal 
wage) of individual workers and jobs as main indicator for productivity. The 
Dutch labor force survey does not include data on wages. Instead, we calculate 
hourly wages by taking the quotient of the annual fiscal wage from tax data and 
the number of hours worked in a typical week from the labor force survey 
multiplied by the number of weeks the employee worked during a year, which is 
calculated from the (employer reported) start and end date of the job. The 
consumer price deflator of Statistics Netherlands has been used to correct wages 
for inflation (the base year is 2008).  
For each employee we have data that are related to individual characteristics 
such as age, gender, country of birth (which originate from census data), self-
reported (all from the labor force survey) level of education, job type (we use the 
2-digit ISCO-88 occupation), the number of hours worked, and work location (at 
the municipality level), and the firm establishment where the individual is 
occupied. If we talk about diversity within multi-plant firms, we thus refer to 
diversity at the location where the individual works rather than within all 
establishments of the firm. 
For each firm, we have the corresponding industry (at the 2-digit NACE rev. 
1.1 level) available. We determine whether a firm is foreign owned or not, using 
the Statistics Netherlands indicator on the home country of the Ultimate 
Controlling Institute (UCI) of each firm. This indicator draws on multiple data 
sources. We have used the Dutch production Statistics to calculate firm level 
exports as share of total turnover. 
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As we focus on a very specific type of migrant, we use four criteria to 
operationalize what we consider foreign knowledge workers from advanced 
countries. Foreign knowledge workers must have been born in a country with a 
nominal GDP per capita in 2010 of at least 20,000 US$47. This definition is 
somewhat arbitrary, and if the minimum threshold for what we consider as an 
advanced country is changed, the results change somewhat due to the fact that 
there is a positive correlation between GDP per capita in the country of origin, 
and the wage that foreign-born workers earn in the Netherlands. OECD 
membership could also be used as a classification. However, the OECD includes 
several middle-income economies in Eastern Europe, Mexico and Turkey. The 
IMF (2011) uses a subjective classification of advanced countries, which is close 
to our classification, but includes a number of countries (particularly in eastern 
Europe) with a nominal GDP per capita that is slightly lower than $20,000. 
Relaxing the GDP per capita threshold would increase heterogeneity within 
countries that we consider advanced, while increasing the threshold would 
exclude countries such as Portugal and South Korea, countries that are generally 
considered to be developed.  
 In addition to having been born in an advanced country, high skilled foreign 
workers must have successfully completed higher secondary education or tertiary 
education, they must be between 28 and 65 (to exclude foreign students), and their 
observed job must have generated an income of at least the minimum wage.  
In our wage regressions, we include only workers that comply with these 
criteria, except – for natives – country of birth (such that we compare native and 
foreign-born individuals that are as similar as possible on all other accounts), and 
we exclude all workers earning in excess of 10 times the average wage.48 In 
addition to the above, we have excluded all foreign-born workers that migrated to 
the Netherlands less than ten years prior to the date of observation from our wage 
regressions. This is the result of an unfortunate (from a research perspective) tax-
                                                 
47 According to the World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund these 
include Luxembourg, Norway, Qatar, Switzerland, Denmark, Australia, Sweden, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Singapore, 
Belgium, Japan, France, Germany, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Italy, Kuwait, Hong Kong, New 
Zealand, Spain, Brunei, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Slovenia, Portugal, the Bahamas and South Korea. 
48 Because of the limited sample size, the number of individuals earning very high incomes is very 
small. For example, in one year the highest wage in the sample was around 5 million, in another 
year it was just 2 million. As such outliers have a relatively large impact on the estimates, we 
exclude these workers. Note that wages above three times the median are rare in the Netherlands. 
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exempt, specifically targeted at attracting foreign knowledge workers. This 
exempt allows employers to pay a fixed 30 percent of the taxable gross wage as 
expense reimbursement. For workers that are entitled to use this arrangement, we 
observe only 70/30th of their wage (their gross wage according to the legal and 
fiscal definition). 
 
Diversity indicators 
All variables related to firms and municipalities – these are total employment, 
average job duration, and two indicators for the presence of foreign workers that 
were born in advanced economies – are constructed directly from the micro data. 
As the labor force survey has only about 50,000 observations annually – which 
implies that for a middle-sized firm with 100 employees only one employee is 
expected to be included, we use tax data for this purpose (which covers, after 
applying the criteria from the previous section, just over 6 million observation 
annually). As we do not have the actual work location of all workers, we use work 
locations that are derived by Statistics Netherlands from a number of sources.49 
Because the level of education is not available in this dataset, we have to exclude 
it from our definition of expats. The first indicator is the share of migrant 
knowledge workers: 
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calculated as the sum of migrant knowledge workers from all countries c in firm j 
and year t, divided by total employment in the firm in that year. We have 
calculated the share of foreign-born workers from advanced countries for 
municipalities as well, using the same formula. Their share ranges from 0.4 
                                                 
49 CBS first derives employees per firm and municipality by combining tax data (that gives total 
employment per firm) with a survey where multi-establishment firms with 10 or more employees 
provide employment in each municipality. Employees of multi-establishment firms with less than 
10 employees (with a relatively low share in employment), are allocated to the headquarter. 
Subsequently, CBS allocates individual employees to establishments by an algorithm that 
minimizes the distance between residence locations of employees and firm establishments of the 
same firm. Even for multi-firm establishments this works rather well, except for firms with 
multiple nearby establishments. Even though derived work locations are inaccurate for a limited 
share of the work force, the derived work location is generally not far from the actual work 
location and misallocations tend to average out. 
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percent to just over 10.1 percent. Figure 6.1 shows the share of foreign workers 
from advanced countries by Dutch municipality. In most municipalities, the share 
of foreign knowledge workers is less than two percent. In the largest 
agglomerations, however, it is much higher. If the presence of these workers is 
related to productivity, the effect on the regional economy will thus be most 
significant in these regions. 
 
Figure 6.1. Share of foreign-born workers from advanced countries in the labor 
force by municipality, 2008 
 
 
The share of foreign-born workers in a firm does not differentiate between 
workers from different advanced countries. As we know from the discussion in 
Section 6.2 on the micro foundations of the spillovers from diversity, however, a 
heterogeneous mix of foreign knowledge workers can be expected to have a 
higher potential for spillovers than a homogeneous mixture. Not only because the 
knowledge of migrant workers can be specific to different foreign markets or 
cultures, but also because the productivity of – say – a US worker in a Dutch firm 
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could benefit from knowledge possessed by a German coworker. Therefore, we 
use the fractionalization index as an additional measure, which is a standardized 
measure for diversity. Following the work of Mauro (1995), this index is widely 
used to capture the probability that two individuals randomly selected from a set 
of different groups belong to the same ethnic group. It is defined as 1 minus the 
Herfindahl index on the shares of workers born in each country in the region, or 
formally: 
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The fractionalization index is calculated using workers born in advanced 
economies only, rather than foreign employees from all countries. Furthermore, it 
excludes natives, such that it only measures diversity within the group of foreign 
workers born in advanced economies.50 
 
Stylized facts and descriptive statistics 
Before we continue with the econometric analyses, we present some stylized facts 
about our data, paying special attention to the differences between highly 
educated foreign workers and native workers. Throughout the remainder of this 
chapter, all figures that we present are about highly educated workers only. For 
comparison, we present many figures not only for natives and foreign workers 
that were born in advanced countries, but also for foreign workers that were born 
in other (lower and middle-income) countries.  
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables that are of 
interest. On average, the share of foreign-born workers (that have been a resident 
of the Netherlands for at least ten years) from advanced countries is on average 
about 1.6 percent, the share of workers born in other (foreign) countries is about 
3.8 percent. Between 2000 and 2008, the number of observations gradually 
increased from 22 thousand to 53 thousand. In total, there are 414 thousand 
observations. As we use pooled cross-sections rather than panel data, the change 
                                                 
50  Overall diversity and the share of foreign workers are highly correlated, which results in 
multicollinearity when simultaneously including these two variables in the model. Therefore, we 
estimate the impact of diversity at a given share of foreign workers. 
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in the number of observations over time is unlikely to be a problem. Hourly wages 
increased by about 8.4 percent in real terms. Furthermore, the average age, the 
share of females and part-time workers, and the share of foreign-born workers 
(both from advanced countries and from other countries) of the individuals in our 
sample all increased substantially over time. 
 
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics, 2000–2008 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
      
# Observations 21,778 42,774 51,786 53,887 53,457 
      
Log real hourly wage 2.969 2.981 2.989 3.028 3.053 
 (0.363) (0.367) (0.368) (0.404) (0.411) 
Age 41.85 42.32 42.87 43.59 44.20 
 (8.63) (8.62) (8.85) (8.95) (9.21) 
Females 0.386 0.413 0.432 0.439 0.448 
 (0.487) (0.492) (0.495) (0.496) (0.497) 
Foreign born, 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.017 
   advanced countries (0.118) (0.124) (0.123) (0.129) (0.128) 
Foreign born, 0.033 0.031 0.038 0.043 0.044 
   other countries (0.178) (0.175) (0.190) (0.203) (0.204) 
Share higher educated* 0.401 0.404 0.442 0.451 0.460 
 (0.490) (0.491) (0.497) (0.498) (0.498) 
Part-time 0.363 0.393 0.412 0.428 0.437 
 (0.481) (0.488) (0.492) (0.495) (0.496) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *Higher educated workers are defined as those with 
at least higher tertiary education (HBO or university degree). 
 
Table 6.2 shows descriptive statistics for three groups of employees: workers that 
were born in the Netherlands, workers that were born in advanced economies, and 
other foreign-born workers. The average wages of foreign workers from advanced 
economies are not very different from those of native workers, as is the number of 
hours worked. However, the standard deviation of their wages is far higher. The 
latter is consistent with theories that suggest that search frictions might be higher 
for foreign workers. Also, they are about equally likely to have obtained at least a 
degree in higher tertiary education.  
Even though there is no statistically significant difference between the 
average age of natives and the foreign-born workers from advanced economies 
that are in our sample, they would have been somewhat younger on average had 
we not needed to remove foreign workers that moved to the Netherlands less than 
ten years ago. Foreign-born workers from advanced economies are more often 
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female relative to natives, and they are far more likely to work in exporting firms 
or foreign owned firms. The latter finding is thus consistent with the hypotheses 
that were formulated in Section 6.2, as the knowledge of foreign workers is more 
likely to be valuable in these firms, while their lack of Dutch language skills could 
be less of a problem in firms with an international orientation. 
The rightmost column of Table 6.2 shows that foreign workers that were born 
in low and middle-income countries are, in contrast, very different from both their 
native-born colleagues and those born in advanced economies. On average, they 
are less well educated (even within our sample, where we have already excluded 
workers with the lowest levels of education), and earn far lower wages. Similar to 
foreign workers from advanced countries (albeit to a somewhat lesser extent), 
they do work more often in foreign owned or exporting firms. 
 
Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics by origin group, 2000–2008 
 Native Dutch 
employees 
Foreign born, advanced 
countries 
Foreign born, other 
countries 
    
# Observations 391,504 6,671 15,884 
Real hourly wage 22.02 22.28 19.62 
(10.86) (13.07) (9.79) 
Real annual wage 38,188 38,557 34,616*** 
(23,432) (27,618) (20,465) 
Hours worked 1,695 1,685 1,742*** 
(436) (439) (399) 
Age 43.06 43.49*** 43.69*** 
(8.92) (8.49) (8.71) 
Females 0.426 0.502*** 0.465*** 
(0.495) (0.500) (0.499) 
Share higher educated 0.438 0.444 0.379*** 
(0.496) (0.497) (0.485) 
Part-time 0.413 0.446*** 0.379*** 
(0.492) (0.497) (0.485) 
Export share 0.243 0.306*** 0.293*** 
   (0.336) (0.361) (0.358) 
Employed at foreign firm 0.098 0.149*** 0.137*** 
(0.297) (0.356) (0.344) 
 
Notes: Higher educated workers are defined as those with at least higher tertiary education (HBO 
or university degree). Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 for the difference to native born 
workers are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Table 6.3 presents descriptive statistics by country of origin. There is considerable 
variation in average wages between workers from different countries of birth. 
Although variation is mostly explained by the low number of observations for 
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some countries (e.g., given the small sample size and the high standard deviation 
of wages, some outliers are to be expected), some broad patterns can be observed 
from differences in average wages. First of all, workers from countries with a 
higher GDP per capita, tend to earn higher wages (see Figure 6.2).  
 
Figure 6.2. GDP per capita (PPP) country of birth and wage of foreign workers 
 
Note: The size of data points represents the number of foreign workers from each country.  
 
There are two explanations for the positive relation between the wage foreign 
workers earn in the Netherlands and GDP per capita in their country of birth. 
First, human capital is generally lower in countries with a relatively low GDP per 
capita, which makes workers less productive. This seems a plausible explanation, 
as the correlation between the share of workers that has at least higher tertiary 
education and the average wage is 0.63, while the correlation between the 
education and GDP per capita is 0.57. A second explanation could be that the 
relatively low wages in the home country provide an incentive to accept job offers 
that pay less than what a native with comparable education and experience would 
earn, because it remains to be a higher wage than what would be earned in the 
home country. Besides wages, there are substantial (often statistically significant) 
differences between countries in the average age of workers, the share of 
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individuals that work at a foreign owned firm, and export activities of the firms 
where workers are employed. The regression analyses in the next section will 
show how these variables are related to the wages and productivity of foreign 
workers. 
 
Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics by country of origin 
Country of origin # Obs. Hourly wage 
(average)     (st. dev.)
Age Higher 
educated
Foreign 
firm 
Export 
share 
 
Dutch Natives 391,504 22.0 10.9 43.1 0.438 0.098 0.243 
Foreign born,  
   developed countries 
6,671 22.3 13.1 43.5*** 0.444 0.149*** 0.306*** 
Foreign born,  
   other countries 15,884 19.6
*** 9.8 43.7*** 0.379*** 0.137*** 0.293*** 
 
Australia 277 20.8* 8.8 42.6 0.419 0.137 0.220 
Austria 135 22.4 13.5 44.5 0.422 0.148 0.290 
Belgium 978 22.9* 13.5 43.7* 0.524*** 0.116 0.312* 
Canada 289 23 14.6 43.4 0.405 0.125 0.325 
Denmark 67 22.7 11.9 42.7 0.433 0.090 NA 
Finland 30 20.4 8.8 48.2*** 0.400 0.200 NA 
France 335 21.7 13.7 43.6 0.472 0.119 0.332 
Germany 1,806 20.8*** 10.5 43.0 0.391*** 0.116* 0.275 
Greece 95 20.7 10.4 41.9 0.337* 0.189* NA 
Hong Kong 132 19.6* 11.4 41.2** 0.394 0.144 0.382 
Ireland 109 22.5 11.9 46.0*** 0.376 0.147 NA 
Israel 59 22.8 9.8 43.2 0.576* 0.119 NA 
Italy 218 21.4 13.4 45.0*** 0.372* 0.193*** 0.407* 
Japan 29 22.1 8.6 47.8** 0.621* 0.310* NA 
New-Zealand 110 27.3* 27.0 43.2 0.473 0.164 NA 
Norway 44 22.5 13.7 41.8 0.614* 0.091 NA 
Portugal 135 19.8* 11.8 41.9 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.271 
Singapore 48 24.2 14.3 40.4* 0.646** 0.146 NA 
South Korea 51 21.4 9.6 33.4*** 0.451 0.216* NA 
Spain 254 20.0*** 9.3 43.1 0.287*** 0.197*** 0.441*** 
Sweden 62 28.0** 17.0 45.0 0.613** 0.129 NA 
Switzerland 129 23.3 15.6 41.9 0.512 0.116 NA 
United Kingdom 896 24.7*** 15.3 45.4*** 0.472* 0.228*** 0.322** 
United States 319 24.5** 14.1 43.7 0.589*** 0.154** 0.278 
 
Notes: Data are only presented if the number of observations is at least 25. Higher educated 
workers are defined as those with at least higher tertiary education (HBO or university degree). 
Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 for the difference to Dutch born workers are denoted 
by *, ** and ***, respectively.  
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The descriptive statistics presented earlier in this section showed that even though 
natives and workers born in other advanced countries are rather comparable on 
average, there are substantial differences across workers born in different 
countries. Table 6.4 compares average wages and the share of different types of 
education. The share of workers with a university degree is considerably higher 
for foreign workers that were born in advanced countries (27 percent), than for 
Dutch workers (15 percent). For other types of education there are also substantial 
differences. However, these differences are likely to have been affected by 
differences in educational systems. While foreign-born employees that have 
finished higher tertiary education earn about the same wage as natives within most 
types of education, lower educated foreign workers earn relatively less (though 
the lowest level is an exception to this). The reason that the average wage across 
all education levels is equal thus results from the fact that foreign workers are 
somewhat higher educated. 
 
Table 6.4. Stylized facts by level of education 
 Dutch Natives Foreign workers from 
advanced countries 
Ratios 
 
hourly 
wage (1) 
%-share 
(2) 
hourly 
wage (3) 
%-share 
(4) 
(3/1) (4/2) 
Lower tertiary education     
   (MBO 2+3) 17.59 20.23 17.84 24.40
*** 1.01 1.21*** 
Lower tertiary education   
   (MBO 4) 
19.08 26.93 18.36*** 15.72*** 0.96*** 0.58*** 
Higher secondary education   
   (HAVO+VWO) 
20.61 9.08 19.36** 15.45*** 0.94** 1.70*** 
Higher tertiary education   
   (HBO+BA) 
23.92 29.13 23.45 21.93*** 0.98 0.75*** 
Higher tertiary education  
   (MA, PhD) 
30.66 14.62 30.72 22.49*** 1.00 1.54*** 
Total 22.02 100.00 22.28 100.00 1.01 1.00 
 
Note: Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 for the difference to Dutch born workers are 
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.  
 
Table 6.5 and Figure 6.3 present stylized facts for natives and foreign-born 
workers from advanced economies by 2-digit ISCO-88 occupation. While there is 
some heterogeneity in occupational composition, differences between natives and 
foreign workers show no clear pattern. When we look at wages, in contrast, an 
interesting pattern emerges. There is a significant positive correlation (with a 
coefficient of 0.33) between the average wage of native workers within an 
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occupation and the ratio between wages of foreign workers and natives. Foreign 
workers earn more than natives in highly rewarded occupations, but less in lower 
paid occupations.  
 
Table 6.5. Stylized facts by 2-digit ISCO-88 occupation 
Dutch Natives Expatriates Ratios 
  
hourly 
wage (1)
%-share 
(2) 
hourly 
wage (3) 
%-share 
(4) 
(3/1) (4/2) 
12 Corporate managers 29.88 9.20 30.99 8.40* 1.04 0.91* 
13 Managers of small enterprises 28.17 3.40 26.85 4.00* 0.95 1.17* 
21 
Physical, mathematical and engineering 
science professionals 26.60 6.20 28.29
* 6.40 1.06* 1.03 
22 Life science and health professionals 26.15 2.60 30.29** 2.40 1.16** 0.94 
23 Teaching professionals 23.06 8.60 24.46** 7.30*** 1.06** 0.85***
24 Other professionals 25.70 10.80 26.87* 10.50 1.05* 0.97 
31 
Physical and engineering science 
associate professionals 21.81 5.30 24.33
** 5.30 1.12** 0.99 
32 
Life science and health associate 
professionals 18.48 6.90 18.44 6.10
** 1.00 0.88**
34 Other associate professionals 21.68 12.00 22.13 12.30 1.02 1.03 
41 Office clerks 18.00 10.00 17.84 10.10 0.99 1.01 
42 Customer services clerks 15.16 1.60 16.27 1.60 1.07 1.01 
51 
Personal and protective services 
workers 16.49 4.80 15.01
*** 5.30 0.91*** 1.10 
52 
Models, salespersons and 
demonstrators 16.67 2.90 15.41
* 3.70** 0.92* 1.25**
61 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 15.00 0.60 15.15 0.50 1.01 0.80 
71 Extraction and building trades workers 16.66 2.60 17.07 1.80*** 1.02 0.69***
72 
Metal, machinery and related trades 
workers 17.93 3.20 17.60 3.70
* 0.98 1.16* 
73 
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and 
related trades workers 17.56 0.40 14.81
* 0.60* 0.84* 1.59* 
74 Other craft and related trades workers 15.24 0.50 14.77 0.40 0.97 0.75 
81 Stationary plant and related operators 24.24 0.80 20.52*** 1.20*** 0.85*** 1.59***
82 Machine operators and assemblers 17.33 1.10 16.78 1.50* 0.97 1.35* 
83 Drivers and mobile plant operators 16.97 1.70 17.14 1.30** 1.01 0.77**
91 
Sales and services elementary 
occupations 14.01 0.90 13.25
* 1.80*** 0.95* 2.10***
93 
Laborers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing and transport 15.62 1.00 14.79 1.50
*** 0.95 1.50***
Total 22.02 97.20 22.28 97.60 1.01 1.00 
 
Notes: Data are only presented for occupations where the number of observations is at least 25. 
Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 for the difference to Dutch born workers are denoted 
by *, ** and ***, respectively.  
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This finding could be related to search frictions, which predict that foreign 
workers may earn more than natives in some jobs, but are at the same time 
relatively likely to earn less if they do not succeed to find a good match. There 
are, however, also other possible explanations for this observation. For example, it 
could be that the Netherlands attracts below average productivity workers in the 
lower paid professions (for example, construction workers with two left hands), 
while attracting the best doctors and professors, that are more productive than 
natives. In this case there would be a simple selection bias. However, it is 
theoretically not clear why such a pattern would emerge. 
 
Figure 6.3. Average wage natives and ratio between employment (left) and wages 
(right) of workers from advanced countries and natives by ISCO-88 occupation 
 
Note: Size of circles denotes total employment within each occupation. The occupation codes 
correspond to those in Table 6.5.  
 
6.4 Empirical evidence 
The approach used in this chapter is similar to the methodology of Chapter 3, 
where augmented Mincer regressions (after Mincer, 1974) are used to estimate the 
effects of agglomeration on wages and productivity. We present the results of 
various estimations of wage regressions: 
 
, , , , , , , , , , ,log( )i f r t i f r t f t f s r t i f r tw X F d d d? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ,      (6.3) 
 
where the natural logarithm of the pre-tax real hourly wage w of employee i in 
firm f and region r in year t is explained by a constant, a matrix X with individual 
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worker characteristics (including occupation fixed effects in most specifications), 
a matrix F with firm characteristics that vary over time, optional firm fixed effects 
df or industry fixed effects ds and time × region fixed effects dr,t, and a residual 
term. The inclusion of fixed effects (both time invariant and variant) is to avoid a 
number of estimation pitfalls. These are endogeneity on the regional level and 
omitted variable bias on the level of industries, firms, occupations, and regions.  
From an empirical perspective, estimating the effects of diversity on the firm 
level has several advantages over estimating it on the regional level. The reason 
for this is that it is difficult to control for endogeneity on the level of regions. As 
exogenous instruments for diversity are rare, using instrumental variable 
techniques is generally not an option. The inclusion of region-specific fixed 
effects does not solve these estimation issues, because in that case the effect of 
diversity (and other variables) is mostly estimated on time variation. This does not 
make the estimates less vulnerable to omitted variable bias and endogeneity, 
because it is likely that regions with above average wage growth are becoming 
increasingly attractive to foreign labor. If we estimate on the level of firms on the 
other hand, we can control for this by including year × region-specific fixed 
effects. Local wage determination takes place on the level of local labor markets 
(rather than on the level of individual firms). Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
individual firms have a large impact on the average attractiveness of locations that 
goes beyond the attractiveness of the region (which represents the attractiveness 
of wages offered by all firms in the region). 
Even when including firm fixed effects, however, one could argue that there 
remains the possibility of endogeneity on the level of the firm. E.g., if a firm has 
become increasingly productive over time, it may have started hiring more people, 
which may explain an increasing share of foreign-born workers. They are likely to 
have a younger workforce that was hired at a more recent time when the share of 
foreign-born workers in the population was higher, and foreign workers are more 
flexible as they do not have a strong bond with a certain location. To control for 
this, we include both the average job duration of workers in each firm, and the 
number of employees in each firm. All specifications report robust standard 
errors, which are clustered within firms. 
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Results 
Table 6.6 presents estimation results for five different specifications. Specification 
(I) includes only time and industry fixed effects, specifications (II)–(IV) include 
sector, occupation and time × region fixed effects, and specification (V) includes 
firm, occupation and time × region fixed effects. Specifications (I) and (II) are our 
basis specifications. They include a dummy for foreign-born workers from 
advanced countries, a dummy for other foreign workers, the log of employment at 
the firm where the individual works, a dummy that indicates whether the firm is 
foreign owned or not, and the share of exports in turnover of the firm. 
Specifications (III)–(V) include several interaction effects for these variables. 
Rather than including a single dummy that indicates whether a worker is foreign 
born, we include interaction effects with the number of years the individual has 
been present in the Netherlands. As we expect that foreign workers will gradually 
accumulate the language and social skills of natives, we expect that the wage 
differential with natives will decrease over time. 
We also estimate interaction effects for natives, foreign-born workers from 
advanced countries and (for reference) foreign-born workers from other countries 
with log firm size, working for a foreign firm, and exports. The theoretical section 
predicted that foreign workers will be relatively more productive in firms with an 
international orientation. We thus expect a difference in the relation of these 
variables with wages for workers born in different countries. For presentational 
convenience, we present these interaction effects separately, in Table 6.7. 
Specification (III) is estimated on our entire sample, specification (IV) is 
estimated only on workers who are employed at firms with at least 20 employees. 
We find that individual worker characteristics provide a strong explanation 
for differences in payment. The results are robust across different specifications, 
and the estimated coefficients are comparable to those in Chapters 2 and 3, 
although the returns to education are somewhat lower in specifications (II)–(V) 
because of the inclusion of occupation dummies. This is because occupation is 
endogenous and largely dependent on education (and, for that matter, ability). 
Interestingly, the wage differentials between males and females and between part-
time and full-time workers are reduced somewhat by the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects. This implies that females work in occupations and firms that pay 
somewhat lower wages ceteris paribus. 
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Table 6.6. Regression results 
Dependent: Log real hourly wage (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
# Observations 413,915 413,695 413,695 340,821 413,695 
Female –0.152*** –0.148*** –0.148*** –0.139*** –0.135*** 
(49.4) (53.6) (53.8) (44.8) (43.1) 
Age 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 
(55.3) (53.0) (53.4) (46.6) (43.0) 
Age-squared –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** 
(45.9) (44.0) (44.5) (39.6) (35.3) 
Part-time –0.031*** –0.010*** –0.010*** –0.007* 0.006* 
(10.9) (3.8) (3.8) (2.5) (2.0) 
Lower tertiary education 0.082*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
   (MBO 4) (39.9) (23.6) (23.4) (19.7) (21.1) 
Higher secondary education 0.113*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.063*** 
   (HAVO + VWO) (41.1) (27.4) (27.7) (24.6) (23.0) 
Higher tertiary education 0.272*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 
   (HBO + BA) (84.8) (54.4) (54.4) (48.5) (41.4) 
Higher tertiary education 0.459*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.335*** 0.311*** 
   (MA + PhD) (103.2) (79.2) (79.4) (72.1) (63.4) 
Foreign-born worker, –0.023*** –0.008***
   from advanced country (4.4) (1.6) 
Other foreign worker –0.135*** –0.086*** Interaction effects 
(38.0) (27.0) 
Log employment firm 0.005*** 0.006*** with country of birth are in 
(3.4) (4.3) 
Foreign firm 0.056*** 0.050*** Table 6.7 
(8.6) (8.6) 
Share of export 0.045*** 0.044***
   in turnover (5.2) (5.5)
Log average tenure firm 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.032*** 
(15.1) (18.3) (18.3) (15.5) (7.6) 
Expat and foreign firm 0.103* 0.075 0.052 0.045 0.004 
    are from same country (2.4) (1.6) (1.1) (0.8) (0.1) 
At least one expat in firm 0.083*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.096*** 0.052*** 
(8.2) (7.7) (7.8) (8.1) (6.4) 
Log share expats in firm 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 
(5.9) (6.0) (6.0) (7.0) (5.7) 
Log diversity expats in firm 0.013*** 0.0004 0.0004 0.007* 0.002 
(3.5) (0.1) (0.1) (2.1) (0.6) 
Year  dummies Yes No No No No 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Occupation dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year × municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes 
R2 0.39 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.38 
 
Notes: (I)–(III) and (V) are estimated on all firms, (IV) only on firms with more than 20 
employees. Omitted category is lower tertiary education (MBO 2+3). t-values are in parentheses. 
Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Foreign-born workers from advanced economies earn slightly lower wages than 
natives in our first specification. Once we include fixed effects for occupations in 
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specification (II), however, the difference completely disappears.51 This implies 
that their lower wage in specification (I) is explained by their overrepresentation 
in lower paid occupations. The interaction effects with the number of years a 
foreign worker has been living in the Netherlands (that are estimated in 
specifications (III)–(V), and presented in Table 6.7) show that the difference is 
somewhere around 4 to 5 percent, and more or less constant over time. The 
difference is somewhat lower, however, for workers that have been living in the 
Netherlands for more than 30 years. The latter is most likely explained by 
selection effects: the more successful foreign workers are more likely to remain 
working. If it were the result of increasingly better Dutch language skills and the 
accumulation of social capital, we would expect a decreasing wage differential for 
workers that have been a resident for 10–30 years as well. Foreign workers that 
were born in middle and lower income countries earn far lower wages than both 
natives and foreign workers from advanced countries. The difference is about 10 
percent on average. Furthermore, the wage difference decreases almost linearly 
over time. 
Larger firms pay relatively more. This may be explained by efficiency wage 
theory (Akerlof, 1982). There are, however, substantial interaction effects 
between firm characteristics and country of birth on wages. As Table 6.7 shows, 
doubling the number of employees in the firm where an individual works is 
associated with a 0.5 percent increase in wages of natives and foreign workers 
from lower and middle-income countries. This figure is between 1.0 and 1.2 
percent for foreign workers from advanced countries. Working for a foreign firm 
also has a substantially different effect on workers born in different countries. 
Dutch natives earn between 2.4 (in specification (V), where firm fixed effects are 
included) and 5.1 percent more in foreign firms. For foreign-born workers from 
advanced economies, this varies from as high as 8.6 percent (specification III) to 
3.2 percent (specification V). 
Although the results for some specifications seem to suggest that foreign-born 
workers earn more in a foreign firm if they come from the same country as the 
owner of the firm, this result is not robust across specifications. As foreign 
                                                 
51 When estimating specification (II) with only year dummies, or with separate year and 
municipality dummies, rather than dummies for year × municipality combinations, the estimated 
coefficient for foreign workers from advanced countries is more or less the same.  
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workers from advanced countries are relatively overrepresented in larger firms 
and foreign firms, the positive association between working in these firms and 
their wages may explain why the wage differential is about zero in specification 
(II) while it is (statistically significant) negative in specifications (III) to (V). This 
implies that while foreign workers born in advanced countries earn about the same 
wage as natives on average, they earn less when they work in small or Dutch 
owned firms, but somewhat more than natives in large firms that are foreign 
owned. Clearly, this is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign workers may be 
expected to earn more in the type of firms that benefit from highly educated 
foreign workers. 
In contrast, the effect of working in an exporting firm on wages is not 
consistent with the theories that were presented. While natives and workers from 
middle and lower income countries earn significantly higher wages in exporting 
firms (although this effect has become insignificant in specification (V)), this is 
not the case for foreign workers from advanced countries. This could imply that 
differences between different types of firms in the (loss of) effectiveness of 
foreign labor due to language differences etc. are relatively more important 
compared to potential knowledge spillovers. Clearly, if the higher productivity of 
foreign workers from advanced countries would be due to their valuable 
knowledge that natives lack, there is no reason why this knowledge would 
suddenly reduce their productivity in exporting firms. We suspect that the 
estimated (and statistically significant) difference in the effect of working for an 
exporting firm in specifications (III) and (IV) was in fact due to unobserved 
heterogeneity, as it completely disappears when firm fixed effects are included. 
All specifications find a statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of foreign workers from advanced countries and the wages of natives in 
the same firms. Having at least one foreign worker is associated with a 5.2 to 9.6 
percent higher wage (depending on the specification). Furthermore, doubling the 
share of foreign workers from advanced countries increases expected wages by 
another 1.1 to 2.1 percent. In larger firms, there is thus a stronger relationship 
between the presence of foreign workers and the wages of natives. In contrast, the 
effect of diversity within the group of foreign knowledge workers does not seem 
to matter much. Once more, this makes no sense from the perspective of “value of 
diversity” kind of explanations. It is, however, also possible that the statistical 
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insignificance of the estimated effect of diversity is explained by the relatively 
low variation of diversity within firms. 
Even though the evidence presented in Table 6.7 provides rather strong 
evidence for the existence of a relationship between the productivity level within 
firms and the presence of foreign workers from advanced economies, we must 
thus conclude that it is not yet entirely clear whether the higher productivity of 
those other workers was caused by the presence these foreign workers or not. 
 
Table 6.7. Results – interactions with country of birth (3 classes) 
Dependent: Log  (III) (IV) (V) 
real hourly wage Native Expat Other 
foreign 
Native Expat Other 
foreign 
Native Expat Other 
foreign 
10–15 years in NL –0.045* –0.139*** –0.046 –0.141*** –0.032 –0.105***
(2.3) (12.6) (1.8) (9.7) (1.4) (6.9) 
15–20 years in NL –0.053** –0.121*** –0.044 –0.119*** –0.052 –0.087***
(2.9) (9.8) (1.9) (7.4) (2.5) (5.2) 
20–25 years in NL –0.064*** –0.077*** –0.051* –0.085*** –0.049* –0.064***
(3.8) (6.3) (2.3) (5.4) (2.4) (4.0) 
25–30 years in NL –0.058*** –0.056*** –0.047* –0.056*** –0.051** –0.041** 
(3.7) (5.3) (2.2) (4.2) (2.6) (3.0) 
? 30 years in NL –0.030* –0.035*** –0.023 –0.042** –0.029 –0.034* 
(2.1) (3.3) (1.1) (3.0) (1.6) (2.4) 
Log firm size 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.006* 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.005 
(4.2) (4.7) (1.9) (4.0) (3.5) (2.1) (4.3) (3.5) (1.8) 
Foreign firm 0.051*** 0.086*** 0.005 0.042*** 0.077*** –0.005 0.024*** 0.032* –0.028** 
(8.9) (5.6) (0.5) (7.2) (4.8) (0.5) (4.4) (2.1) (2.9) 
Share of export 0.043*** 0.017 0.063*** 0.031*** –0.003 0.054*** –0.008 –0.030 –0.0003 
in turnover firm (5.5) (0.7) (4.0) (3.7) (0.1) (3.3) (1.3) (1.2) (0.0) 
 
Note: t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported in parentheses. Significance levels of 0.05, 0.01 
and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
To further analyze the relation between the presence of foreign workers from 
advanced economies on the wages of natives, we have extended models (III) and 
(IV) with interaction effects between level of education of natives and the dummy 
that indicates whether at least one foreign worker from an advanced country is 
present in the firm, the log share of these workers, and the log share of diversity 
among these foreign workers. 
The results presented in Table 6.8 show substantial heterogeneity among 
workers with different levels of education. While the wages of native workers 
with at most lower tertiary education are almost completely unrelated to the share 
of foreign workers in the firm (or this relation might be even slightly negative), 
this relation becomes increasingly more positive as we move to the higher levels 
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of education. Consistently among all levels of education, the effect is more 
positive when estimated on a sample of larger firms. In larger firms, wages of 
native workers with a university degree are expected to be as much as 16 percent 
higher when at least one of their colleagues was born in an advanced country 
other than the Netherlands. Doubling their share is associated with another 3.5 
percent increase of the wages of natives with a university degree. Again, diversity 
among foreign-born workers has no effect at all. The interpretation of these results 
is not straightforward. However, the absence of a diversity effect seems to be 
inconsistent with the view that knowledge spillovers explain higher wages in 
firms where foreign workers are present.  
 
Table 6.8. Interactions between the effect of foreign-born workers from advanced 
countries on the wages of other workers in the firm by level of education 
Dependent: Log real Similar to (III), all firms Similar to (IV),  >20 empl. 
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Lower tertiary education –0.011 –0.006* –0.009 –0.010 –0.003 –0.006 
   (MBO 2+4) (1.1) (2.2) (1.7) (0.8) (1.1) (1.0) 
Lower tertiary education 0.048*** 0.009*** –0.002 0.068*** 0.014*** 0.004 
   (MBO 4) (4.9) (3.9) (0.3) (5.4) (5.0) (0.7) 
Higher secondary education 0.077*** 0.013*** 0.007 0.099*** 0.018*** 0.015 
   (HAVO + VWO) (5.0) (3.4) (0.8) (5.3) (4.1) (1.8) 
Higher tertiary education 0.112*** 0.026*** 0.009 0.136*** 0.030*** 0.014* 
   (HBO + BA) (7.9) (7.7) (1.3) (8.3) (8.0) (2.1) 
Higher tertiary education 0.126*** 0.028*** 0.001 0.158*** 0.035*** 0.010 
   (MA + PhD) (4.8) (4.8) (0.1) (5.3) (4.4) (0.9) 
 
Notes: The effects of the presence of foreign knowledge workers on the wages of other employees 
in the firm with different levels of education are estimated by extending models (III) and (IV) with 
interaction terms. Other parameter estimates are qualitatively the same as the estimates of the 
respective base models. t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported in parentheses. Significance 
levels of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. aForeign workers that were 
born in advanced countries. 
 
As we have seen in Section 6.3, foreign knowledge workers from advanced 
economies are still a rather heterogeneous group in terms of average wages. Our 
econometric specification allows us to include separate dummies for foreign-born 
workers from different countries as opposed to a single combined dummy. Table 
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6.9 shows the estimates of these dummies – again for all countries with at least 25 
observations, using specification (III) as a basis. The wage differentials between 
foreign workers that were born in advanced economies and natives are almost 
never statistically significant. There are no countries that supply citizens that earn 
a significantly higher wage (e.g. that are ceteris paribus more productive) than 
native Dutch workers. There are a few countries, however, whose citizens earn 
considerable lower wage relative to otherwise comparable Dutch natives (in terms 
of observed individual characteristics, type of occupation, industry, and region). 
These countries are mostly located in southern Europe. However, the main 
message of the low significance of the parameters for separate countries is that 
differences in the productivity of foreign workers are mostly explained by 
differences in observed worker characteristics such as age, education, occupation, 
and the type of firms where they work. The country where a foreign worker came 
from does not matter much. 
 
Table 6.9. Dummies foreign-born workers by country of origin 
Country of origin Coefficient t-statistic  Country of origin Coefficient t-statistic 
 (continued) 
Portugal –0.120 (3.9)  Canada –0.041 (1.4) 
Hong Kong –0.130 (3.6)  Finland –0.107 (1.3) 
Italy –0.096 (3.2)  United Kingdom –0.032 (1.3) 
Spain –0.077 (2.5)  Belgium –0.026 (1.1) 
France –0.069 (2.4)  Switzerland –0.042 (0.9) 
Greece –0.087 (2.2)  Norway –0.031 (0.5) 
Israel –0.096 (1.9)  Singapore –0.023 (0.4) 
Germany –0.039 (1.9)  Ireland –0.017 (0.4) 
Japan –0.131 (1.8)  New  Zealand 0.013 (0.2) 
Australia –0.047 (1.7)  Denmark 0.028 (0.6) 
Austria –0.065 (1.6)  Sweden 0.032 (0.6) 
United States –0.050 (1.6)  South Korea 0.059 (1.0) 
 
Notes: t-statistics are in absolute values. Omitted category: native workers. Significance levels of 
0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
We have estimated several additional specifications. For example, we included 
interaction effects between the level of education of foreign workers and the wage 
differential to natives, as well as interaction effects with occupation. However, 
that did not yield any substantial (i.e., statistically significant) results. 
Furthermore, we estimated many different specifications on subsamples 
(excluding part-time workers, including only employees in firms with at least 100 
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employees), different combinations of fixed effects, and gross annual wages rather 
than hourly wages. The findings presented in this section are rather robust across 
different specifications. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The presence of foreign workers – particularly high skilled – is often associated 
with externalities that result in higher productivity. The questions addressed in 
this chapter are whether there is a difference between the productivity of high 
skilled foreign workers and similar natives, and whether the presence of these 
foreign workers is related to the productivity of native workers. 
Our results show that the presence of foreign workers is likely to have a 
positive effect on productivity in some firms and occupations (where 
heterogeneous knowledge is valuable), but that their lack of knowledge about 
language and local culture may reduce their productivity in many other 
professions. This may imply a more complex labor market match for foreign 
workers. The finding of Chapter 5 that foreign workers from advanced countries 
have an unemployment duration that is almost twice as long compared to natives 
after having been fired, is consistent with this theory. 
Our empirical evidence shows that the difference between the wages of 
foreign-born workers from advanced countries and the wages of comparable 
natives is rather small. In native firms, and in foreign owned firms, they earn 
between 3 to 5 percent lower hourly wages. When working in foreign firms, 
however, this effect disappears. As foreign workers from advanced countries also 
earn a relatively high wage premium in larger firms, they earn a ceteris paribus 
higher average wage compared to natives in firms that are both large and foreign 
owned. This is consistent with the view that it is important (and more difficult) to 
find a good match. In some types of firms, foreign workers (from advanced 
countries) earn more than natives, in other firms they earn less. 
Foreign workers from lower and middle-income countries earn lower wages 
across all types of firms. Furthermore, while the wage differential between natives 
and foreign workers from advanced countries remains rather constant as they have 
been living in the Netherlands for a longer time, the differential between natives 
and foreign workers from other countries gradually decreases. This implies that 
6.5. Conclusion    |   165 
 
 
 
the lack of language and social skills is relatively more problematic for workers 
that migrated from lesser-developed countries, who start at a relatively large 
productivity disadvantage. In contrast with the so-called value of diversity 
hypotheses, we do not find a stronger effect of working in an exporting firm on 
the wages of foreign workers compared to natives. There is no clear reason why 
the knowledge and international orientation of foreign workers would increase 
their productivity in foreign owned firms, but not in exporting firms. 
We also estimate the relationship between the presence of foreign-born 
workers from advanced countries and the wages of natives within the same firm. 
By including various fixed effects (both time invariant and time variant), we 
attempt to avoid a number of estimation issues. We find a robust positive 
association between the presence of high skilled foreign workers and the wages of 
natives. This effect is relatively larger for higher skilled natives (while the effect 
is negligible for lower educated workers), and it is larger for natives working in 
larger firms. In contrast to the presence of foreign workers, diversity among the 
foreign workers that are present within firms is almost completely unrelated from 
the wages of natives. Again, this finding seems to be inconsistent with the view 
that the positive association between the presence of foreign workers and the 
productivity of other workers results from knowledge spillovers. If knowledge 
spillovers would be the explanation, it would be reasonable to expect that more 
diversity – and thus more heterogeneous knowledge within the firm – would result 
in larger externalities. 
While our empirical evidence rather convincingly shows that foreign-born 
workers from advanced countries are more likely to work in the type of firms 
where highly educated natives are relatively productive, it cannot be ruled out that 
this relationship is the result of something other than the positive externalities 
from the presence of foreign workers. Future research will need to increase our 
understanding about what explains the positive relation between firm level 
productivity and the presence of skilled foreign workers. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
Looking back at the previous five chapters, we find little evidence in support of 
negative effects of increased international and regional division of labor, while 
several chapters find evidence pointing in the opposite direction. There is a long 
tradition in the economic literature – starting with Smith, Ricardo and Mill – that 
emphasizes the benefits for the average citizen of the increased division of labor 
that is made possible by agglomeration and free trade. Less attention, however, 
was devoted to the transitional or distributional effects that these trends could 
have for different groups of workers – not the least because of a lack of means. 
The micro data that are used in this thesis allowed us to address this issue. 
 
Wage inequality 
In retrospect, the start of this thesis already set the tone for the chapters to come. 
Chapter 2 showed that between 2000 and 2008 – despite some drastic changes in 
the economic landscape – aggregate wage inequality in the Netherlands changed 
little. In 2000, computers and the use of the internet had just started the conquests 
of our offices. By 2008, new information and telecommunication technologies had 
brought considerable change in many professions. 
During the same period, the share of imports from the BRIC countries in total 
Dutch imports increased from just 5 percent in 2000 to 13 percent in 2008. Even 
though these trends changed both the domestic and the international division of 
labor, the 90th to 10th percentile wage differential increased by only 3 percent. 
However, at the same time the findings showed that the flatness of the aggregate 
distribution hides the dynamics for different groups on the labor market. While 
Chapter 2 attributed this mostly to the composition of the labor market, we also 
observed a slight increase in the return to education (resulting in higher inequality 
because high skilled employees have relatively high incomes). The chapter thus 
showed that there could be some truth in theories predicting that technological 
progress and globalization are relatively more beneficial for higher skilled 
workers, but its effect is not large.  
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From a policy perspective, this has some important implications. If we had found 
wage inequality to be significantly increasing, there would at least be something 
low-wage workers could be protected against. Though it still would not be clear 
whether that something was globalization, agglomeration, or maybe something 
else entirely, and although it would be uncertain whether the government could 
intervene without causing additional disturbances, there would at least be a 
potential for government intervention. However, if there is nothing to protect 
against, the only thing we can expect from policy measures are the disturbances 
they might or might not cause. 
 
Agglomeration economies 
In Chapter 3, we shifted our attention from wage inequality in general to the 
regional dimension of inequality: wage differences between regions. In this 
chapter, we find that firms in larger agglomerations pay a wage premium to 
workers, after correcting for observed worker characteristics. Using population 
density of 1840 to instrument for current density, we find that doubling the 
employment density of a NUTS-3 area (which approximates the size of a local 
labor market) is associated with a 4.8 percent higher productivity. Furthermore, 
we find a positive effect of specialization. Doubling the relative share of an 
industry in a region is related to a 2.9 percent higher wage level. The amount of 
specialization and agglomeration that is offered by cities is thus associated with 
considerable productivity advantages for workers. 
This has some important implications for policies that aim to regulate the 
dispersion of people across space, investment in infrastructure, as well as policies 
that aim at reducing commuting. The lesson to be learned from Chapter 3 is that 
the location where an individual works matters a great deal. If we pick a random 
individual from the countryside, and move him or her to Amsterdam or one of the 
other larger Dutch cities, Chapter 3 shows that we may expect a wage or 
productivity premium in excess of 10 percent. Having workers employed at the 
location where they are most productive is not only beneficial to themselves, but it 
also increases the budget we have to pursue other valuable goals.  
Housing market regulations increase the difficulty for individuals to work 
closer to a productive job. In fact, the most productive cities in the Netherlands 
are among the municipalities with the most regulated housing markets, and are 
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characterized by a high share of social renting houses that are occupied by 
individuals to whom the productivity advantages of the cities where they live do 
not matter much. The individuals that would have lived there if the allocation of 
housing would have been left to the market, are now faced with the option of 
either commuting a longer distance or working at a less productive location. 
 
Commuting 
It is not difficult to see how increasing the costs of commuting further reduces the 
incentives of workers to work at the most productive locations. Because the 
decisions of individuals to work in a job with a certain productivity level (or 
maybe not work at all) have implications for tax revenues and social security 
expenses, the outcomes of these decisions result in externalities that go far beyond 
the individual. 
Chapter 4, which analyses heterogeneity in commuting patterns between 
workers with different levels of education, finds that highly educated workers 
commute further than lower educated, both in terms of time and distance. This is 
often explained by labor market and housing market rigidities that are relatively 
high for higher educated workers. Compared to lower educated workers, higher 
educated workers are also far more likely to commute towards the larger 
agglomerations and the more productive regions, which implies that the 
productive advantages offered by densely populated areas are particularly large 
for higher educated workers. 
Housing market regulations have on the one hand reduced the supply of the 
kind of housing that is in demand by higher income households in some of the 
largest Dutch cities, while on the other hand taxes have resulted in relatively high 
transaction costs of buying a new house (although these costs have been 
considerably reduced in recent years). As higher educated individuals are more 
likely to own rather than rent a house, this affects them relatively strong. On the 
labor market, search frictions are likely to be larger for higher educated workers, 
because they are more specialized. The probability of finding an optimal match 
close to the current residence of a worker is therefore relatively low for a higher 
educated worker.  
Highly educated workers are thus particularly affected by the trade-off 
between accepting a less productive job (if they do not find a good match close to 
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their home location), incurring high costs of buying a house closer to a productive 
job, or commuting longer distances. Due to the externalities associated with using 
the available human capital in a country as productively as is possible, it makes no 
sense from a policy perspective to ceteris paribus discourage commuting. Rather, 
the findings of the Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that substantial externalities (in terms 
of worker productivity) are associated with having housing markets that allow 
workers to live and work at the location where they are the most productive, and 
to reduce commuting costs such that workers are able to work at a location where 
they are relatively more productive while living somewhere else. If commuting is 
not an option, the way to go from a policy perspective is thus to make housing 
markets more flexible: particularly markets for housing that is attractive to high 
skilled workers in the largest and most productive cities. 
This does not mean that all housing market regulation, taxation of 
commuting, or open space preservation policies should be completely abandoned 
– the advantages of these policies to the wellbeing of people could generate 
externalities that are beyond the scope of this dissertation – but rather that is it 
important that the inefficiencies that result from such policies are sufficiently 
taken into consideration. Further research may be needed to identify to what 
extent commuting is associated with more people working in productive jobs. 
 
Unemployment, trade, offshoring and multinationals 
In Chapter 5, we analyze the effects of three different dimensions of globalization 
on unemployment: exporting behavior of firms, working for a foreign owned firm, 
and offshorability of occupations. We find that variation in unemployment 
incidence is largely explained by personal characteristics. For example, females 
have a ceteris paribus almost fifty percent higher probability of getting fired, as 
have foreign workers from advanced countries, while foreign workers from lower 
and middle-income countries are more than twice as likely to be fired. Older 
workers, in contrast, have a lower probability of getting fired. Once unemployed, 
however, it takes a longer time for older workers to find a job again. The 
transition of females back to a job is similar to that of males. Foreign workers do 
not only face a higher risk of becoming unemployed, it takes also longer for them 
to find a new job. Contrary to popular belief, education does not matter much for 
both the risk of getting unemployed and finding a new job. While there is a very 
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strong relation between level of education and wages, this relation is largely 
absent for unemployment. 
Of all firm and job characteristics that were taken into account, only firm size 
has a substantial effect on unemployment. Workers employed at larger firms are 
less likely to become unemployed. Exports, working for a foreign firm, or 
offshorability of jobs are not related to higher unemployment incidence. In fact, 
our results associate offshorability of jobs to less rather than more unemployment. 
The findings thus imply that offshoring is unlikely to have a negative effect on 
unemployment incidence and duration. 
In view of the consensus about the positive long-term effects of increased 
international specialization, even if globalization would have short term negative 
effects for some groups on the labor market, it would make no sense to shelter 
domestic workers from an economic perspective. A far more efficient solution 
would be to redistribute some of the gains from those who benefit from 
globalization to those who lose. However, the findings of both Chapter 2 and 5 
indicate that – even in terms of short-term transition effects – we have little to fear 
from increased international specialization. In fact, given its history as a center of 
international trade and its position as a gateway to Europe, the trend of increased 
internationalization offers the possibility to further specialize in the creation of 
value through orchestrating international value chains. 
From a policy perspective, this means that it is unlikely to be helpful in any 
way to take measures when individual jobs are lost to other countries. If a foreign 
firm downsizes its Dutch activities, this is likely to be part of normal business 
dynamics. Even though this may have negative effects in terms of wages or 
unemployment for those who got fired, many hundreds of thousands of 
individuals find new jobs each year in the Netherlands. As the Netherlands is 
rather successful in attracting and retaining foreign firms (for example, the share 
of employees that works for a foreign owned firm is increasing), it is not unlikely 
that more foreign jobs are lost in other countries and relocated to the Netherlands 
than the other way around. Government intervention aimed at retaining 
employment at these firms is likely to result in rent seeking behavior of firms, and 
misallocation of resources as these help programs reduce the incentive to use 
employees and capital into more productive activities. 
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Rather than protecting jobs, adapting some elements of the Danish flexicurity 
system, which combines a relatively low level of employment protection with 
generous unemployment benefits and active labor market policies, could be an 
option for the Netherlands (De Groot et al., 2006; OECD, 2012). Active labor 
market policies – such as training schemes – could improve the transition to a new 
job of workers who are fired. At the same time, a more flexible labor market will 
speed up the transition towards more productive activities. 
As was noted in the introduction, unemployment is not the outcome of the 
number of jobs that are destroyed, but rather the outcome of labor market 
clearing. One of the most important determinants of (long-term) cross-country 
differences in unemployment is the quality of labor market institutions. Besides 
preventing labor markets from becoming overly rigid, and getting the incentives 
to work right, a useful policy goal should be to prevent school dropouts and 
encourage adolescents to at least achieve higher secondary education (HAVO or 
VWO) or the intermediate levels of tertiary education (MBO4). While having 
more individuals with higher tertiary education – particularly university graduates 
– is likely to generate substantial externalities in terms of productivity, it does not 
matter much for unemployment. 
Minimum wage arrangements and social transfers have a relatively strong 
impact on the incentives to work for the lowest educated workers (particularly 
those with only primary education). There are possibilities to improve these 
incentives somewhat, for example, by arranging social benefits in such a way that 
the decision to work enables individuals to increase their consumption bundle – 
including all benefits in kind – by at least a few hundred euros. However, some 
disincentives are probably unavoidable given the desire to provide minimum 
standards of living to all. In view of that desire, it is the more important to 
encourage individuals to acquire a minimum level of education. 
 
Foreign workers 
Chapter 6 shows that foreign workers who were born in advanced countries are on 
average equally productive as natives, while at the same time they are not equally 
productive in all firms. After controlling for an extensive set of worker 
characteristics, including education and occupation, we find that they are slightly 
less productive in smaller firms and Dutch owned firms, but relatively more 
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productive than natives in large and foreign owned firms. In contrast, foreign 
workers from lower and middle-income countries earn substantially lower wages 
across all firms.  
The finding that there are differences in observed wages between natives and 
similar foreign workers may simply reflect productivity differences due to 
unobserved heterogeneity (in which case they are not that similar after all). 
However, it is also likely that foreign workers are less productive in many 
occupations and firms because of their lack of language skills. In the opposite 
direction, there are theoretical reasons why there might be externalities from 
having a heterogeneous work force to some firms. The finding that foreign 
workers from advanced countries earn somewhat more than natives in large and 
foreign owned firms, while slightly less in small and Dutch owned firms cannot 
be fully accounted for by unobserved worker heterogeneity. It is not clear, 
however, whether foreign workers are relatively more productive in larger and 
foreign firms because of the value of their knowledge and skills for these firms, or 
because it is less of a problem that they (for example) do not speak Dutch. 
If the presence of high skilled foreign workers would result in externalities 
through knowledge spillovers, this could result in higher productivity and wages 
of natives. Indeed, we find rather strong evidence for the existence of a positive 
relation between the share of foreign workers from advanced countries and the 
wages of natives in these firms. This is particularly the case for high skilled 
natives. Even though there could thus be a truth in theories predicting that the 
presence of high skilled foreign workers results in externalities due to the 
available of more heterogeneous knowledge, some of the evidence we found was 
inconsistent with this view. For example, we find that working in an exporting 
firm is in fact more positive for natives than it is for foreign workers from 
advanced countries. Furthermore, we find that a diverse composition of the group 
of foreign workers in firms does not matter for the wages of natives. This is again 
inconsistent with the “value of diversity” hypothesis, as more heterogeneous 
knowledge implies more opportunity for knowledge spillovers. 
 
Future research 
Even though the use of micro data offers unprecedented possibilities to describe 
the dynamics that underlie trends in aggregate wage inequality that were observed 
174    |   Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
 
in Chapter 2, it does not provide a full-fledged explanation for those observed 
trends. Future research can use the findings of the present study to further 
theorize, and ultimately integrate theory and empirical evidence on the 
determinants of wages. A further question of interest is what explains cross-
country differences in (trends in) wage inequality. 
Chapter 3 studies agglomeration economies in relative isolation, albeit 
explicitly taking sorting processes into account. A valuable topic for further 
research is analyzing agglomeration economies, amenities, housing prices, and the 
decisions of individuals about their residence, where they work, and their 
commuting behavior in an integrated manner. This way, agglomeration economies 
(Chapter 3) and commuting behavior (Chapter 4) could be analyzed using an 
integrated framework. In addition to this, more research is needed to the specific 
channels through which agglomeration externalities work. For example, it remains 
unclear whether it is the work location or the residence location of individuals that 
matters. 
Another topic that should be addressed by future research is the importance of 
knowledge spillovers for regional productivity. Such spillovers are not only one of 
the explanations behind the productivity advantages of cities, they also have 
implications for the wages of workers with different characteristics. As regions 
differ substantially in the composition of the work force, it is important to know 
how this composition is related to spillover effects. For example, if lower 
educated workers would benefit from the presence of higher educated workers, 
this would have implications for regional wage inequality.  
Chapter 4 focused mostly on the productivity advantages offered by cities as 
a driving force behind commuting behavior. Amenities could, however, also be an 
important determinant of the location behavior of individuals (De Groot et al., 
2010). Future work can address how trends in the spatial sorting of individuals are 
related to amenities offered by cities. A further topic that is of interest is the effect 
of (costs of) commuting on employment and the productivity level of employees. 
While this dissertation addresses both agglomeration and globalization, more 
research is needed to analyze how these two processes are interrelated. For 
example, the revival of cities during the last decades remains – to a large extent – 
unexplained. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether future advancements in 
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transaction and transportation costs will result in more or rather in less 
agglomeration. 
While Chapter 5 shows that highly educated foreign-born workers from 
advanced countries are more likely to work in the type of firms where highly 
educated natives are relatively productive, it remains possible that this relation is 
mostly the result of something else than the positive externalities from the 
presence of foreign workers. Future research will need to increase our 
understanding about what explains the positive relation between firm level 
productivity and the presence of skilled foreign workers. 
Because of the limited access to micro data in other countries, studies that 
compare countries using comparable micro data – whether it is on inequality, 
commuting behavior, or unemployment – are relatively scarce. At the same time, 
it is precisely this type of data that can help to explain the large differences 
between countries in, for example, trends in wage inequality or commuting 
distance. As the methodology of data collection has been to a large extent 
harmonized within the European Union, the solution to this problem boils down to 
improving accessibility of data.  
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APPENDIX A. NUTS-3 CLASSIFICATION 
 
There are 40 NUTS-3 regions in the Netherlands (known in the Netherlands as 
COROP regions). The borders of NUTS-3 regions respect the borders of 
provinces. Municipalities are never divided into multiple NUTS-3 regions. 
Because the boundaries of a NUTS-3 region only change when two municipalities 
merge that are in different regions, the classification is rather stable over time. 
Even though NUTS-3 regions are not defined as local labor market areas, they are 
a reasonable approximation of local labor markets in most cases. 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
(SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Agglomeratie, globalisering en regionale arbeidsmarkten  
Inzichten op basis van Nederlandse microdata 
 
Deze dissertatie onderzoekt de gevolgen van agglomeratie en globalisering voor 
regionale arbeidsmarkten in Nederland. Ze bestaat uit één algemeen hoofdstuk 
over loonongelijkheid (hoofdstuk 2), twee hoofdstukken die zich richten op 
agglomeratie (hoofdstukken 3 en 4), en twee hoofdstukken waarin aan 
globalisering gerelateerd onderzoek centraal staat (hoofdstukken 5 en 6). 
Binnen de economische literatuur worden agglomeratie en globalisering 
traditioneel geassocieerd met een toename van arbeidsdeling, die resulteert in 
hogere productiviteit – en daarmee uiteindelijk welvaart – voor de gemiddelde 
werknemer. Dichtbevolkte regio’s laten meer specialisatie toe, doordat de omvang 
van relevante afzetmarkten groter is. Globalisering, met de daaraan verbonden 
internationale arbeidsdeling, maakt verdere stijgingen van productiviteit mogelijk 
doordat landen zich in toenemende mate kunnen specialiseren naar hun 
comparatieve kostenvoordelen. Door hun goede verbindingen met de 
buitenwereld lijkt de trend van globalisering het belang van steden op het 
wereldtoneel versterkt te hebben.  
De jaren 2000 tot en met 2008 waar de analyses in dit proefschrift betrekking 
op hebben waren een tijd waarin zich veel veranderingen voordeden. Het 
decennium na 2000 werd gekenmerkt door grote dynamiek op het gebied van 
globalisering en technologische vooruitgang. Zo steeg het aandeel van de BRIC 
landen in de Nederlandse invoer van 5 procent in 2000 naar 13 procent in 2008. 
Tegelijkertijd veroverde de computer onze werkplaatsen, waardoor het gemak 
waarmee gegevens – op een globale schaal – kunnen worden uitgewisseld 
drastisch is toegenomen. Binnen veel professies is de manier waarop gewerkt 
wordt hierdoor aanzienlijk gewijzigd. 
Hoewel maatschappelijke onrust – met name over globalisering – zich in het 
bijzonder toespitst op specifieke subgroepen op de arbeidsmarkt, zoals 
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laagopgeleiden en oudere werknemers, zijn juist deze verdelingseffecten lange tijd 
onderbelicht gebleven doordat de beschikbaarheid van data met een voldoende 
detailniveau zeer beperkt was. De microdata die aan de empirische analyses in dit 
proefschrift ten grondslag liggen stellen ons in staat om een bijdrage te leveren 
aan het bestuderen van dit vraagstuk. 
Het gebruik van microdata met daarin de kenmerken van werknemers en de 
bedrijven waarin zij werkzaam zijn is één van de elementen waarin deze 
dissertatie zich onderscheidt. Traditioneel wordt bij onderzoek naar macro-
economische onderwerpen zoals agglomeratie en globalisering voornamelijk 
gebruik gemaakt van geaggregeerde data, niet in de laatste plaats omdat betere 
data lange tijd niet beschikbaar waren. De laatste decennia is het zwaartepunt in 
zowel de theoretische als de empirische literatuur steeds verder in de richting van 
een micro-economische benadering verschoven. Een belangrijk inzicht dat hieruit 
is voortgekomen, is dat inzichten in heterogeniteit van regio’s, bedrijven, en 
werknemers essentieel zijn om de complexiteit van economische vraagstukken 
adequaat te adresseren (Van Bergeijk e.a., 2011).  
Vanuit beleidsoogpunt zijn ‘one size fits all’ oplossingen eerder uitzondering 
dan regel. Niet alleen kunnen de gevolgen van fenomenen zoals agglomeratie en 
globalisering zeer uiteenlopend zijn voor verschillende bevolkingsgroepen, het 
niet in ogenschouw nemen van heterogeniteit van actoren kan leiden tot inaccurate 
conclusies. Zo laat hoofdstuk 3 in navolging van het werk van Combes e.a. 
(2008a) zien dat de correlatie tussen agglomeratie en geaggregeerde productiviteit 
in belangrijke mate wordt verklaard door verschillen in de samenstelling van de 
lokale beroepsbevolking, en niet uitsluitend door de relatie tussen economische 
dichtheid en productiviteit. 
 
Loonongelijkheid 
De studie start in hoofdstuk 2 met het in kaart brengen van recente trends in 
loonongelijkheid. Hoewel zich gedurende de onderzochte periode (2000–2008) 
een aantal drastische veranderingen voordeden in het economische landschap, 
bleef de geaggregeerde loonongelijkheid in Nederland relatief constant: het 
loonverschil tussen het 90e en het 10e percentiel uit de loondistributie nam toe 
met ongeveer 3 procent over de gehele periode. Tegelijkertijd laat hoofdstuk 2 
echter zien dat deze relatieve stabiliteit op geaggregeerd niveau een aanzienlijke 
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onderliggende dynamiek verbergt voor verschillende groepen werknemers. Zo is 
het belang van opleidingsniveau voor de beloning toegenomen. Lonen van 
hoogopgeleide werknemers zijn relatief snel gestegen, wat ceteris paribus tot een 
toename van ongelijkheid heeft geleid. Het hoofdstuk laat daarmee zien dat er een 
kern van waarheid kan zitten in theorieën die voorspellen dat technologische 
vooruitgang en globalisering relatief voordelig zijn voor hoogopgeleide 
werknemers, maar dat het onwaarschijnlijk is dat deze verschillen in effecten 
groot zijn. 
 
Agglomeratie effecten 
Hoofdstuk 3 verschuift de aandacht van inkomensongelijkheid in zijn 
algemeenheid naar de ruimtelijke dimensie van ongelijkheid. Een belangrijk deel 
van loonverschillen tussen regio’s wordt verklaard door verschillen in 
samenstelling van de beroepsbevolking. Zo werken hoogopgeleiden relatief vaak 
in de grote steden. Hoewel de geografische omvang van Nederland beperkt is, 
blijken er na correctie voor geobserveerde heterogeniteit van werknemers 
substantiële loonverschillen tussen regio’s te bestaan. We vinden dat een 
verdubbeling van het aantal werknemers in een COROP regio samengaat met een 
4,8 procent hogere productiviteit, waarbij reële uurlonen worden gebruikt als 
productiviteitsmaat. Hierbij gebruiken we de bevolkingsdichtheid kort voor het 
begin van de industriële revolutie (1840) als instrument voor de huidige dichtheid. 
Het verdubbelen van het relatieve aandeel van een sector in de lokale economie – 
een maat voor specialisatie – resulteert in een 2,9 procent hogere productiviteit. 
Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat de locatie waar een werknemer werkt van grote 
invloed is op de productiviteit. Wanneer een werknemer met gegeven kenmerken 
van het platteland naar één van de grote steden verhuist is een loonstijging van 
ongeveer 10 procent te verwachten. Vanuit beleidsoogpunt is het dan ook 
belangrijk dat er rekening wordt gehouden met de productiviteitseffecten van 
barrières die verhinderen dat werknemers werken op de plaats waar zij het meest 
productief zijn. 
 
Forensengedrag 
Niet alleen in het locatiegedrag van werknemers zijn aanzienlijke verschillen 
zichtbaar tussen hoger- en lager opgeleide werknemers. Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat 
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opleidingsniveau ook een belangrijke verklarende factor is voor geobserveerd 
forensengedrag. Hoogopgeleide werknemers forensen verder dan hun lager 
opgeleide collega’s, zowel in termen van reisafstand als reistijd. In de literatuur 
wordt dit vaak verklaard door relatief grote zoekfricties voor hoger opgeleiden op 
zowel de woningmarkt als de arbeidsmarkt. Terwijl lager opgeleide werknemers 
relatief ver van hun woonlocatie werken indien ze een relatief hoog loon 
verdienen, zijn de reistijd en reisafstand van hoger opgeleiden relatief hoog (ook 
na correctie voor inkomensverschillen). Ook forensen hoger opgeleide 
werknemers vaker in de richting van grotere steden, en steden die gekenmerkt 
worden door een relatief hoog productiviteitsniveau, wat impliceert dat de 
voordelen van agglomeratie relatief groot zijn voor hoogopgeleiden. Naast 
verschillen in de omvang en richting van forensenstromen, zijn er ook verschillen 
in de gebruikte vervoersmodaliteit. Hoogopgeleiden maken relatief vaker gebruik 
van de trein, en fietsen vaker naar hun werk. 
 
Werkloosheid 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de aandacht verschoven van de regionale dimensie van 
arbeidsdeling naar internationale handel. Met behulp van een unieke dataset is de 
koppeling gelegd tussen werkloosheidsuitkeringen, kenmerken van personen, en 
kenmerken van de laatste baan die werknemers hadden voordat ze werden 
ontslagen, en de baan na werkloosheid (indien die er is). Op basis van deze dataset 
is onderzocht in welke mate een drietal dimensies van globalisering – 
internationale handel, de mate waarin beroepen te offshoren zijn, en het werken 
voor een onderneming in buitenlands eigendom – samenhangen met de kans op 
werkloosheid en de kans op een baan na werkloosheid. 
De belangrijkste verklaringen voor werkloosheid zijn te vinden in 
persoonskenmerken. Zo ligt de ontslagkans van vrouwen ceteris paribus bijna 
vijftig procent hoger ten opzichte van mannen, net als de ontslagkans van 
buitenlandse werknemers die in westerse landen zijn geboren, terwijl buitenlandse 
werknemers uit niet-westerse landen zelfs twee maal zo vaak ontslagen worden 
als in Nederland geboren werknemers. Oudere werknemers hebben daarentegen 
juist een relatief lage kans om ontslagen te worden, maar als ze eenmaal ontslagen 
worden hebben ze een relatief lage kans om een nieuwe baan te vinden. Mannen 
en vrouwen vinden ongeveer even snel een nieuwe baan, terwijl in het buitenland 
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geboren werknemers niet alleen relatief vaak ontslagen worden maar ook minder 
snel een nieuwe baan vinden. In tegenstelling tot de hoogte van lonen, hangt de 
kans op werkloosheid slechts in beperkte mate samen met opleidingsniveau. 
Alleen werknemers met de laagste opleidingsniveaus – in het bijzonder wanneer 
ze de middelbare school niet hebben afgerond – hebben een relatief grote kans op 
werkloosheid. 
Van alle bedrijfs- en baankenmerken die in het onderzoek zijn meegenomen 
heeft alleen de omvang van het bedrijf een (statistisch) significante relatie met de 
kans op werkloosheid. Werknemers die in grote bedrijven werken hebben een 
relatief grote kans om ontslagen te worden. Exportactiviteiten, of een bedrijf al 
dan niet in buitenlands eigendom is, en de mate waarin de baan van een 
werknemer te offshoren is blijken nauwelijks gerelateerd te zijn aan de kans op 
werkloosheid. Offshorability wordt zelfs geassocieerd met relatief lagere 
werkloosheid. Mogelijk is dit te verklaren doordat het job-matching proces 
relatief minder gecompliceerd is voor mensen met beroepen die gemakkelijk te 
outsourcen zijn. Zowel de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 2 als die van hoofdstuk 5 
impliceren dat de negatieve transitie effecten van globalisering relatief beperkt 
van omvang zijn. 
 
Buitenlandse werknemers 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt in welke mate er een verband is tussen de aanwezigheid 
van hoogopgeleide buitenlandse werknemers in bedrijven en productiviteit. 
Buitenlandse werknemers beschikken mogelijk over kennis die hun Nederlandse 
collega’s niet hebben, bijvoorbeeld over buitenlandse afzetmarkten. Het is echter 
ook mogelijk dat de aanwezigheid van buitenlandse werknemers de productiviteit 
(zowel van de buitenlandse werknemers zelf als van hun collega’s) juist verlaagt, 
bijvoorbeeld door verschillen in taal en cultuur. 
Na correctie voor een groot aantal kenmerken van zowel werknemers als 
bedrijven blijkt dat hoogopgeleide buitenlandse werknemers uit westerse landen 
ongeveer even productief zijn als in Nederland geboren werknemers met 
vergelijkbare kenmerken. Tegelijkertijd laat het echter zien dat de productiviteit 
niet in alle bedrijven even groot is: in kleine bedrijven en ondernemingen in 
Nederlands eigendom ligt de productiviteit iets lager, terwijl de productiviteit van 
hoogopgeleide buitenlandse werknemers in grote bedrijven en in bedrijven in 
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buitenlands eigendom juist iets hoger is. In tegenstelling tot werknemers uit 
westerse landen verdienen hoogopgeleide buitenlandse werknemers die geboren 
zijn in niet-westerse landen een relatief laag loon in alle typen bedrijven.  
De aanwezigheid van buitenlandse werknemers in bedrijven blijkt ook van 
belang voor de productiviteit van de andere werknemers in het bedrijf. 
Hoogopgeleiden verdienen een relatief hoog salaris in bedrijven met een hoog 
aandeel van buitenlandse werknemers. Voor lager opgeleide werknemers is er 
nauwelijks een effect. Het is echter niet duidelijk of dit productiviteitsverschil te 
verklaren is door de waarde van de kennis van buitenlandse werknemers. Een deel 
van de bevindingen is daarmee namelijk inconsistent: zo verdienen buitenlandse 
werknemers relatief minder in exporterende ondernemingen (terwijl eventuele 
buitenlandse kennis ook daar van belang zou moeten zijn), en vinden we geen 
effect van diversiteit binnen de in bedrijven aanwezige buitenlandse werknemers 
op de productiviteit, terwijl meer heterogeniteit meer mogelijkheden tot kennis 
spillovers zou moeten bieden. 
 
Besluit 
Dit proefschrift heeft laten zien dat microdata belangrijke inzichten op kunnen 
leveren in de dynamiek die schuil gaat achter cijfers op geaggregeerd niveau. De 
economische wetenschap staat aan het begin van een periode met veelbelovend 
onderzoek, waarin individuele werknemers, bedrijven en regio’s in toenemende 
mate centraal zullen staan. De inzichten die dit oplevert zijn niet alleen van 
wetenschappelijk belang, maar kunnen ook helpen bij het ontwerpen van beleid 
dat toegespitst is op de veelzijdigheid en diversiteit van de economische realiteit.  
 Hoewel de economische waarde van zowel binnenlandse als internationale 
arbeidsdeling al eeuwen lang erkend wordt binnen de economische wetenschap, 
bestaan er nog altijd restricties die het vrije verkeer van personen en het 
internationale handelsverkeer beperken. De resultaten van dit proefschrift vormen 
een toevoeging aan het bewijs dat agglomeratie en globalisering resulteren in een 
hogere productiviteit, zonder noemenswaardige negatieve transitie- en 
herverdelingseffecten te veroorzaken. 
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